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C.C.P. that apply here;             WHEREAS according to the certified statement of the RPMRR, filed by the plaintiff (exhibit 1 of the affidavit of documents signed by Louise Vallière on October 17, 2000), Her Majesty's name does not appear therein;             WHEREAS the plaintiff submitted no claim to the officer responsible for seizure and sale of the delimber and the deadlines laid down in article 614 C.C.P. have expired;             WHEREAS at the hearing counsel for the plaintiff mentioned that the Crown is frequently unaware that she has a claim against a tax debtor at the time proceedings are brought at the initiative of other creditors for a judicial sale of a tax debtor's property;             WHEREAS in the case at bar this allegation is not based on any evidence;             WHEREAS, further, the Crown's ignorance clearly would not as such prevent the application of the general provisions of the C.C.P. on the execution of judgments;             WHEREAS it would have been advisable for Her Majesty to take recovery proceedings against the debtor under the ITA or to register a legal hypothec against the debtor's property;             WHEREAS, unlike the situation considered by the Federal Court in the decision rendered on September 13, 2002, in Les Entreprises Forestières P.S. Inc. and NewCourt Financial Ltd., 2002 FCT 968, now on appeal, there was no seizure by Her Majesty of the debtor's movable property; IN VIEW OF article 612 C.C.P.;             WHEREAS, in the absence of a judgment rendered by a competent court quashing the seizure and sale under judicial authority of the delimber, these legal acts must be considered valid and capable of being set up against the plaintiff and Her Majesty with their full effect; NO REAL RIGHT OR RIGHT OF PURSUIT OVER MOVABLE PROPERTY             WHEREAS subsections 227(4.1) in fine ITA and 86(2.1) in fine EIA apply to cases of judicial sales or other similar cases where the proceeds of realization of property must be shared between creditors;             WHEREAS the beneficial right specified in subsections 227(4.1) ITA or 86(2.1) EIA does not as such confer any real right or right of pursuit over the property; NO PERSONAL ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT             WHEREAS the federal provisions confer no right to a personal remedy against a bona fide purchaser of property subject to the deemed trust, whether the latter is a creditor of the tax debtor or not;             WHEREAS in the absence of clear language in the ITA the Court cannot accept the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the effect of the federal provisions, which in the absence of fraud or collusion amounts to holding secured or unsecured creditors and bona fide third party purchasers severally and personally liable for the non-payment of source deductions, which must be made exclusively by the tax debtor under section 153 ITA;             WHEREAS the Court must interpret the federal provisions consistent with, first, the achieving of predictable results in commercial transactions, and second, the distribution of the exclusive powers assigned to Parliament and the provincial legislatures by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;             WHEREAS if the Court accepted the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the federal provisions, this would be likely to create legal uncertainty that would be harmful to the security of commercial transactions and would also compromise the operation and effectiveness of the provincial provisions in the province of Quebec;             WHEREAS when the federal Parliament decides to allocate liability for payment to a third party other than the tax debtor, it does so expressly, providing that a request for payment shall be sent to the third party, as in the case of section 224 ITA, where inter alia it has conferred a right of seizure in execution on the Minister when the particular conditions mentioned in that provision have been met;             WHEREAS it would have been desirable for the federal Parliament to intervene clearly and to specify the joint liability of persons other than the tax debtor, as indicated inter alia in sections 160 or 227.1 ITA;             WHEREAS Her Majesty has no right of action against a third party unless the latter was in a position in which he could have been held jointly and severally liable in a personal action brought by Her Majesty against the tax debtor; WHEREAS the proceedings for recovery, execution of judgments and judicial sales contained in the C.C.P. apply to all creditors and are intended to ensure predictable results;             WHEREAS the sum of $18,633.44 claimed from the defendant personally is not a tax, interest, penalty, costs or any other amount payable by the defendant personally under section 222 ITA;             WHEREAS the plaintiff has no cause of action under the federal provisions against the defendant and her claim is without basis;             FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:             The plaintiff's action is dismissed; The whole with costs against the plaintiff. ...

And at pages 464- 465: The question before the prothonotary in the case at bar can be considered interlocutory only because the prothonotary decided it in favour of the appellant. ... It seems to me that a decision which can thus be either interlocutory or final depending on how it is decided, even if interlocutory because of the result, must nevertheless be considered vital to the final resolution of the case. ...

Using a very sophisticated formula referred to in the expert report, the electrical energy consumed by "hotel services" can be calculated and from that calculation, the fuel used to create hotel services electrical energy is determined and shown not to be used in the propulsion or the navigation of the vessel. [5]                               Again referring to the expert report, the on-board electrical services and electrical engineering systems that are considered to be "hotel load" and are recognized as such by the marine industry, and in particular by naval architect and marine engineers involved in the design marine vessels, are:    (a)             cooking appliances; (b)             heating accommodation and working spaces; (c)             domestic refrigeration and freezer appliances; (d)             mechanical ventilation systems; (e)             air-conditioning systems in accommodation and working spaces; (f)              supply of sanitary water and sewage treatment appliances; (g)             supply of freshwater including heating. [6]                               The expert also mentioned that the "hotel load" applies to all vessels and not only to those carrying passengers. [7]                               The electrical energy was generated exclusively by the auxiliary generators. ... In Via Rail, supra, the CITT did not make a distinction between the crew-members of Via Rail and the passengers, and as I do not wish to deny the importance of the crew-members on a ship, it would not, nonetheless, be reasonable to conclude that even though the crew-members could stay on a vessel for lengthy period such as two, three or four weeks, all the electricity generated to provide services for them should be considered as "primarily in the operation of the vehicle". [22]                         In my opinion, when reading the relevant section of the law, this conclusion simply cannot be drawn. ...

.; WHEREAS Her Majesty could have taken recovery proceedings against the debtor under the ITA or registered a legal hypothec on the debtor's property; WHEREAS in such a case, within the time allotted for surrender, the plaintiff as hypothecary creditor could have required the defendant to abandon the taking in payment and itself sold the movable property, or had it sold by judicial authority; WHEREAS the defendant was not obliged to liquidate the movable property, but could have taken it in payment;             WHEREAS, unlike the situation considered by the Federal Court in the decision rendered on September 13, 2002, in Les Entreprises Forestières P.S. Inc. and NewCourt Financial Ltd., 2002 FCT 968, now on appeal, there was no seizure by Her Majesty of the debtor's movable property;             WHEREAS, in the absence of a judgment rendered by a competent court quashing the taking in payment, this legal act must be considered valid and capable of being set up against the plaintiff and Her Majesty with their full effect; NO REAL RIGHT OR RIGHT OF PURSUIT OVER MOVABLE PROPERTY             WHEREAS subsections 227(4.1) in fine ITA and 86(2.1) in fine EIA apply to cases of judicial sales or other similar cases where the proceeds of realization of property must be shared between creditors;             WHEREAS in a taking in payment made in good faith in accordance with the legal exercise of a hypothecary remedy involving surrender of property subject to the deemed trust, no money was remitted by the debtor to the creditor; WHEREAS since there was no realization of the property, there are no proceeds resulting from sale of the property as the creditor took the property in payment, being free to keep or sell the said property; WHEREAS the beneficial right set out in subsections 227(4.1) ITA or 86(2.1) EIA does not as such confer any real right or right of pursuit to the property; NO PERSONAL ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT             WHEREAS the federal provisions confer no right to a personal remedy against a bona fide purchaser of property subject to the deemed trust, whether the latter is a creditor of the tax debtor or not;             WHEREAS in the absence of clear language in the ITA the Court cannot accept the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the effect of subsections 227(4.1) ITA and 86(2.1) EIA, which in the absence of fraud or collusion amounts to holding secured or unsecured creditors and bona fide third party purchasers severally and personally liable for the non-payment of source deductions, which must be made exclusively by the tax debtor under section 153 ITA; WHEREAS the plaintiff neither advanced to the defendant the money needed for the sale of the debtor's movable property nor in her action offered to repay the costs incurred by the defendant;             WHEREAS the scheme of movable guarantees set out in the C.C.Q. is designed to ensure certainty in commercial transactions;             WHEREAS the Court must interpret the federal provisions consistent with, first, the achieving of predictable results in commercial transactions, and second, the distribution of the exclusive powers assigned to Parliament and the provincial legislatures by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;             WHEREAS if the Court accepted the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the federal provisions, this would be likely to create legal uncertainty that would be harmful to the security of commercial transactions and would also compromise the operation and effectiveness of the provincial provisions in the province of Quebec;             WHEREAS when the federal Parliament decides to allocate liability for payment to a third party other than the tax debtor, it does so expressly, providing that a request for payment shall be sent to the third party, as in the case of section 224 ITA, where inter alia it has conferred a right of seizure in execution on the Minister when the particular conditions mentioned in that provision have been met;             WHEREAS it would have been desirable for the federal Parliament to intervene clearly and to specify the joint liability of persons other than the tax debtor, as indicated inter alia in sections 160 or 227.1 ITA;             WHEREAS Her Majesty has no right of action against a third party unless the latter was in a position in which he could have been held jointly and severally liable in a personal action brought by Her Majesty against the tax debtor;             WHEREAS the sum of $8,578.50 claimed from the defendant personally is not a tax, interest, penalty, costs or any other amount payable by the defendant personally under section 222 ITA;             WHEREAS the plaintiff has no cause of action under the federal provisions against the defendant and her claim is without basis;             FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:             The plaintiff's action is dismissed; The whole with costs against the plaintiff. ...

The second condition is that both cases, that is the pending case to the Tax Court and the outstanding taxpayer's appeal to the Tax Court, raise the same or substantially the same issues. [13]            The Applicant points out that the issues raised in his Notice of Appeal differ significantly from those considered by the Tax Court and subsequently by the Federal Court of Appeal in Global Communications, supra. ... That issue was not raised in the case before the Tax Court. [14]            The Applicant submits that the issues raised in his Notice of Appeal are different from those considered by the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal. ...

This question was considered by the trial judge as the second issue in the case. [12]      In this regard, Strayer J. ... The trial judge then considered the proper interpretation of the term "acquired" and concluded that original rights could become timber resource properties if, after May 6, 1974, they were acquired in the form of the renewal, extension, or substitution of or for earlier rights. ...

From what is contained in the tape, I cannot accept that because sunglasses can make a "major fashion statement" that one can conclude that "sunglasses" can be considered as "clothing" and this because clothing can also make a "major fashion statement". [24]      It is interesting to note that at no time does Robert Marc, a designer of sunglasses, speak of sunglasses as "clothing". ...                  [5]      The issue in this appeal is the same issue that was before The Canadian International Trade Tribunal on February 20, 1992, that is, "whether sunglasses are exempt from federal sales tax as being "clothing and footwear" within the meaning of section 1, Part XV, Schedule III to the Excise Tax Act and the Clothing and Footwear Determination Regulations ". [6]      Although the evidence is to the effect that sunglasses are a fashion accessory, the evidence does not indicate that because sunglasses can be considered a fashion accessory they would fall under section 2(f) or 2(k), that is, headwear or miscellaneous clothing and accessories such as bathrobes, bathing suits, beach wear, etc. [7]      I think it important to quote Mr. ...

Paragraph 18(1)(m) of the Income Tax Act might well be considered as an "appreciable change". ... On the other hand, defendant's argument that to uphold plaintiff's action to be allowed to continue to deduct royalty payments prohibited by paragraph 18(1)(m) on the basis that this infringes the Tax Convention, unless at the same time the judgment finds that subsection 124(2) cannot be applied to plaintiff, and to allow it to claim the 15 per cent deduction from profits allowed therein, would defeat the purpose of the amendments considered as a whole and the intent of the Act, is considerably weakened by another section of the amended Protocol and by other jurisprudence. ...

Having finally disposed of all matters raised during those two days of hearings, including the two applications for show cause orders and the award of costs in relation to those applications, I now direct that costs be awarded to Her Majesty in relation to all other matters considered on October 23 and November 19, 1996, in a fixed sum $2,500.00, payable by the plaintiff Mary David in any event of the cause. ... It will assist in explanation of my Order for costs if the background is briefly described and if the various motions considered on October 23 and November 19 are reviewed with summary reasons for their disposition.          ...

It should also be noted that the letter of assignment shall be considered to not be in force after the expiry date of the application, after the cancellation date of the application or after the date the applicant named in the application goes out of business.               ... Government of Canada 3, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the role of policy guidelines in the context of the Export and Import Permits Act 4. ...