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The orders that were made in September and December 1996 contained no retroactivity provision of the type contemplated by subsection 60.1(3), which read at that time as follows: For the purposes of this section and section 60, where a decree, order or judgment of a competent tribunal or a written agreement made at any time in a taxation year provides that an amount paid before that time and in the year or the preceding taxation year is to be considered to have been paid and received thereunder, the amount shall be deemed to have been paid thereunder. [12] Whether this was inadvertent or intentional is something on which I shall not speculate. ... Copeland, 16 C.B. 517, 24 L.J.C.P. 169, 139 E.R. 861 (1855) the expression "consent in writing by the author or proprietor" was considered. ...

The text of the operative part of that judgment reads as follows: [TRANSLATION] ORDERS the respondent to pay the applicant, for her children, monthly alimony of $2,750, with the applicant being required to pay the household expenses, including mortgage, heating, tax, electricity and other payments; this amount shall be deposited on the first of each month to the applicant's bank account, no. 208104, at the Caisse d'Économie des Cantons. [15]          The scope of subsection 56(12) of the Act has been considered by the courts on numerous occasions. ... In such a case, the taxpayer is considered for the purposes of subsection 56(12) as having discretion as to the use of those amounts. [18]          Considering the paragraph cited above, in paragraph 14 of these reasons, taken from the judgment of October 30, 1992, and having regard to the above observations, it may be seen that a relationship is established in that paragraph between the obligation imposed on the former spouse to pay the appellant monthly alimony of $2,750 for her children and the appellant's obligation to pay the expenses relating to the family home that are described in that paragraph. ...

I would add that she seems to have had the appellants’ full co-operation. [20] As regards the issue of whether the Minister, in making his determination, considered facts that were wrong or incorrectly assessed the other facts he had before him by failing to take all the relevant circumstances into account, I would note here that it is not sufficient in order to overturn the Minister's determination that the appellants merely disprove some of the facts taken into account by the Minister. ... In my view, the respondent’s version, which is that the appellants worked for longer periods than are indicated on their records of employment (while they were collecting unemployment insurance benefits), is not without merit. [34] If I were to believe the appellants’ version, namely that Renée Gasse, Jovette Gasse and her husband were capable of looking after the business alone during periods when income was higher, I would have to conclude that the appellants’ work was not justified during the periods at issue because the company was able to manage quite well without their services when the business was earning substantial income. [35] These are all relevant factors on which the Minister’s representative relied in concluding, after looking at all the circumstances, [13] that a substantially similar contract of employment would not have been entered into if the parties had been dealing with each other at arm’s length. [36] In light of the foregoing, it is my view that the appellants have not shown on a balance of probabilities that all the facts the Minister considered were wrong or that the Minister incorrectly assessed them in concluding as he did. ...

In the circumstances of this case I have concluded that the most appropriate exercise of my discretion is to vacate the assessments. [37] One of the important differences between these appeals and O'Neill is that Judge Bowman considered the O’Neill decision in context of a trial with full benefit of the available evidence and factual considerations, whereas in this case, a motion, there are only affidavits and cross-examination on affidavits, and from that and a review of the filed materials I conclude not all the relevant evidence was before the Court. [38] The jurisprudence of Att. ... After the litigation process continues in this matter including document discovery, examination for discovery and other pre-trial procedures, the situation may be somewhat clearer and as a matter of evidence or as a Charter issue of alleged solicitor-client privilege breach, if still considered appropriate by counsel, may be brought to the trial judge. ...

He referred to Interpretation Bulletin IT-114 which discussed the various criteria that the Courts have considered in concluding whether or not a particular transaction is an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. [49] It was counsel’s position that when one examines all the facts and the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence given in Court, the conclusion should be that this transaction was clearly not an adventure or concern in the nature of trade, that the taxpayers here merely realized an accretion of capital from an investment. [50] With respect to the question of the penalty the Minister must establish more than a mere failure to use reasonable care. ... In any event they only acted after being advised by Revenue Canada of the omission and that was already too late. [79] On that issue the Court is in agreement with counsel for the Respondent and the Court is satisfied that the reasonableness of the actions of the Appellants must be considered at the time that they filed their returns or at least at any time up to the time Revenue Canada made it clear to them that their returns were being reconsidered. [80] The Court disagrees with counsel for the Appellants that the state of the law is such that every time a bonus or discount is received on a mortgage that the amount is an accretion to capital and not income. [81] The case of Harold Wood, supra, does not stand for that proposition. ...

He stated that, for the purposes of the audit, all the amounts deposited at the bank had been considered as income whereas he had received non-taxable amounts, in particular damages in connection with an accident his wife had had in Virginia. ... The size of the unreported amounts relative to the taxable income reported was also considered. ...

The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer’s training, the taxpayer’s intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ... In Land & Sea Enterprises Ltd. v The Queen, 2011 TCC 101, [2011] TCJ No. 70, at paragraph 14, I stated the following in respect to business activities conducted in the initial start up phase: [14] It is clear that an activity may be considered a commercial activity well in advance of the stage of profitability. ...

The March 12 th 2014 inscrutable statement of account and the March 14 th, 2014 inexplicable return of cheques are constructive acknowledgment by CRA that all taxpayer extension and/or abeyance requests were consented to or, given the general confusion such communications caused, constitute a more equitable start date for the grace period in which to bring an application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal and/or Notice of Objection. [20]         For the reasons which follow, the applications of Thomas for an extension to file a Notice of Appeal for 2011 and a Notice of Objection for 2012 are dismissed. [21]         While the inscrutable and non-descript statement of account dated March 12, 2014 and the unexplained return of cheques dated March 14, 2014 are confusing per se, when logically considered against the specifically referable and addressed communications by CRA, especially the specific response letter of March 11 th, 2014, any such confusion is resolved. [22]         In addition, the letter of Thomas’ accountant dated February 11, 2014 is no  beacon of clarity. ... Respondent’s counsel advised the Court on May 26 th, 2016 that the Minister considered Emmanuel’s request of August 26 th, 2015 to be a request for an adjustment (presumably under sub-section 154(4.1)) and not a loss determination request under sub-section 152(1.1). [32]         The Court, having undertaken a path to learn the Minister’s position regarding the purported loss determination request finds itself no further ahead. ...

Monjazeb indicated he considered himself a full-time employee in technical support. [9]              Three months later, a salesperson left PCS and a position became available in sales, and Mr. ... The traditional factors of control, ownership of equipment, risk of loss, chance of profit and responsibility for investment and management are considered in this analysis. [22]         The difficulty in this case, as I alluded at the outset, is that Mr. ...

The critical issue in this appeal is to determine who, for the purpose of that provision, meets the definition of “eligible individual”. [29]         Prior to the disputed period, it is apparent that the Appellant had the benefit of the presumption set out in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) in that both A and C resided with her and, as the female parent, she was presumed to be the parent who primarily fulfilled the responsibility for their care and upbringing. [30]         However, the presumption noted above is rebuttable in two important instances i) where both parents meet the definition of “shared-custody parents” or where ii) another parent has filed an application claiming to be the primary caregiver (subsection 6301(1)(d) of the Income Tax Regulations (the “ITR”)). [31]         Section 122.6 contains a number of key definitions as follows: “ eligible individual ” in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time; (a) resides with the qualified dependant; (b) is a parent of the qualified dependant who; (i) is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant; or (ii) is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant; (c) is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year;... and for the purposes of this definition; (f) where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant’s female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent; (g) the presumption referred to in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances, and (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing; " shared-custody parent " in respect of a qualified dependent [sic] at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition "eligible individual" does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who; (a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other; (b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis; and (c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors. [32]         Where the court is satisfied that two parents meet the definition of “shared‑custody parents” including the requirement that the children reside with both “on an equal or near equal basis” and that both parents “primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing” of the children when they are residing with them, the CCTB will be shared equally between them, subject to their adjusted income. ... Factors — For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition “eligible individual” in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant: (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides. [33]         Since the Court must determine which parent was the “qualified individual”, it is clear that this case is based almost entirely on the credibility of the Appellant and the father. ...