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I do not believe Respondent has argued in the alternative, but even if it can be considered an alternative argument, it is still not a new basis of assessment. ... Although it is often considered that a new amount is a new basis, (since an assessment is equivalent to the amount of tax liability (Judge Christie in the case of Hagedorn v. ...

There is certainly no allegation of fraud or collusion here but the Respondent argues that a taxpayer's motivation or state of mind is not a prerequisite for a taxpayer to be liable pursuant to paragraph 296(1)(b). [11]     Respondent submitted that subsection 334(2) is specific and unambiguous when it states: A person who is required under this Part to pay or remit an amount shall not be considered as having paid or remitted the amount until it is received by the Receiver General. ... While subsection 334(2) provides that the purchaser of a supply is considered to have not paid the tax, if it is not received by the Receiver General, I do not believe this was intended to be a basis to secure payment of a tax the second time from a taxpayer/purchaser who has already paid. ...

The relevant subsections state: 15(1)     Where at any time in a taxation year a benefit is conferred on a shareholder, or on a person in contemplation of the person becoming a shareholder, by a corporation otherwise than by (a)         the reduction of the paid-up capital, the redemption, cancellation or acquisition by the corporation of shares of its capital stock or on the winding-up, discontinuance or reorganization of its business, or otherwise by way of a transaction to which section 88 applies, (b)         the payment of a dividend or a stock dividend, (c)         conferring, on all owners of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation at that time, a right in respect of each common share, that is identical to every other right conferred at that time in respect of each other such share, to acquire additional shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and, for the purpose of this paragraph, (i)          where (A)        the voting rights attached to a particular class of common shares of the capital stock of a corporation differ from the voting rights attached to another class of common shares of the capital stock of the corporation, and (B)        there are no other differences between the terms and conditions of the classes of shares that could cause the fair market value of a share of the particular class to differ materially from the fair market value of a share of the other class, the shares of the particular class shall be deemed to be property that is identical to the shares of the other class, and (ii)         rights are not considered identical if the cost of acquiring the rights differs, or (d)         an action described in paragraph 84(1)(c.1), (c.2) or (c.3), the amount or value thereof shall, except to the extent that it is deemed by section 84 to be a dividend, be included in computing the income of the shareholder for the year. 15(5)     For the purposes of subsection (1), the value of the benefit to be included in computing a shareholder's income for a taxation year with respect to an automobile made available to the shareholder, or a person related to the shareholder, by a corporation shall (except where an amount is determined under subparagraph 6(1)(e)(i) in respect of the automobile in computing the shareholder's income for the year) be computed on the assumption that subsections 6(1), (1.1), (2) and (7) apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, and as though the references therein to "the employer of the taxpayer", "the taxpayer's employer" and "the employer" were read as "the corporation". [21]     Subsection 15(1) deals with what may be considered to be a distribution to a shareholder of part of the accumulated assets of a corporation. ...

The appellant considered the Property to be inventory. It computed the cost of the Property on reacquisition to be $1,244,296, relying on subsection 79.1(6) of the Act and claimed an "inventory write-down" of $885,296 to $359,000 in respect of the Property pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the Act. [25]          By notice of reassessment the Minister disallowed the deduction on the basis that the Property was a capital property when reacquired by the appellant in 1995. [26]          The parties concede that if the Property was inventory or if the reacquisition and eventual sale in 1999 was a venture in the nature of trade, the appeal should succeed but if the property continued to have the character of capital when so acquired, the appeal should fail. [27]          The appellant's argument proceeded on the basis that there is no rule of law that requires a taxpayer's former capital property to continue to be treated as capital property when subsequently reacquired by the taxpayer in consequence of a default under a loan. [28]          Section 79.1 of the Act, sets out the rules applicable to a creditor who reacquires property in consequence of non-payment of a debt, whether the creditor had held the property as capital or inventory. ... On reacquisition of the asset, at a cost determined in accordance with subsection 79.1(6), the Act does not determine the tax character of the asset. [31]          Appellant's counsel considered it important to the facts at bar that once the appellant disposed of the Property in 1990 and acquired a secured debt evidenced by the Agreement for Sale, that from April 30, 1990 to December 12, 1995, the appellant had no beneficial interest to the Property, except as security for Soni's debt and, on December 12, 1995, the appellant disposed of the debt for the consideration of reacquiring the Property. [3] A taxpayer who acquires or reacquires property on the default of a loan, counsel declared, may do so with the intention of holding the asset as an investment on capital account or as a speculative venture in the nature of trade and, in any event, with the intention completely different from the taxpayer's interest when the property was originally acquired. [32]          Counsel argued that if the appellant was not a trader, it dealt with the Property in the same way a trader would and, therefore, reacquired the Property and disposed of the Property as part of a venture in the nature of trade. ...

I point out that the auditor Careen in his testimony, detailed the various factors which he considered before recommending the imposition of penalty and in addition to those mentioned above, specifically considered the fact that the Appellant is a businessman who has successfully operated a stationery store and a courier service through a corporation since 1988. [19]          In dealing with the imposition of penalties, Strayer J. in Lucien Venne v. ...

Rankin, and the changes in American tax law had a negative and unexpected impact on the business, no evidence was presented to show what profit the taxpayer might have earned had these events not occurred and whether the amount would have been considered substantial when compared to his professional income. ... It is clear that this is not so and it is the net farm income that has to be considered. ...

Pierre-Louis told her that she was interested in signing a contract under which she would be considered a self-employed worker. She did not want employment that was considered to be insurable within the meaning of the Act. ...

It was considered by the Chief Judge- and I think I said this on Tuesday in Dr. ... At that time he asked me to recuse myself, and he asked for an adjournment of his appeal even if I chose not to recuse myself, on the basis that he was no longer being given 30 days' notice of the hearing of his appeals as the Rules provide for, in as much as it was less than 30 days prior to July 10 when he was told that we would begin on July 10. [5]            I considered his motions during the two-hour interval between the two 40-minute sessions that were held on Tuesday, and after careful consideration of my Reasons for Judgment, given about four years ago, and the passage in particular to which Dr. ...

The tax advantage which is received from gifts is not normally considered a " benefit " within this definition, for to do so would render the charitable donations deductions unavailable to many donors. ... I agree with counsel for the respondent that it is much more likely, given the evidence, that the appellant stopped claiming charitable gifts in 1994 because that was the year the Order, which was being investigated, ceased issuing false receipts for an amount much higher than the actual amount of the gift. [37]     The fact that the appellant's income increased significantly in the following years along with the fact that he never again made any substantial gifts, when considered in light of the respondent's extensive evidence demonstrating the existence of the fraudulent scheme devised by the Order and specifically by fathers Joseph El-Kamar and Claude Nadras, with whom the appellant dealt regularly, casts serious doubt on the appellant's philanthropic side. [38]     More than likely, the appellant was seeking only to benefit personally through the alleged gifts to the Order. ...

Justice Ross Goodwin of the Superior Court rendered judgment on the motion to cancel arrears and support brought by the appellant against his former spouse; (d)            by the said judgment, that court confirmed and gave effect to paragraphs 2 and 4 of the agreement signed on August 18, 1998, and formally recognized the parties' understanding set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 5-9 of that agreement; (e)            in paragraph 2 of the agreement, the appellant's former spouse waived all support arrears owing to her by the appellant on August 18, 1998; (f)             according to paragraph 3 of the agreement, all the other clauses of the agreement confirmed by the divorce judgment continued to apply, the parties being of the view that paragraph 9 applied from then on, which meant that support was set at $385 payable every two weeks; (g)            each party was held to be responsible for paying his or her own legal expenses; (h)            to back up his claimed deduction for support payments, the appellant submitted the following supporting documents: ·          a list of cheques for the support payable to his former spouse during the 1998 taxation year; ·          photocopies of cheques payable to his former spouse, which are practically illegible; ·          a photocopy of his bankbook, some of the entries in which are also illegible; (i)             the Minister was able to identify eight payments of $385 each and therefore allowed a total of $3,080 as a deduction for support payments; (j)             during the year at issue, the appellant paid $3,125.43 to the law firm of Garneau, Verdon, Michaud of Québec for professional fees and disbursements in connection with proceedings to have support and arrears cancelled; (k)            the $3,125.43 in legal expenses incurred by the appellant for the 1998 taxation year were not so incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a property or business but are considered personal or living expenses. [4]            The appellant had initially been ordered to make support payments to his former spouse by a judgment rendered by the Honourable Mr. ... He went on as follows: 46             Not only is support not income from property within the usual meaning of that term, but it also cannot be considered as such given the overall context in which the term income from property is used in the Act. ...