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For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant:   (a)        the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant;   (b)        the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides;   (c)        the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant;   (d)        the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant;   (e)        the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person;   (f)        the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis;   (g)        the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and   (h)        the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides ...   [35]     As formally worded, the applicable legislative provision is the following: "eligible individual" in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time (a) resides with the qualified dependant, (b) is the parent of the qualified dependant who primarily fulfills the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant, (c) is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year, (d) is not described in paragraph 149(1)(a) or 149(1)(b), and (e) is, or whose cohabiting spouse or common-law partner is, a Canadian citizen or a person who (i) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (ii) is a temporary resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, who was resident in Canada throughout the 18 month period preceding that time, or (iii) is a protected person within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (iv) was determined before that time to be a member of a class defined in the Humanitarian Designated Classes Regulations made under the Immigration Act, and for the purposes of this definition, (f) where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant’s female parent, the parent who primarily fulfills the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent, (g) the presumption referred to in paragraph 122.6 eligible individual (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances, and (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing;   [36]     In the instant case, this Court reiterates that the conduct of both parents is beyond reproach, given all the constraints facing them in their respective settings as well as their professional obligations—and taking for granted that perfection in this regard does not exist ...

  [3]      In 2005, 75% of Florexpert's workers were considered employees, and 25% of them were considered independent contractors. ...

To that effect, subsection 248(1) of the Act provides for the following definition for the words “common-law partner”:   "common-law partner", with respect to a taxpayer at any time, means a person who cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer and   (a) has so cohabited with the taxpayer for a continuous period of at least one year, or   (b) would be the parent of a child of whom the taxpayer is a parent, if this Act were read without reference to paragraphs 252(1)(c) and (e) and subparagraph 252(2)(a)(iii),   and for the purposes of this definition, where at any time the taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they are, at any particular time after that time, deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were not cohabiting at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a breakdown of their conjugal relationship; [6]   [18]     T he “cohabiting spouse or common-law partner” is defined for matter pertaining to the equivalent-to-spouse credit, the GSTC and the CCTB under section 122.6 of the Act as follows:   "cohabiting spouse or common-law partner" of an individual at any time means the person who at that time is the individual’s spouse or common-law partner and who is not at that time living separate and apart from the individual and, for the purpose of this definition, a person shall not be considered to be living separate and apart from an individual at any time unless they were living separate and apart at that time, because of a breakdown of their marriage or common-law partnership, for a period of at least 90 days that includes that time; [7]   [19]     T he notion of “cohabiting in a conjugal relationship” is not specifically defined in the Act. ... H, [10]   the Supreme Court of Canada stated:   Obviously the weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining whether an opposite‑sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost infinitely. ...

. … 152(1.2)      Paragraphs 56(1)(l) and 60(o), this Division and Division J, as they relate to an assessment or a reassessment and to assessing or reassessing tax, apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to a determination or redetermination of an amount under this Division or an amount deemed under section 122.61 or 126.1 to be an overpayment on account of a taxpayer’s liability under this Part, except that …[the exceptions are not relevant] 160.1 (1)      Where at any time the Minister determines that an amount has been refunded to a taxpayer for a taxation year in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act, the following rules apply: (a)            the excess shall be deemed to be an amount that became payable by the taxpayer on the day on which the amount was refunded; and (b)            the taxpayer shall pay to the Receiver General interest at the prescribed rate on the excess (other than any portion thereof that can reasonably be considered to arise as a consequence of the operation of section 122.5 or 122.61) from the day it became payable to the date of payment. … 160.1(3)      The Minister may at any time assess a taxpayer in respect of any amount payable by the taxpayer because of subsection 160.1(1) or 160.1(1.1) or for which the taxpayer is liable because of subsection 160.1(2.1) or 160.1(2.2), and this Division applies, with such modifications as the circumstances require, in respect of an assessment made under this section as though it were made under section 152. ... The Minister of National Revenue has considered the reasons set out in your objection and all the relevant facts. ...

If the answer is yes the application of paragraph 18(1)(b) must be considered. ... Similarly, if 930 had been in a position to satisfy the Order of the Employment Standards Officer, as later negotiated down to $252,297, and had it done so, that payment would have satisfied the joint requirements of section 9 and paragraph 18(1)(a), In either of these events the amount would properly have been considered to be compensation paid by 930 for the labour of the workers employed by it in the production process, and so would have been deductible in the computation of profit ...

  [15]     Sections 118.3 and 118.4 of the Income Tax Act read as follows:     118.3. (1) Where   (a) an individual has a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment,   (a.1) the effects of the impairment are such that the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted or would be markedly restricted but for therapy that   (i) is essential to sustain a vital function of the individual,   (ii) is required to be administered at least three times each week for a total duration averaging not less than 14 hours a week, and   (iii) cannot reasonably be expected to be of significant benefit to persons who are not so impaired,   (a.2) in the case of   (i) a sight impairment, a medical doctor or an optometrist,   (i.1) a speech impairment, a medical doctor or a speech-language pathologist,   (ii) a hearing impairment, a medical doctor or an audiologist,   (iii) an impairment with respect to an individual's ability in feeding or dressing themself, or in walking, a medical doctor or an occupational therapist,   (iv) an impairment with respect to an individual's ability in perceiving, thinking and remembering, a medical doctor or a psychologist, and   (v) an impairment not referred to in any of subparagraphs (i) to (iv), a medical doctor   has certified in prescribed form that the impairment is a severe and prolonged mental or physical impairment the effects of which are such that the individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted or would be markedly restricted but for therapy referred to in paragraph (a.1),   (b) the individual has filed for a taxation year with the Minister the certificate described in paragraph 118.3(1)(a.2), and   (c) no amount in respect of remuneration for an attendant or care in a nursing home, in respect of the individual, is included in calculating a deduction under section 118.2 (otherwise than because of paragraph 118.2(2)(b.1)) for the year by the individual or by any other person,   there may be deducted in computing the individual's tax payable under this Part for the year the amount determined by the formula  ...   118.4. (1) For the purposes of subsection 6(16), sections 118.2 and 118.3 and this subsection,   (a) an impairment is prolonged where it has lasted, or can reasonably be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months;   (b) an individual's ability to perform a basic activity of daily living is markedly restricted only where all or substantially all of the time, even with therapy and the use of appropriate devices and medication, the individual is blind or is unable (or requires an inordinate amount of time) to perform a basic activity of daily living;   (c) a basic activity of daily living in relation to an individual means   (i) perceiving, thinking and remembering,   (ii) feeding oneself or dressing oneself,   (iii) speaking so as to be understood, in a quiet setting, by another person familiar with the individual,   (iv) hearing so as to understand, in a quiet setting, another person familiar with the individual,   (v) eliminating (bowel or bladder functions), or   (vi) walking;   (d) for greater certainty, no other activity, including working, housekeeping or a social or recreational activity, shall be considered as a basic activity of daily living; and   (e) feeding oneself does not include   (i) any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring food, or   (ii) the activity of preparing food to the extent that the time associated with the activity would not have been necessary in the absence of a dietary restriction or regime; and   (f) dressing oneself does not include any of the activities of identifying, finding, shopping for or otherwise procuring clothing ... The activity of feeding oneself includes meal preparation.   17       When it comes to the activity of feeding oneself, it is not just the act of putting food in one's mouth that must be considered. ...

(c)     If not, can the amount received by the appellant upon the sale of her shares be considered a deemed dividend within the meaning of subsection 84(3) of the Act?     ... B) Must the amount that she received upon the sale of her shares be considered a deemed dividend within the meaning of subsection 84(3) of the Act?   ...

The arbitration board had decided that only an amount of $36,000 was to be considered income within the meaning of the Employment Insurance Act (Exhibit I-4). ... Judge Miller considered that, although they were called interest, they were not of the same nature of interest within the meaning of paragraph 12(1)(c) of the Act but they were of the same nature as the tort damages granted to the taxpayer. ...

[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION] REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Tardif J. [1]      This is the appeal from the confirmation of notices of determination respecting the Canada Child Tax Benefit made by the Minister of National Revenue (the "Minister") on February 18, 2005, in respect of the 2001, 2002 and 2003 base years, and respecting the goods and services tax credit for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years. [2]      The Minister determined that the Appellant was not the eligible individual in respect of her children, Vincent and Marise, for the period from July 2002 to January 2005 inclusive. [3]      After issuing the notices of redetermination of the Canada Child Tax Benefit in respect of the Appellant for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 base years on February 18, 2005, the Minister determined that the overpayments had totalled $13,303: (a) 2001 base year $4,910.00 (b) 2002 base year $5,287.00 (c) 2003 base year      (July 2004 to January 2005 inclusive)    $3,106.00 $13,303.00 [4]      In notices of redetermination of the goods and services tax credit ("GSTC") made on January 28, 2005, for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years, the Minister revised the annual benefit for the goods and services tax at $295.40, $330 and $342 respectively. [5]      Upon issuing the notices of redetermination of the GST credit for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years in respect of the Appellant on January 28, 2005, the Minister determined that the overpayments had totalled $941.10: (a) 2001 $354.60 (b) 2002 $330.00 (c) 2003 (July and October 2004, January 2005) $256.50 $941.10 [6]      On August 29, 2005, the Minister confirmed the notices of redetermination of Canada Child Tax Benefit made on February 18, 2005, for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 base years, and the notices of redetermination of GSTC made on January 28, 2005, for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years. [7]      In issuing the notices of redetermination in issue, the Minister assumed the same facts: [TRANSLATION] (a)         before the period in issue, the Appellant was always considered as the parent who was primarily responsible for the care and upbringing of her children; (b)         in November 2004, the father, Robert Gagné, filed a Child Tax Benefit claim stating that his two children, Vincent and Marise, had been living with him since September 2001; (c)         on the form referred to in the previous paragraph, the Appellant had stated, as former beneficiary, that the children Vincent and Marise had no longer been her dependents since September 2001; (d)         before taking any corrective action, the Minister telephoned the Appellant for confirmation that the two children had no longer been living with her since September 2001; (e)         thus, in early 2005, the Minister made the required adjustments against the Appellant in respect of the Canada Child Tax Benefit and goods and services tax credit (GSTC) for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 base years and taxation years; (f)          the Appellant had attached to her notice of objection a Superior Court judgment dated September 13, 2001, in which the Honourable Justice Ginette Piché approved an agreement signed by the two parties, who established, among other things, the following measures: (i)       custody of the minor children was assigned to Robert Gagné; (ii)      the Appellant's access to the children was defined; (iii)     the beneficiary of the family allowance benefits would remain the Appellant. [8]      The issue is whether the Minister correctly concluded that the Appellant was no longer the eligible individual in respect of her children, Vincent and Marise, for the period from July 2002 to January 2005 inclusive, for the purposes of the Canada Child Tax Benefit for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 base years, and for the GSTC for the 2001, 2002 and 2003 taxation years. [9]      The Appellant stated at the hearing that she and her former spouse had always complied to the letter with the agreement that the parties had signed and that had been confirmed by a Superior Court judgment rendered by the Honourable Justice Ginette Piché of the Superior Court on September 13, 2001 (Exhibit I-1). ... All things considered, residence implies a certain constancy, a certain regularity or else a certain permanence according to a person's usual lifestyle in relation to a given place and is to be distinguished from what might be called visits or stays for specific purposes or of a sporadic nature. ...

The assessment was based on these costs paid by the corporation, plus an amount of $28,452, which represented a 9% rate of return on $316,135, which was considered to be the corporation's investment in the residence. ... The employer is responsible for reasonably estimating the amount of such a benefit, which would normally be considered to be the fair market rent for equivalent accommodation had the employee rented from a third party, less any rent paid... ...