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The plaintiff sought to establish that from the mid-1960s up until and including valuation day, the father no longer considered the 1950 agreement to be valid. ... They therefore also contribute to the submission that the father considered the agreement to be void at the time of valuation day. ... In essence the plaintiff is submitting that, while the father may have later confirmed the validity of the 1950 agreement, at the material time, December 31, 1971, it is submitted that the father considered the agreement to be void. ...

The purpose of this line of evidence was, I presume, to illustrate that the piece of useless scrap representing the customer's engine, which came into the plaintiff's facility for overhauling, could not be considered to be the same engine which was returned after being overhauled or, as the plaintiff's witnesses put it, after being remanufactured. ... Strayer, J. found that while the activity constituted manufacturing or processing, which the overhauling of airplane engines must also be considered to be, he also found that the manufacturing or processing was not with respect to goods for sale or lease. ... However even this apparent similarity is not really comparable for in the case being considered by Urie, J.A. the billing of materials are for those provided in accordance with the customer's specifications while in the present case the billing of materials is simply an itemization of the materials which the taxpayer has decided are necessary in order to complete its contract for overhauling the engine. ...

  [2]                The Tax Court of Canada (TCC) judge who considered the issue found that fishing licences were not property (within the meaning of the ITA) that the respondent could dispose of and “that the amount received thus [could not] give rise to a capital gain that must be included in his taxable income for the 2001 taxation year” (Reasons for Judgment at paragraph 1: 2010 TCC 10, January 7, 2010, Justice Lamarre) ... In my opinion, giving up one’s right to operate a business, and thus a right to income, by agreeing to sign a non‑competition agreement may be considered analogous to giving up the right to apply for a fishing licence and thereby giving up any profit à prendre from that licence. ... She considered whether the respondent’s abandonment of his fishing licences constituted a disposition of property- a condition precedent to realizing a capital gain. ...

,or   (v) the use in Canada, in relation to activities engaged in by the person, of a motor vehicle,   (b) an amount in respect of the allowance is deductible in computing the income of the person for a taxation year of the person for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, or would have been so deductible if the person were a taxpayer under that Act and the activity were a business,   (c) in the case of an allowance to which subparagraph 6(1)(b)(v), (vi), (vii) or (vii.1) of that Act would apply   (i) if the allowance were a reasonable allowance for the purposes of that subparagraph, and   (ii) where the person is a partnership and the allowance is paid to a member of the partnership, if the member were an employee of the partnership, or, where the person is a charity or a public institution and the allowance is paid to a volunteer, if the volunteer were an employee of the charity or institution,   the person considered, at the time the allowance was paid, that the allowance would be a reasonable allowance for those purposes and it is reasonable for the person to have considered, at that time, that the allowance would be a reasonable allowance for those purposes,   the following rules apply:   (d) the person is deemed to have received a supply of the property or service,   (e) any consumption or use of the property or service by the employee, member or volunteer is deemed to be consumption or use by the person and not by the employee, member or volunteer, and   (f) the person is deemed to have paid, at the time the allowance is paid, tax in respect of the supply equal to the amount determined by the formula A × (B/C) where   A is the amount of the allowance,   B is (i) the total of the rate set out in subsection 165(1) and the tax rate for a participating province if   (A)     all or substantially all of the supplies for which the allowance is paid were made in participating provinces, or   (B)      the allowance is paid for the use of the motor vehicle in participating provinces, and   ii) in any other case, the rate set out in subsection 165(1), and   C is the total of 100% and the percentage determined for B.   ...        [12]         The Midland Hutterian Brethren decision was not considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in ExxonMobil. ...   [15]         Although not relying on the Midland Hutterian Brethren decision, counsel for the Respondent argued that whether applying the “functional connection” test or the ExxonMobil test, the outcome would be the same: the purely discretionary nature of the Yukon Flights rendered their supply “too remote” from the Appellant’s activities to be considered anything other than for its employees’ “exclusive” personal use. ...

The appellant submitted that case law has established that the exercise of effective control by a group, whether or not they have legal control, is a question of fact which must be considered in determining which group controlled the corporations for purposes of paragraph 39(4)(b) of the Act. ... Referring to Yardley Plastics of Canada Limited v MNR, [1966] CTC 215; 66 DTC 5183, Mr Justice Addy at 222 and 6211 respectively stated: It appears clear in this latter case that the question is first and foremost one of fact and that it is indeed de facto control that must be considered. ... In that case Mr Justice Noel statd at 233 and 5188 respectively: The appellant’s second submission is that under section 39(4)(b) for the purposes of association, where corporations are controlled by the same group of persons, this group must have the right to effectively control the corporations and if it does not then it cannot be considered as the group contemplated in the section. ...

The decision of the Tax Court [8]                The Tax Court began its analysis, at paragraph 16, by noting that the principal focus on the motion was the correct interpretation of paragraph 242(1)(b) of the Ontario BCA and what the Court characterized to be the conflicting lines of authority that have considered this provision. ... No. 805, 92 DTC 6534(F.C.T.D.) (‘354 Ontario). [10]            In ‘354 Ontario, Associate Chief Justice Jerome considered the then relevant legislative provision which was substantially similar to what is now subsection 242(1) of the Ontario BCA. ... There is no provision that deems the matter to be an action or proceeding. [31]            When this legislative regime is considered, in my respectful view, it is no longer correct to say that the filing of a notice of appeal in the Tax Court does not constitute the initiation of a legal proceeding. ...

Since the risk that the Forward Contracts were intended to hedge no longer existed, the Contracts ceased to be hedges and the profit on the closeout of the Contracts could not be considered to relate to the income generated from the business of producing and processing gold from the Doyon Mine. [27]         In support of its position that the Forward Contracts ceased to be hedges prior to being closed out, the Respondent relies on the expert accounting evidence given at the hearing by Ms. ... O’Malley also stated that, according to GAAP, where a hedging relationship ceases to exist, the profit is considered to be attributable to speculative activity. The Respondent maintains, therefore, that the profits earned on the Forward Contracts was income from speculative activities and, as such income is not within the scope of gross resource profits, it cannot be taken into account in computing the resource allowance. [31]         The Respondent’s final argument is that, as stand-alone transactions, the Forward Contracts cannot be considered to be related to the Appellant’s production and processing of gold from the Doyon Mine. ...

(h)     prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing;   [7]              Paragraph (b) of section 122.6 was replaced by S.C. 2010, c. 25, subsection 24(2) applicable to overpayments that are deemed to arise after June 2011. ...   [8]              The prescribed factors referred to in paragraph (h), to be considered in determining which parent meets the qualification in paragraph (b) are set out in Regulation 6302 as follows:   For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition "eligible individual" in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant:   (a)     the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b)     the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c)     the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d)    the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e)     the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f)     the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g)     the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h)     the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides ...   [31]         Considering the evidence submitted by both parties and the factors to be considered under Regulation 6302, I came to the conclusion that the appellant never gave up her responsibility as the primary caregiver to her son even when he lived under his father’s roof on a part-time basis ...

  [39]          Generally considered, this factor pointed more to an employer/employee relationship than to an independent contractor relationship.   ...   [46]          Considered as a whole, this factor appears to me to be neutral.   ... The Appellant argued in her pleadings that the integration factor shall be considered from the point of view of the worker and not from the point of view of the employer. ...

There was nothing in the Appellant's questioning of the assessment to show that he even considered that he had filed an objection. ... That is merely an allegation in the Notice of Appeal and it does not make it a fact, neither can it be considered as proof to the contrary of the statements made under subsection 244(10) of the Respondent's Affidavit upon which the Respondent is entitled to rely as evidence of the statements contained therein. ... The fact that the Appellant continued to carry on these discussions was not evidence that he had considered that he had filed a Notice of Objection, that the Minister had considered that he had filed a Notice of Objection or that he had filed a Notice of Objection. ...