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As noted in Royal Winnipeg Ballet at para. 64, the relevant factors must be considered "in the light of" the parties' intent. ... Chow's evidence, it became clear that the appellant considered the contract of little importance. ...

She even said that she considered the appellant to be her father and that she had never seen him take or sell drugs. ... The Queen, 2005 TCC 330, Justice Archambault once more considered the Quebec evidence law applicable to an extrajudicial admission, and nowhere in his decision did he discuss the requirement, to allege the extrajudicial admission in the pleadings. ...

I am in substantial agreement with counsel for the plaintiff that the expression "highway truck tractor" in this context, i.e. s-s.1(f) of that Schedule, is used simply to clarify the scope of the phrase "internal combustion tractor" and it provides no guidance to the Court in terms of determining the scope of "trucks" in s.7 of Schedule I. [19]      While the Customs Tariff and the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System use the term "road tractors for semi-trailers", describing a class of commodity, that does not address, let alone establish, whether these sorts of vehicles are to be considered a subset of "trucks" under the Excise Tax Act. ... The defendant notes that Parliament was so specific in s.7 that it names station wagons, vehicles that otherwise would have been considered "automobiles". ...

In these representations, the Plaintiff proposed that the benefit assessed to the Plaintiff should be considered to be a shareholder debt under s. 15(2) of the Act rather than a benefit under s. 15(1). He also submitted that the Plaintiff's shareholder credit balance in Gold Seal should be taken into account and the personal withdrawals made by the Plaintiff from Gold Seal should be considered to be repayment of Gold Seal's debt to the Plaintiff.                                                                       ... 8.              ...

THE TRAVERS CASE [21]       Section 45(1) of the National Defence Act and the terms of reference of a board of inquiry convened thereunder were considered by Joyal J. in Travers v. ... This direction is to ensure that as much information as is appropriate and reasonable is publicly available and disclosed. [40]            Unlike the version of section 28 of the Federal Courts Act which the Supreme Court considered in [1979] 1 S.C.R. 495 "> Coopers and Lybrand, supra, the Federal Court, under section 18 of the Act, has jurisdiction to give the CBC a right of attendance before the Board of Inquiry even though it is not carrying out a judicial function. [41]            In rejecting the CBC's request, Commodore Murphy stated that he struck a balance by using a number of mechanisms including the posting of information on a National Defence website, interviews with the press, and press releases. ...

It clearly considered this evidence submitted by the applicant, correctly indicated that it was not bound by that decision and then gave its reasons for not using the same reasoning, inter alia that the standard of proof applied by the Board of referees was that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the employer had not presented any evidence to the Board. ... Since there is evidence to support its finding, the Board did not make a reviewable error. [35]      The applicant's other argument was that the Board did not really conclude that she had in fact noted a falsification in this file, only that she could have done so. [7] In the applicant's submission, therefore, the Board could not conclude from this possibility that the employer had established on a balance of probabilities she was aware of her spouse's activities and his misconduct. [36]      Clearly, the decision has to be considered as a whole. ...

Marshall also considered the office layout. In concluding that the Applicant made the phone calls, he took into consideration that there would have been a high number of individuals in close proximity to the Applicant's workstation, and if another person had made the calls, he or she would have been noticed by other staff members. [11]            On or about November 9, 1995, the Applicant learned that he was to receive a twenty day suspension for reasons set out in the letter of suspension from Mr. ... Canada (Attorney General) [1998], 161 F.T.R. 82, Justice Muldoon of this Court considered the appropriate standard of review applicable to the decision of an adjudicator appointed pursuant to section 93 of the PSSRA. ...

While the courts have not interpreted the term "recourse" in the context of an analogous statutory framework, the word "redress" has been considered. ... (p. 725) [34]      Having considered these arguments, I find that the applicant's failure to meet the preconditions enumerated in Apotex in this instance, is arguable rather than conclusive. ...

.;             WHEREAS it was not alleged or proven that the plaintiff would have intervened with the trustee or the Superior Court to assert her prior claim and her beneficial ownership of the debtor's movable property or to ask that the latter be sold by judicial authority by the defendant;             WHEREAS the defendant was not required to liquidate the movable property but could have taken it in payment;             WHEREAS in accordance with the BIA provisions, a release was given by the trustee, and the taking in payment of the debtor's movable property was authorized under the provisions of the C.C.Q. and C.C.P. by the Superior Court, without any intervention or objection by the plaintiff;             WHEREAS it would have been possible for Her Majesty to take recovery proceedings against the debtor under the ITA or to register a legal hypothec against the debtor's property;             WHEREAS unlike the situation considered by the Federal Court in the decision rendered on September 13, 2002, in Les Entreprises Forestières P.S. Inc. and NewCourt Financial Ltd., 2002 FCT 968, now on appeal, there was no seizure by Her Majesty of the debtor's movable property;             WHEREAS according to the certificate issued by the deputy registrar of the Superior Court on December 13, 1999, the deadlines for appealing the judgment rendered on November 11, 1999, have expired and no appeal has been filed, no application in nullity entered and no motion in revocation made against that judgment;             WHEREAS in the absence of a judgment rendered by a competent court quashing the taking in payment, this legal act must be considered valid and capable of being set up against the plaintiff and Her Majesty with full effect; NO REAL RIGHT OR RIGHT OF PURSUIT OVER MOVABLE PROPERTY             WHEREAS subsections 227(4.1) in fine ITA and 86(2.1) in fine EIA apply to cases of judicial sales or other similar cases where the proceeds of realization of property must be shared between creditors;             WHEREAS in a taking in payment made in good faith in accordance with the legal exercise of a hypothecary remedy involving surrender of property subject to the deemed trust, no money was remitted by the debtor to the creditor;             WHEREAS since there was no realization of the property, there are no proceeds resulting from sale of the property as the creditor took the property in payment, being free to keep or sell the said property;             WHEREAS the beneficial ownership mentioned in subsections 227(4.1) ITA or 86(2.1) EIA does not as such confer any real right or right of pursuit over the property; NO PERSONAL ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT             WHEREAS the federal provisions confer no right to a personal remedy against a bona fide purchaser of property subject to the deemed trust, whether the latter is a creditor of the tax debtor or not;             WHEREAS in the absence of clear language in the ITA the Court cannot accept the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the effect of subsections 227(4) ITA and 86(2.1) EIA, which in the absence of fraud or collusion amounts to holding secured or unsecured creditors and bona fide third party purchasers severally and personally liable for the non-payment of source deductions, which must be made exclusively by the tax debtor under section 153 ITA;             WHEREAS the plaintiff neither advanced to the defendant the money needed for the sale of the debtor's movable property nor in her action offered to repay the costs incurred by the defendant;             WHEREAS the scheme of movable guarantees set out in the C.C.Q. is designed to ensure certainty in commercial transactions;             WHEREAS the Court must interpret the federal provisions consistent with, first, the achieving of predictable results in commercial transactions, and second, the distribution of the exclusive powers assigned to Parliament and the provincial legislatures by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;             WHEREAS if the Court accepted the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the federal provisions, this would be likely to create legal uncertainty that would be harmful to the security of commercial transactions and would also compromise the operation and effectiveness of the provincial provisions in the province of Quebec;             WHEREAS when the federal Parliament decides to allocate liability for payment to a third party other than the tax debtor, it does so expressly, providing that a request for payment shall be sent to the third party, as in the case of section 224 ITA, where inter alia it has conferred a right of seizure in execution on the Minister when the particular conditions mentioned in that provision have been met;             WHEREAS it would have been desirable for the federal Parliament to intervene clearly and to specify the joint liability of persons other than the tax debtor, as indicated inter alia in sections 160 or 227.1 ITA;             WHEREAS Her Majesty has no right of action against a third party unless the latter was in a position in which he could have been held jointly and severally liable in a personal action brought by Her Majesty against the tax debtor;             WHEREAS despite the reference made to section 159 ITA by the plaintiff's representative in its letter of notification, there is no evidence in the record on which this Court could conclude that the defendant could at any point be the debtor's legal representative;             WHEREAS accordingly the defendant clearly cannot be held personally and severally liable with the debtor under section 159 ITA to repay the source deductions withheld by the latter to Her Majesty;             WHEREAS the sum of $9,249.31 claimed from the defendant personally is not a tax, interest, penalty, costs or any other amount payable by the defendant personally under section 222 ITA;             WHEREAS the plaintiff has no cause of action under the federal provisions against the defendant and her claim is without basis;             FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:             The plaintiff's action is dismissed; The whole with costs against the plaintiff. ...

.;             WHEREAS the plaintiff filed in this Court a certified statement from the RPMRR dated February 3, 1999, (exhibit 1 of the affidavit of documents dated October 18, 2000, signed by Henri Bégin);             WHEREAS the said statement clearly indicates that prior notice of the exercise of a hypothecary right was registered by the defendant in the RPMRR on October 10, 1998;             WHEREAS according to the certified statement from the RPMRR dated February 3, 1999, Her Majesty's name does not appear therein;             WHEREAS the plaintiff submitted no claim to the person designated and the deadlines laid down in articles 910.2 and 910.3 C.C.P. have expired;             WHEREAS at the hearing counsel for the plaintiff mentioned that the Crown is frequently unaware that she has a claim against a tax debtor at the time proceedings are brought at the initiative of other creditors for a judicial sale of a tax debtor's property;             WHEREAS in the case at bar this allegation is not based on any evidence;             WHEREAS, further, the Crown's ignorance clearly would not as such prevent the application of the general provisions of the C.C.Q. and C.C.P. on the exercise of hypothecary remedies and judicial sales;             WHEREAS it would have been advisable for Her Majesty to take recovery proceedings against the debtor under the ITA or to register a legal hypothec against the debtor's property;             WHEREAS, unlike the situation considered by the Federal Court in the decision rendered on September 13, 2002, in Les Entreprises Forestières P.S. Inc. and NewCourt Financial Ltd., 2002 FCT 968, now on appeal, there was no seizure by Her Majesty of the debtor's movable property;             WHEREAS, in the absence of a judgment rendered by a competent court quashing the sale under judicial authority and scheme of collocation prepared by the notary, these legal acts must be considered valid and capable of being set up against the plaintiff and Her Majesty with their full effect; NO REAL RIGHT OR RIGHT OF PURSUIT OVER MOVABLE PROPERTY             WHEREAS subsections 227(4.1) in fine ITA and 86(2.1) in fine EIA apply to cases of judicial sales or other similar cases where the proceeds of realization of property must be shared between creditors;             WHEREAS the beneficial right specified in subsections 227(4.1) ITA or 86(2.1) EIA does not as such confer any real right or right of pursuit over the property; NO PERSONAL ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT             WHEREAS the federal provisions confer no right to a personal remedy against a bona fide purchaser of property subject to the deemed trust, whether the latter is a creditor of the tax debtor or not;             WHEREAS in the absence of clear language in the ITA the Court cannot accept the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the effect of the federal provisions, which in the absence of fraud or collusion amounts to holding secured or unsecured creditors and bona fide third party purchasers severally and personally liable for the non-payment of source deductions, which must be made exclusively by the tax debtor under section 153 ITA;             WHEREAS the scheme of movable guarantees set out in the C.C.Q. is designed to ensure certainty in commercial transactions;             WHEREAS the Court must interpret the federal provisions consistent with, first, the achieving of predictable results in commercial transactions, and second, the distribution of the exclusive powers assigned to Parliament and the provincial legislatures by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867;             WHEREAS if the Court accepted the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff of the federal provisions, this would be likely to create legal uncertainty that would be harmful to the security of commercial transactions and would also compromise the operation and effectiveness of the provincial provisions in the province of Quebec;             WHEREAS when the federal Parliament decides to allocate liability for payment to a third party other than the tax debtor, it does so expressly, providing that a request for payment shall be sent to the third party, as in the case of section 224 ITA, where inter alia it has conferred a right of seizure in execution on the Minister when the particular conditions mentioned in that provision have been met;             WHEREAS it would have been desirable for the federal Parliament to intervene clearly and to specify the joint liability of persons other than the tax debtor, as indicated inter alia in sections 160 or 227.1 ITA;             WHEREAS Her Majesty has no right of action against a third party unless the latter was in a position in which he could have been held jointly and severally liable in a personal action brought by Her Majesty against the tax debtor;             WHEREAS the sum of $35,977.46 claimed from the defendant personally is not a tax, interest, penalty, costs or any other amount payable by the defendant personally under section 222 ITA;             WHEREAS the plaintiff has no cause of action under the federal provisions against the defendant and her claim is without basis;             FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ORDERS THAT:             The plaintiff's action is dismissed; The whole with costs against the plaintiff. ...