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You are considered sovereign, thus having the free will to govern yourself. [8]               This section concludes, stating: The underlying principle in the C2++ Process is that loans are NOT revenues. ... It involves a high degree of negligence tantamount to intentional acting or indifference as to whether the law is complied with or not. [21]          I have considered the decisions of Torres v R, 2013 TCC 380; Strachan v R, 2015 FCA 60; Lauzon v R, 2016 TCC 71; Lauzon v R, 2016 FCA 298; Tomlinson v R, 2016 TCC 246; Chartrand v R, 2015 TCC 298. [22]          As noted in Torres (supra) at paragraph 62, it is settled law that gross negligence can include wilful blindness. ... But to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt, I will decide this appeal on the basis of wilful blindness constituting gross negligence. [25]          The guiding jurisprudence in this regard is Torres (supra) which sets out a check-list of items to be considered as “red flags” suggestive of an enquiry, absent which wilful blindness constituting gross negligence may be found. [26]          One red flag is magnitude of the advantage or omission sought. ...

Analysis: [10]          I have considered the following jurisprudence submitted by the Respondent – Van Boekel v. ... “eligible individual” in respect of a qualified dependant at any time means a person who at that time (a) resides with the qualified dependant, (b) is a parent of the qualified dependant who (i) is the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant and who is not a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, or (ii) is a shared-custody parent in respect of the qualified dependant, (c) is resident in Canada or, where the person is the cohabiting spouse or common-law partner of a person who is deemed under subsection 250(1) to be resident in Canada throughout the taxation year that includes that time, was resident in Canada in any preceding taxation year, (d) is not described in paragraph 149(1)(a) or 149(1)(b), and (e) is, or whose cohabiting spouse or common-law partner is, a Canadian citizen or a person who (i) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (ii) is a temporary resident within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, who was resident in Canada throughout the 18 month period preceding that time, or (iii) is a protected person within the meaning of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (iv) was determined before that time to be a member of a class defined in the Humanitarian Designated Classes Regulations made under the Immigration Act, and for the purposes of this definition, (f) where the qualified dependant resides with the dependant’s female parent, the parent who primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant is presumed to be the female parent, (g) the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) does not apply in prescribed circumstances, and (h) prescribed factors shall be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing;- and- “shared-custody parent” in respect of a qualified dependent [sic] at a particular time means, where the presumption referred to in paragraph (f) of the definition “eligible individual” does not apply in respect of the qualified dependant, an individual who is one of the two parents of the qualified dependant who (a) are not at that time cohabitating spouses or common-law partners of each other, (b) reside with the qualified dependant on an equal or near equal basis, and (c) primarily fulfil the responsibility for the care and upbringing of the qualified dependant when residing with the qualified dependant, as determined in consideration of prescribed factors. [13]          I find on the evidence, summarized above, that for the earlier of the two pertinent periods- July 2012 to June 2013- Michael was a “shared-custody parent” and hence an “eligible individual”. ... ITR 6302 provides: 6302 For the purposes of paragraph (h) of the definition “eligible individual” in section 122.6 of the Act, the following factors are to be considered in determining what constitutes care and upbringing of a qualified dependant: (a) the supervision of the daily activities and needs of the qualified dependant; (b) the maintenance of a secure environment in which the qualified dependant resides; (c) the arrangement of, and transportation to, medical care at regular intervals and as required for the qualified dependant; (d) the arrangement of, participation in, and transportation to, educational, recreational, athletic or similar activities in respect of the qualified dependant; (e) the attendance to the needs of the qualified dependant when the qualified dependant is ill or otherwise in need of the attendance of another person; (f) the attendance to the hygienic needs of the qualified dependant on a regular basis; (g) the provision, generally, of guidance and companionship to the qualified dependant; and (h) the existence of a court order in respect of the qualified dependant that is valid in the jurisdiction in which the qualified dependant resides. [15]          Regarding ITR 6302(a), I find on the totality of the evidence that Michael did have supervision of the daily activities and needs of DF when Michael was residing with DF. ...

Given that according to paragraph 5(2)(b), the employee must control more than 40% of voting shares, the votes held by Gestion cannot be considered in this calculation. ... Thus, the Court found that an employee who holds 100% of a corporation, which in turn holds 50% of another corporation that controls 100% of the employer corporation, will be considered as controlling more than 40% of the voting shares in the employer corporation (para 20). [29]   In Remstar Distribution Inc et al. v MNR, [2002] TCJ No. 479 (QL), this Court found that the jobs of Maxime and Julien Rémillard were not insurable employment because they controlled more than 40% of the voting shares in the corporations that employed them. ... The respondent adds that the work conditions in that regard need to be considered and, in this specific case, since the salary was set according to market conditions and since bonuses were paid, there was an arm’s-length relationship between Mr.  ...

He considered Mr. Karamitsos a friend who had experience in the restaurant business. ... Karamitsos was considered to be a friend and an advisor and that he came for coffee to the restaurant every time he came to play the races at Kenzo. ... Karamitsos on the premises of her restaurant, namely, in the kitchen to show how to make the food, the Commission des normes du travail considered that he had worked for her. [43]   Finally, the owner of the appellant indicated that she did not have the means to pay a $16 hourly wage to Mr. ...

.- any particular amount (other than a prescribed amount) received by the taxpayer in the year, in the course of earning income from a business or property, from (i) a person or partnership (in this paragraph referred to as the “payer”) who pays the particular amount (A) in the course of earning income from a business or property, (B) in order to achieve a benefit or advantage for the payer or for persons with whom the payer does not deal at arm's length, or (C) in circumstances where it is reasonable to conclude that the payer would not have paid the amount but for the receipt by the payer of amounts from a payer, government, municipality or public authority described in this subparagraph or in subparagraph (ii), or (ii) a government, municipality or other public authority, where the particular amount can reasonably be considered to have been received (iii) as an inducement, whether as a grant, subsidy, forgivable loan, deduction from tax, allowance or any other form of inducement, or... to the extent that the particular amount (v) was not otherwise included in computing the taxpayer's income, or deducted in computing, for the purposes of this Act, any balance of undeducted outlays, expenses or other amounts, for the year or a preceding taxation year,... (viii) may not reasonably be considered to be a payment made in respect of the acquisition by the payer or the public authority of an interest in the taxpayer, an interest in, or for civil law a right in, the taxpayer's business or an interest in, or for civil law a real right in, the taxpayer's property; II. ... This exclusion applies, in part, where the inducement (the Signing Bonus) may reasonably be considered to be a payment made in respect of the acquisition by the payer (Enbridge) of an interest in the taxpayer’s (the Appellant’s) property. [33]   The specific question the Court must answer is whether the Signing Bonus was a payment made in respect of the granting of the easement, i.e., the acquisition by Enbridge of an interest in the Appellant’s land. [34]   The Supreme Court of Canada, in the following often-quoted passage from Nowegijick v. the Queen [2] states that: The words “in respect of” are, in my opinion words of the widest possible scope. ...

For particular purposes Parliament can and does create its own lexicon. [22]   The Supreme Court noted that the “elements” of a commercial fishing licence “do not wholly correspond to the full range of rights necessary to characterize something as ‘property’ at common law”. [12] However, the Court then considered the BIA ’s statutory definition and purpose. The Court found that the statutory definition of “property” in the BIA “unambiguously signalled an intention to sweep up a variety of assets of the bankrupt not normally considered ‘property’ at common law.” [13] The Court found that the BIA ’s purpose was to “fulfill certain objectives in the event of a bankruptcy which require, in general, that non-exempt assets be made available to creditors.” [14] Consequently, the Court concluded that the BIA ’s definition of “property” included a commercial fishing licence. [23]   With respect, the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Manrell dealing with the definition of “property” under the Income Tax Act is a far more persuasive authority than a Supreme Court of Canada decision dealing with the definition of “property” in an entirely different legislative context. ... Therefore, I have not considered whether James transferred a “right to invoice for legal services” in that role. ...

The fact that the fair market value of the shares of Holdings has been erroneously calculated has not been contested during the hearing of the appeal. [34]   It is also clear in jurisprudence that an error made when filing a tax return whether made in good faith, by inadvertence or by a simple calculation error is considered to be a misrepresentation within the meaning of subparagraph 152(a)(i) of the Act (Mont-Bruno v. ... Canada, 2008 FCA 206, the executor of an estate was considered to have been negligent in the performance of his duties to ensure that the terminal return was properly filed. ... Grossbaum did not explain why he considered that dividend was not collectible. ...

The Court then referred to the non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered: [47] … In making this determination, the level of control the employer has over the worker’s activities will always be a factor. ... The Minister of National Revenue, 2013 FCA 85, [2013] FCJ No. 327, at paras. 38 to 42, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the weight to be given to the parties’ intention in determining whether a worker is an employee (contract of service) or an independent contractor (contract for services). ... No. 330 (Q.L.), the worker will be considered an employee. [24]   At paragraph 75 of Wolf, the Court noted that in the case of skilled workers, the control test can be inadequate because little supervision or control can be exercised over the way in which the work is done. [25]   The Appellant testified that her responsibilities initially consisted of general bookkeeping, entering accounts receivable, calculating payroll semi-monthly, and preparing cheques for signature. ...

  [21]   In the 14   March   2014 occupancy permit comments section, the list of items to be done prior to the final occupancy permit was relatively modest. [22]   The absence on the 14   March   2014 of the required items did not prevent the Appellant and her husband from being able to make normal use of the house. [23]   While the first occupancy certificate is not in itself determinative, the fact that it permits residential occupancy combined with the relatively minor list of items that are required to be done before issuance of a final certificate are significant factors to be considered. [24]   The Appellant took the position that the first occupancy certificate should not have much impact because the certificate was issued to them only because the inspector knew that they would not be living there all the time. [25]   The difficulty I   have with the Appellant’s position based on this last point is twofold. ... Whatever may or may not have been said to the Appellant by the Canada Revenue Agency does not modify the Act and my obligation is to apply the Act and the substantial completion test in that Act to the facts in evidence before me. [32]   What advice might or might not have been given might, however, be a relevant question to be considered by the Minister if she received a request to extend the time pursuant to paragraph   256(3)(b) of the Excise Tax Act. ... The Queen. [11] [39]   Starting in October   2015, the Appellant and her husband have considered the new house near Lake Huron to be there primary place of residence. [40]   The Appellant and her husband changed their address for their driver’s licenses and health cards to the new house in the second half of 2015. ...

MacIntosh should not be considered a supporting person of her son. In other words, Ms.  ... MacIntosh should not be considered a supporting person of her son, at least in the financial sense of the term. ... MacIntosh primarily fulfils the responsibility for the care and upbringing of her son. [9] See condition (c) of the definition of “eligible individual” in section 122.6. [10] Computed without reference to certain inclusions and deductions, as detailed in the definition of “adjusted income” in section 122.6. [11] See section 122.6 of the Act. [12] For this purpose, they will not be considered to be living separate and apart unless they are living separate and apart because of a breakdown of their marriage or common-law partnership for a period of at least 90 days. ...