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The second version reads in part as follows: Where a shareholder or partner has loaned money at no interest to his corporation or partnership or has guaranteed its debts for no consideration, any subsequent loss arising from the inability of the corporation or partnership to discharge its obligation in respect of that loan or guarantee may be, despite the absence of consideration, a deductible capital loss.... ...

Counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant is not ordinarily engaged in the business of leasing property, that he leased a business as a going concern, that the $75,000 received was not in lieu of future rent but was for liquidated damages for deterioration of capital assets of the business, and that at no time did the appellant enter into an arrangement for the cancellation of the lease in consideration of payment of any moneys. ... One can neither ignore the clauses that are contained therein and agreed upon by the parties, nor interpret the lease on the basis of ex post facto considerations. ...

The appellant, on entering a contract of employment with the BC Hydro was advised the amount of salary he was to receive for services required of him and, furthermore, was issued a bus pass as a result of a negotiated agreement between BC Hydro and the Office and Technical Employees’ Union which formed part of the conditions of employment of that company at the time and, as such, could reasonably be regarded as a consideration or inducement for entering into the contract of employment. ... Although some of the conditions of employment resulting from the new collective agreement may have changed from the time the bus passes were freely issued to BC Hydro employees, the alternatives offered to the employees in possession of the passes in 1971 still remained, in my opinion, an integral part of the original consideration for entering into a contract of employment and/or a partial remuneration for services under the contract of employment with the difference, however, that a specific value for the passes was established and given to employees who surrendered their entitlement. ...

Subsection 13(1) refers specifically to a taxpayer’s chief source of income, and in attempting to determine whether or not the appellant’s chief source of income is from farming or a combination of farming and some other source of income, a most important consideration, referred to in the Federal Court decision in Bert James v MNR (supra), is whether the bulk of the appellant’s income might reasonably be expected to come from the appellant’s horse-racing operations. ... Then, by the enactment of The 1948 Income Tax Act, consideration was first given to the taxpayer’s chief source of income instead of his chief position, occupation, trade, business or calling but the provision permitting the determination by the Minister to be final and conclusive was not reenacted. ...

By an agreement of sale dated February 20, 1964 Pacific, at the request of Crescent and, more specifically, on the instructions of the appellant Andrew Tulloch, transferred the “Sea Prince” to a company known as Blaine Myers & Co Ltd and one Norman Sigmund for a consideration of $40,000 and, on February 21, 1964, entered into an agreement of indemnity whereby Pacific agreed to indemnify the purchasers from all manner of actions, suits, claims and demands, etc, with respect to any liens, encumbrances or other charges attaching to the boat “Sea Prince”. ... From a consideration of all the evidence adduced, it appears well established that the two payments totalling $7,000 which the appellant received from Blaine Myers & Co Ltd and from Pacific were in the nature of commissions earned by the appellant in the course of an adventure in the nature of trade and that the net proceeds thereof were taxable income in his hands. ...

On the facts of that case it was held that the separate incorporation of the companies was dominated by considerations other than tax advantages, and that the tax advantages were not the main reason for the separate incorporation. 16 From the facts of the appeal before us it is not that clear that the separate existence of Wee Folks and ABC Diaper Service Inc is dominated by considerations other than tax advantages. 17 Even if one were to conclude that the reasons advanced by the appellant for the separate existence of the two companies could be considered a sound business arrangement, it still does not eliminate the possibility that one of the main reasons for the separate existence of the two companies is to pay less taxes than otherwise payable. 18 It is clear from the evidence that ABC Diaper Service Inc had no hard assets whatever, no plant, no equipment, no office, no employees, all it had was a list of clients whose laundering was done by Wee Folks and all the administrative work and bookkeeping was done by the personnel of Wee Folks. ...

Evidence In reaffirming his stated original intention for the use of the Kamloops property, and the alleged purpose for the Palm Springs property, the appellant submitted several documents for the Board’s consideration. ... Findings The physical evidence presented by the appellant is of only superficial value at best, and the Board is essentially faced with consideration of the testimony of the taxpayer on both issues. ...

So they lost, in other words, they took the risk of signing a guarantee for $65,000 in consideration for security plus a $10,000 bonus, plus interest, and the loss was $65,000 plus bank interest being about $74,000 which was satisfied equally, and that’s how we get to the roughly $37,000 figure mentioned in the pleadings. ... So, I would say... that the $65,000 was not a payment on account of capital to acquire an asset of long-term or enduring advantage, it was a last debt ina speculative transaction involving a guarantee that I think must be considered to; be speculative, having consideration to the evidence, ie that the purchaser or the principal behind the purchaser company could not get further funds from his own bank, either may or may not have been able to get them, it would have taken some time to get funds from the Federal Business Industrial Bank.... ... Even if consideration should be given to the proposition of counsel for the appellants that no such “enduring advantage” would be perceived (presumably because of the intervening transaction and events), I doubt that this outlay could pass any test which took into account the comments of Justice Locke noted earlier from BC Railway (supra): To say, however, that an expenditure made with a view to bringing into existence an asset or an advantage for the enduring benefit of a trade is a capital expenditure is not to say that all other expenditures must, in order to be properly classified as outlays of a capital nature or on account of capital, be made in order to produce such a benefit. ...

Frank S Hibbins of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in consideration of the payment to me of $21,354.80 inclusive of costs, do hereby remise, release and forever discharge Nisbet Lodge, its successors and assigns of and from all manner of actions, courses of actions, claims and demands whatsoever which against the said Nisbet Lodge I ever had, now have, or which my heirs, executors, administrators or assigns or any of them hereafter can, shall, or may have, for or by reason of any cause, matter or thing whatsoever existing up to the present time including the actions that I have against Nisbet Lodge for the wrongful dismissal of me from my employment with them. ... Law—Cases—Comments 4.1 Law The main sections of the Income Tax Act involved in the present case are 5(1) and 6(3) which read as follows: 5. (1) Subject to this Part, a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from an office or employment is the salary, wages and other remuneration, including gratuities, received by him in the year. 6. (3) An amount received by one person from another (a) during a period while the payee was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer, or (b) on account or in lieu of payment of, or in satisfaction of, an obligation arising out of an agreement made by the payer with the payee immediately prior to, during or immediately after a period that the payee was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer, shall be deemed, for the purposes of section 5, to be remuneration for the payee’s services rendered as an officer or during the period of employment, unless it is established that, irrespective of when the agreement, if any, under which the amount was received was made or the form or legal effect thereof, it cannot reasonably be regarded as having been received (c) as consideration or partial consideration for accepting the office or entering into the contract of employment, (d) as remuneration or partial remuneration for services as an officer or under the contract of employment, or (e) in consideration or partial consideration for a covenant with reference to what the officer or employee is, or is not, to do before or after the termination of the employment. 4.2 Cases The following precedents were referred to the Board by both counsel: 1. ...

On February 3, 1970 the Appellant and Union Oil Company of Canada Limited entered into an agreement to sublease Lots 1 to 3 inclusive, Block 37, Banff Township, Alberta, the consideration stated being $250,000.00. 6. ... This company subsequently sub-subleased from Union Oil Company of Canada Limited, by lease dated December 1, 1970, 1.32 lots of the leasehold interest above-described for a consideration of $110,000.00. 10. By mortgage dated December 2nd, 1970 Big Horn Restaurants Ltd granted a mortgage to Union Oil Company of Canada Limited on the lands in question in consideration for $219,900.00. 11. ...