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At page 6075 of Cranswick, the Court accepted the indicia applied by the lower court in the characterization of payments when computing income: (a) the Respondent had no enforceable claim to the payment; (b) There was no organized effort on the part of the Respondent to receive the payment; (c) The payment was not sought after or solicited by the Respondent in any manner; (d) The payment was not expected by the Respondent, either specifically or customarily; (e) The payment had no foreseeable element of recurrence; (f) The payor was not a customary source of income to the Respondent; (g) The payment was not in consideration for or in recognition of property, services or anything else provided or to be provided by the Respondent; it was not earned by the Respondent, either as a result of any activity or pursuit of gain carried on by the Respondent or otherwise. [17]   In applying those indicia to the amounts that Mr. ... Consequently, there was an expectation of recurring tip amounts from the class of winning patrons as a whole in consideration of the services provided to those casino patrons by the slot attendants. [18]   The Appellant has not adduced evidence that could demolish the Minister's assumptions of fact in this regard. ...

He argues that he made a substantial contribution to his RRSP in 2006 and that, taking into consideration the RRSP deductions claimed from 2006 to 2012, he had unused RRSP contributions which he claimed within the deduction limit for each of the subject taxation years. [3]   The only issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the Appellant had unused RRSP contributions in excess of $2,000 at the commencement of the 2013 taxation year. ... These adjustments allowed for the recalculation of your yearly Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) deduction limit for the subsequent years (2004 to 2015). [13]   This was clearly an error and the Appellant produced a printout from the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) (Exhibit A‑2) indicating that a pension adjustment of $6,027 had in fact been taken into consideration in the calculation of his RRSP deduction limit for 2003. ...

(ii)   a loss from the disposition of a debt or other right to receive an amount, unless the debt or right, as the case may be, was acquired by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business or property (other than exempt income) or as consideration for the disposition of capital property to a person with whom the taxpayer was dealing at arm’s length, is nil; Section 50: Debts established to be bad debts and shares of bankrupt corporation (1) For the purposes of this subdivision, where (a) a debt owing to a taxpayer at the end of a taxation year (other than a debt owing to the taxpayer in respect of the disposition of personal-use property) is established by the taxpayer to have become a bad debt in the year, or (b) a share (other than a share received by a taxpayer as consideration in respect of the disposition of personal-use property) of the capital stock of a corporation is owned by the taxpayer at the end of a taxation year and (i)   the corporation has during the year become a bankrupt, (ii)   the corporation is a corporation referred to in section 6 of the Winding-up Act   that is insolvent (within the meaning of that Act) and in respect of which a winding-up order under that Act has been made in the year, or (i ii)   at the end of the year, (A)   the corporation is insolvent, (B)   neither the corporation nor a corporation controlled by it carries on business, (C)   the fair market value of the share is nil, and (D)   it is reasonable to expect that the corporation will be dissolved or wound up and will not commence to carry on business and the taxpayer elects in the taxpayer’s return of income for the year to have this subsection apply in respect of the debt or the share, as the case may be, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have disposed of the debt or the share, as the case may be, at the end of the year for proceeds equal to nil and to have reacquired it immediately after the end of the year at a cost equal to nil. [17]   To be eligible to deduct a BIL pursuant to sections 38 and 39 of the Act, the appellant must show that it has incurred a capital loss from the disposition of a property. ...

(ii)   a loss from the disposition of a debt or other right to receive an amount, unless the debt or right, as the case may be, was acquired by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business or property (other than exempt income) or as consideration for the disposition of capital property to a person with whom the taxpayer was dealing at arm’s length, is nil; Section 50: Debts established to be bad debts and shares of bankrupt corporation (1) For the purposes of this subdivision, where (a) a debt owing to a taxpayer at the end of a taxation year (other than a debt owing to the taxpayer in respect of the disposition of personal‑use property) is established by the taxpayer to have become a bad debt in the year, or (b) a share (other than a share received by a taxpayer as consideration in respect of the disposition of personal‑use property) of the capital stock of a corporation is owned by the taxpayer at the end of a taxation year and (i)   the corporation has during the year become a bankrupt, (ii)   the corporation is a corporation referred to in section 6 of the Winding‑up Act that is insolvent (within the meaning of that Act) and in respect of which a winding‑up order under that Act has been made in the year, or (i ii)   at the end of the year, (A)   the corporation is insolvent, (B)   neither the corporation nor a corporation controlled by it carries on business, (C)   the fair market value of the share is nil, and (D)   it is reasonable to expect that the corporation will be dissolved or wound up and will not commence to carry on business and the taxpayer elects in the taxpayer’s return of income for the year to have this subsection apply in respect of the debt or the share, as the case may be, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have disposed of the debt or the share, as the case may be, at the end of the year for proceeds equal to nil and to have reacquired it immediately after the end of the year at a cost equal to nil. [21]   To be eligible to deduct a BIL pursuant to sections 38 and 39 of the Act, the appellant must show that she incurred a capital loss from the disposition of a property. ...

. … the acceptance of the concession by the Court must be taken into consideration and given significant weight. ... That being said, even if the panel gives this little weight, the panel finds that when its considered with the other evidence presented by the Minister as well as in consideration of the Canada and Benneth decisions, the panel finds that the Minister has established that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the MASSOB high jacked oil tankers in Nigeria and that these are acts that fall within the ambit of Section 34(1)(b) of the Act. [15]   Thus, the IAD allowed the Minister’s appeal and issued a deportation against the Applicants. ...

The Officer stated, with respect to the two decisions impugned: Having taken into consideration the totality of the evidence before me, based on a balance of probabilities, I find that your declarations are more likely false than true and that your declarations regarding where you have been residing since 2016 are not credible. ... [32]   Ruba argued that the Officer had erred in failing to consider the best interests of her son Victore, a Canadian citizen who does not have the right to attend school in Lebanon. [33]   The context of an evaluation conducted by a visa officer who is assessing a claim filed outside Canada in the country of asylum class in accordance with section 96 of the Act and section 147 of the Regulations, is equivalent to a claim for humanitarian and compassionate considerations made under subsection 25(1) of the Act. ...

Since the constitutional issues were not raised before the RAD, no record of relevant evidence was developed before that body for my consideration.   ... The presentation of facts is not, as stated by the respondent, a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues.   ...

The IAD therefore dismissed the applicant’s application to reopen his appeal. [8]   The applicant essentially alleges that the IAD considered section 71 of the Act in isolation when it was required, in his opinion, to interpret it in accordance with subsection 51(3) of the Immigration Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2002-230 (Rules), which allows “a person” to request to reinstate an appeal that was made to the IAD and then withdrawn and requires the IAD to grant such a request not only on evidence of a breach of a principle of natural justice, but also if it is otherwise in the interests of justice to do so. [9]   In the alternative, he urges the Court to make an exception to the principle of judicial comity since following Nazifpour v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 35, leave to appeal to the SCC refused, 31976 (June 28, 2007) [Nazifpour], which limited the scope of section 71 of the Act to cases where the reopening of an appeal is justified when the IAD has not observed one of the principles of natural justice, would create an injustice in the particular circumstances of this case. [10]   The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether the IAD committed a reviewable error in refusing this application to reopen an appeal based solely on section 71 of the Act. [11]   It is not disputed that this issue must be considered under the standard of reasonableness since there is no doubt that the IAD’s consideration of an application for reopening an appeal raises questions of mixed fact and law within its expertise (Pham v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1251 at para 25). ... Since I did not, and the matter has been returned to the IAD for consideration of the applicant’s claim in relation to section 51, I do not see the need to certify a question of general importance. ...

Under Rule 65(4), the Division must consider any explanation offered by the claimant and “any other relevant factor” in deciding if the claim should be declared abandoned. [31]   This Court has consistently held that “the central consideration with respect to abandonment proceedings is whether the claimant’s conduct amounts to an expression of his or her intention to diligently prosecute his or her claim” (Csikos at para 25; Octave v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 597 at para 18, quoting Ahamad v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 FC 109, at para 32). [32]   Until the morning of June 26, 2018, the applicant had never been in default in the proceeding.   ... In my view, neither consideration reasonably supports a finding that the applicant had abandoned his refugee claim. [33]   It may very well have been unwise for the applicant’s new lawyer to accept the retainer given that he was not available on the hearing date. ...

Whether there is any good reason for a sale before trial. [21]   These elements, however, do not constitute a mechanical test to be applied, but elements that might assist the Court in balancing the two essential but competing considerations at play in ordering a sale before trial. These two opposing considerations are the interests of the creditors in preserving the value of the vessel and the ownership interests of the owners. ...