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(c) The decision in this appeal was the first judicial consideration of the excluded property exception in Article 13(4) of the Treaty, and the application of the general anti-avoidance rule is an important issue. [9]   The Respondent does not take issue with the Appellant’s request for disbursements. [10]   The Respondent’s position is that the result of the proceeding as well as the importance of the issues may support an enhanced costs award but not a significantly enhanced one. [11]   The Respondent relies on the following factors to justify a reduction to the Appellant’s costs request: (a) The $48,318,680.14 at issue is not significant given the size of the two private equity funds (18.2 billion) that had an indirect 80% interest in the Appellant. ... The complexity of the issues [28]   This appeal was the first judicial consideration of the application of Article 13(4) of the Treaty. ... In contrast, the Appellant’s position is that certain discovery steps were unnecessary. [35]   Boyle J. gave this factor significant consideration in awarding costs in Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited v The Queen, 2015 TCC 185, at paragraph 20, resulting from the Respondent’s “disappointing failure” to file written representations in advance despite committing to do so during case management. [36]   I agree with the Respondent that this factor is not applicable here. ...

The motion, the written representations on the motion, the Court’s consideration of them, and the dismissal are not captured statistically. [7]   Noting the large number of matters started by Dr. ... Out of consideration for his interests as a self-represented litigant, I remind him that he is welcome to express his disagreement by seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court: Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. ... Fabrikant brings before this Court and every set of submissions he makes deserve separate, impartial, and fair consideration. ...

Although a reviewing court may look to the record and supplement the reasons of a decision-maker, this does not extend so far as allow a court to undertake, de novo, a consideration and interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, the very analysis in which the decision-maker was required to engage in. [5]   In granting the application, I wish to emphasize that Mr. ... The Judge’s interpretation creates uncertainty and confusion and defeats the purpose of the strict physical presence requirement; The Judge disregarded the difference between the “filing date” and the “receipt date”; and The Judge’s references to a shortfall of more than seven calendar days or receipt of an application more than 14 days after signature are irrational and arbitrary considerations that will lead to an inconsistent and incoherent application of the law. [26]   I agree with the Minister’s view that the Judge erred. ... However, not being bound by guidelines does not open the door to the adoption of an interpretation of a statute without first engaging in some consideration of whether the meaning to be adopted is consistent with a reading of the words “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para 21, citing Elmer A Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87). [29]   This circumstance was recently considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in Bonnybrook, a case involving the interpretation of the Income Tax Act. ...

While the LAS Officer writes that the intent is not to circumvent statute-barred dates and that a reassessment would render sections 152(3.1) and 152(4)(a)(ii) meaningless, there is no consideration about the exception to statute barred dates and whether it applies in this case.   ... On the facts of that case, the Federal Court of Appeal held that it was appropriate to “decide the appeal with respect to subsection 220(3) by taking into consideration the Minister’s arguments presented at the hearing.” [27]   On the facts of the case before me, both parties offered alternative interpretations of the provision.   ... Furthermore, neither party commented on this Court’s previous consideration of this issue in Abakhan: [9] Further, I cannot conclude that Abakhan’s application for judicial review runs contrary to Parliament’s intent to confine late requests for reassessments to individuals. ...

Malgré les paragraphes 152(4) à (5), le ministre établit les cotisations voulues concernant les intérêts et pénalités payables par le contribuable ou la société de personnes pour tenir compte de pareille annulation. [19]   The Minister must take into account all relevant considerations in determining whether to grant taxpayer relief pursuant to subsection 220(3.1) and must base her decision on the purpose of the provision, that of fairness (Canada v Guindon, 2013 FCA 153 at para 58). ... In my view, the Taxpayer Relief Fact Sheet reflects a detailed consideration of the Applicant’s request for relief and forms a reasonable basis for the Decision. [28]   In the Decision, Ms Martel considered the Third Request Letter and granted relief from interest levied on the Applicant under the ITA for specific periods from August 2001 to April 2015. ... Ms Martel’s consideration of the arguments made by Thorsteinssons in the Third Request Letter was thorough and her reasoning clear. [30]   The decision of the Minister to only partially grant relief from interest levied on outstanding balances owed by Applicant may appear harsh given the overall circumstances of the case. ...

The amounts and complexity of the issues alone may not be a reason for departing from costs in the Tariff. [7] Amongst other things, subsection 147(5) provides the Court with the discretion to award or refuse costs in respect of a particular issue or part of a proceeding or a percentage of taxed costs. [8]   Under subsection 147(4) of the Rules, the Court may fix costs, partially or wholly, with or without reference to the Tariff, and it may award a lump sum in lieu of or in addition to any taxed costs after consideration of the amounts at issue, the complexity and the importance of those issues, the work generated and a party’s success. [8] [9]   In considering section 147 of the Rules, are costs warranted in the circumstances of the present case? ... Until the Judgment, most jurisprudence dealt with revocation of a registered charity’s registration, whereas the present case considered a suspension of receipting privileges and qualified-donee status under subsection 188.2(2) of the Act and consideration of the consequence imposed in the context of the graduated step approach. [13]   I find that this factor favours an appropriate award of costs in favour of the respondent and would justify an increase over Tariff. ... Complexity of issues – paragraph 147(3)(f) [15]   The respondent submits that there is an inherent complexity to considerations of reasonableness. ...

I agree with Evolution that the Federal Court implicitly came to this construction, and that it then committed an error of law by failing to apply this construction in its consideration of infringement. ... Brienza’s approach, which it described as, among other things, “purposive” and arising from a consideration of “the patent as a whole.” ... Claims construction is therefore antecedent to consideration of infringement: Mediatube Corp. v. ...

As a result, the only consideration was whether the delay was reasonable. ... Paranthaman’s characterization of the adequacy of reasons as an issue of procedural fairness, the jurisprudence has established that the adequacy of reasons should be addressed in the consideration of whether the decision is reasonable. ... He only raised his mental health issues as a reason for his delay in filing his complaint after being alerted in the Report that this was a relevant consideration.   ...

Issues [14]   The Applicant articulates the following issues for the Court’s consideration: What is the applicable standard of review? ... The parties seem to agree that the consideration of evidence is a question of fact, reviewable on a standard of reasonableness, and I so find. [17]   The Applicant submits that her circumstances are different from many cessation cases, which involve refugee claimants who fear persecution by state authorities in their countries of nationality. ... I nevertheless wished to note the point for consideration in any future matters of a similar nature with which the Court may be presented. ...

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed the consideration of any viable defences, including duress, by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board when deciding whether a claimant satisfies the definition of “refugee” (Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 at para 100 [Ezokola]). [18]   The crux of the Minister’s argument is that the ID and the IAD do not have jurisdiction to consider the defence of duress in inadmissibility proceedings, as the proper forum for considering duress is an application for Ministerial relief under subsection 42.1(1) of the IRPA. [19]   The Minister argues that if the ID and IAD were to consider duress in inadmissibility proceedings, this would deprive subsection 42.1(1) of its function. ... Notably absent from the Minister’s argument is any mention of Justice Mactavish’s implicit endorsement of consideration of duress by the ID in the subsection 37(1)(a) context in this very matter. [33]   Having found that the defence of duress is applicable in inadmissibility hearings under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the IRPA, the only issue is whether the IAD erred in finding that the Respondent had no safe avenue of escape. ... Further, as noted above, the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed the consideration of any viable defences, including duress, by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board when deciding whether a claimant satisfies the definition of “refugee” (Ezokola, above at para 100). [47]   I have decided that the ID and IAD are entitled to consider the defence of duress in inadmissibility proceedings under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the IRPA.   ...