Search - 2002年 抽纸品牌 质量排名

Russell J further found that the taxpayer was not a de facto director, stating (at paras 38, 40): Jurisprudence reflects that the concept of de facto director should be limited to persons who hold themselves out as directors …. ... R., 2002 GTC 244 (TCC), Justice C. Miller observed that a person could not be considered a de facto director where the person, …did not believe he was a director and he never thought he had any authority to advise, influence or control, the management or direction of the company. ... …[S]he engaged in no acts of management … let alone any actions specific to a director. ...

Following an audit, the Minister laid income tax evasion charges against the taxpayers for their 2002 to 2007 years, resulting in a plea bargain based upon an agreed statement of facts. ... She noted that convictions based on plea bargains are not dispositive in civil proceedings, but are rather prima facie proof (paras. 31, 35), and that there was insufficient identity of issues between the current and prior proceedings – for example, the agreed facts did not deal with Grant's tax matters or the corporation's GST appeal. ...

CC died in 2002. In rejecting the taxpayer’s submission that she had provided full consideration for the transfer through her agreement to marry CC and care for him, Owen J stated (at paras. 82, 83): There is no evidence of a legally binding agreement between CC and the Appellant identifying marriage as consideration given by the Appellant for the Property, and there is no evidence of the fair market value of such a promise. A promise to marry that had already been fulfilled by the Appellant at the time of the Transfer cannot be consideration given by the Appellant for the Property at the time of the Transfer. … The Appellant continued to work outside the home after marrying CC and had no special training qualifying her to care for CC in a manner beyond the level of care that might be expected of any spouse. ...

The forward sale date initially was June 26, 2002, but the contract was subsequently extended. ... MacDonald owned the BNS [and predecessor] shares for approximately 30 years prior to entering into the Forward Contract. … Mr. ... MacDonald had mitigated or reduced a risk. … The fact that the taxpayer also received a TD loan (which was much less than the maximum he could have borrowed and was largely repaid by 2004) was of limited relevance. ...

The forward sale date initially was June 26, 2002, but the contract was subsequently extended. ... Gains and losses arising from hedging derivative contracts take on the character of the underlying asset, liability or transaction being hedged …. ... Purpose is ascertained objectively (Ludco …). … As the cases demonstrate, the primary source of ascertaining a derivative contract’s purpose is the linkage between the derivative contract and any underlying asset, liability or transaction purportedly hedged. ...

.$3 billion in 2001 and 2002 by issuing seven notes that were guaranteed by its non-resident parent (“BRI”). The Minister reassessed Burlington’s 2002 to 2005 taxation years to deny under ss. 247(2)(a) and (c) deductions for annual payments made by Burlington to BRI for its unconditional guarantee of the Notes under ss. 247(2)(a) and (c). ... Before granting the amendments, D’Auray J indicated that Rule 132 applied only to “formal admissions” such as in pleadings Andersen Consulting ([1998] 1 FC 605 (FCA)) had established “that an application for leave to withdraw admissions did not require a separate form” (para. 75), so that the requested amendment to the Reply could constitute application to withdraw an admission In Burlington’s examination for discovery of the Crown’s nominee in 2014, “[n]umerous times the respondent’s counsel stated that it was the respondent’s position that no amounts were payable as guarantee fees” (para. 77) Although in an Amended Reply, the Crown had admitted that guarantee fees had been paid in the amounts stated in the Notice of Appeal, “the respondent did not make a clear and deliberate concession that the amounts paid to BRI were guarantees fees” (para. 80) in light of the point immediately above and denials made by the Crown elsewhere in the Reply Even if there had been such an admission, D’Auray J “would still have permitted the withdrawal of the admission since … there is a triable issue which ought to be tried in the interests of justice” (para. 82) “In addition, the purported withdrawal does not amount to an injustice to Burlington since it has been aware of the respondent’s position at least since its discovery of the respondent’s nominee in 2014.” ...

The basement unit, which represented 54% of the triplex, had been occupied by him for use as his residence and a home office since his purchase of the triplex in 2002. ... In confirming the ARQ’s reassessment made on the basis that only 54% of the taxpayer’s gain was eligible for the principal residence exemption, Breault JCQ stated (at paras. 57, 68 TaxInterpretations translation): Breault JCQ stated: [I]n order for two housing dwellings or units in the same immovable to be considered a single housing unit for the purposes of TA section 274 (or ITA 54), they must be sufficiently integrated, one with the other, such that the owner can benefit from full enjoyment of the entirety. … [N]o transformation or modification of much significance was made to the Triplex in order for the three units to be linked in some manner to each other. ...

In finding that the taxpayer’s claimed losses (except for an $8 million overstatement of the 2002 loss due to an “egregious error” – for which a gross negligence penalty was sustained) were fully deductible, Spiro J noted (at para. 191): Friedberg stands for the proposition that straddle traders may report the results of their trades for tax purposes on a [realization] basis that does not reflect the true economic results of such trades.” ...

. … Just because the documents are not part of the evidentiary record does not mean that they are not part of the Court record and, it should be recalled, it is the documents in the Court record that are subject to the open court principle. Regarding the open court principle, he referred (at para. 27) to the observation in Sierra Club, 2002 SCC 41, at para. 36 that “[t]he link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court,” and stated (at paras. 30-31): Section 26 of the FCR is clear. The open court principle allows any person to inspect a court record and any annex "that is available to the public" …. ...

Expense- Damages legal fees incurred to recover misappropriated funds were not capital expenditures The taxpayer (Mobile), which was owned by the Waibel family in Europe, sold its two Toronto properties in 2002 and 2003 for $7.3 million, with $7.258 million of that sum being diverted by one of its directors (Black) without the authorization of the family. ... The result: the receipt of amounts, as interest, that was not a capital transaction, and that was income arising from property, the property being Black's obligation arising from the misappropriation, as confirmed by the legally binding effect of a settlement. … The analogy with the Kellogg and Evans cases is not perfect, because the former involved a business and the latter involved income from a trust, but it is sufficient to convince us that an expense is not capital in nature simply because the expense is not recurring or extraordinary. ...