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On the trucks’ return to the company premises, they would sit there for 12 hours in order to permit the oils to settle out in their holding tanks – before the now, somewhat separated oils, were pumped out for further processing at the company’s premises with a view to their sale. Guimond JCQ found that, as this settling-out process was part and parcel of the process for purifying the oils and was more significant than the use of the trucks in transporting the oil, the trucks qualified as processing equipment under the Quebec equivalent of ITA s. 127(9) – qualified property – (c)(i). ...

The Court found that the appellant was a financial institution under s. 149(1)(a)(iii) as a person “whose principal business is as a … dealer in … financial instruments.” ... Turning to the meaning of “dealer,” the Court stated (at para. 29, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he author Simon Labrecque properly states that the term “dealer” … relates to a person “whose business consists of dealing in financial instruments for its own account…” where this is for the purpose of profit. ... Furthermore, the role of the appellant – which was to the receive a cheque endorsed by the client, to whom it made the charges, followed by cashing it into its own bank account as endorsee – indicates that it was acting as a financial intermediary, the criterion identified by … Labrecque…. ...

In the course of his reasons, he stated (at p. 157): In “ Lindley on Partnership ”, Eleventh Edition (1950).. at page 154, it is stated: … [T]he firm is not recognized by English lawyers as distinct from the members composing it. … [T]he firm as such, has no legal recognition. ... Fordham, speaking for the majority, agreed (at p. 156) with the proposition that “It is with the partnership, as individuals, that a trader must deal… ” but found that it would be contrary to the legislative intent to find that s. 8(3) did not apply. ...

The ARQ determined that the amounts paid by the Government of Canada to MDA were “contract payments” (defined in s.1029.8.17 (c) (ii) of the Quebec Taxation Act to include “an amount in respect of an expenditure of a current nature … of a taxpayer … payable by the Government of Canada … or other public authority … for scientific research and experimental development to be performed for the authority) for SR&ED work for the RCM Program, so that the bulk of the work did not qualify for the Quebec tax credit for salaries and wages. ... Regarding the second test, he found that: “Canada assumed both the risks related to the additional costs of the RCM Program and those related to the possibility that the technology developed for the purpose of the project would not perform as expected” (para. 147) and “would lose its investment if the satellites exploded” (para. 148) “Had there been insufficient funds … MDA would have been paid for the work undertaken up to the end of the contract for Phases B/C” (para. 151) and “ MDA would have been paid had the Government of Canada terminated the contract for Phase D” (para. 153). ...

Mainville JCA stated (at para. 72, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he portion of the incentives received in respect of payments made by the appellant to the insurers for the purpose of the investment account provided for in the Contract (approximately two-thirds in the appellant's case) come within paragraph 87(w) … but … the portion of the incentives received in respect of payments made by the appellant to the insurers for the purpose of life insurance coverage only (approximately one-third in the appellant's case) are not. In further finding that it was irrelevant that in fact Verrier did not generate any income from the policy under s. 148(1), Mainville JCA stated (at para. 75): If the property in question is reasonably likely to generate income, paragraph 87(w) … can apply, regardless of whether the property actually generates income or whether the taxpayer decides to dispose of it before it generates income. ...

. … [I]f the term … of the lease was irrelevant to the method of calculation of the payment, then any argument that the payment was in truth … a computation of prepayment of rent is extremely difficult to mount. … The taxpayer has, in effect, purchased the right to have the better lease with the lower rent. … The method of calculation of the prepayments was the same across the different leases, even though the duration of the leases varied. ...

. … [I]f the term … of the lease was irrelevant to the method of calculation of the payment [as was the case here], then any argument that the payment was in truth … a computation of prepayment of rent is extremely difficult to mount. … The taxpayer has, in effect, purchased the right to have the better lease with the lower rent. … ...

The Court found that the appellant was a financial institution under s. 149(1)(a)(iii) as a person “whose principal business is as a … dealer in … financial instruments.” ... The Court also noted (also at para. 26, TaxInterpretations translation): Furthermore, in Elgin Mills Leslie Holdings … the Tax Court of Canada indicated that a cheque is a “financial instrument” within the meaning of subsection 123(1) …. ...

., the plaintiffs had transferred the property …. It was the deed of sale, in the clause entitled “Price,” that “entitl[ed] … to proceeds of disposition of the property, ” to repeat the words used in TA section 248. … It was otherwise and as bare owner, which necessarily involves the transfer of property and its disposition, that 9212-7133 Québec Inc. granted to the plaintiffs a dismemberment of the right of property, in the form of a right of usufruct. ...

Burton v Commissioner of Taxation, [2018] FCA 1857, aff'd [2019] FCAFC 141-- summary under Subsection 126(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 126- Subsection 126(1) a foreign tax credit was reduced by ½ when only ½ of a capital gain was brought into income The taxpayer was an Australian resident who was taxed at the 15% long-term U.S. capital gains rate on his gains on disposal of U.S. oil and gas drilling rights. ...