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. … [T]here must be an element of an individual’s privacy concerns that elevates them to a public concern, beyond personal concerns and sensibilities (Sherman at para 54). ... Rémillard’s personal safety, an attack on his dignity, a risk of psychological harm or a risk to his professional reputation. … This leaves Mr. ... In my opinion, whether the important public interest is privacy or tax secrecy, the inconvenience of media attention in this case is at odds with the open court principle and does not in itself warrant the order sought. … As the Supreme Court made clear in Sherman, the implementation of the open court principle will necessarily infringe the privacy rights of litigants, so the preservation of that right cannot be a ground in itself for overriding the public nature of court proceedings. ...

Power was admissible), Gogan J stated (at paras. 83, 84, 87, 93): … None of Power’s work can be characterized as de facto investigation. ... In this case, I am satisfied that any evidence obtained came as a result of Power’s audit inquiries.... … I find that the predominant purpose of the investigation did not turn to criminal or penal liability until after the completion of Power’s interviews with each of the accused. … ...

Before the Federal Court rendered a decision on the Minister’s application, Dominelli and the Minister reached an agreement under which Dominelli undertook “to perform a detailed and exhaustive search of… records in my possession” and to “particularize my efforts” and “to request and direct my professional advisors to conduct an exhaustive search”, “to make inquiries of individuals and entities listed below” and to “particularize my efforts in making these inquiries,” all as described by affidavit with appended documents – with it being further agreed that if the Minister was not satisfied with the affidavit materials, she would ask that judgment be delivered on the compliance application. ... Pentney J stated (at para. 59) that he agreed “with Dominelli that the scope of the Minister’s discretion to determine that she is not satisfied that he has discharged his obligations under the agreement must be limited by the terms of their agreement ….” ... After noting the various documents that had been requested on audit and not provided, Pentney J stated (at para. 79): Understood in that context, the gap between what Dominelli promised to do and what his affidavit states is striking. … [H]is evidence does not establish that he has met the specific and detailed terms of the agreement and the Undertaking that he negotiated, and thus his motion cannot succeed. ...

Accordingly, Taxation Act s. 99 (equivalent to the ½ step-up rule in ITA s. 13(7)(e)) did not apply to reduce the capital cost to 501 of the acquired software. ... The fact that a deduction, in the abstract, could have been allowed in respect of a property cannot, however, permit that property to be characterized as a purely depreciable property to SherWeb, when the evidence demonstrated that it had lost that character by reason of the various expenditures on programmers' salaries, and the SR&ED credits that were accorded to it year after year. … One cannot escape the fact that, to SherWeb, the Software has never been treated as a depreciable asset, and so continually until the time "immediately before the transfer" to the respondent. Regarding an ARQ submission that the Reg. 1102(1)(d) equivalent was intended only to preclude a double deduction (for SR&ED and CCA) and not to avoid the ½ step-up rule, the Court stated (at para. 34): Regarding the appellant's position that the deduction of salaries over the years as an expense does not preclude the Software being depreciable property, it must be remembered that the salaries were deducted as an expense paid to maintain the profitability of the business activities which were, as such, an expense on income account even though the sums spent on the initial creation of the Software could have qualified as capital costs. ...

Revenue and Customs v Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC, [2022] UKUT 199 (TCC), overruled on transfer-pricing analysis but aff'd on other grounds at [2024] EWCA Civ 330-- summary under Paragraph 247(2)(b) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 247- New- Subsection 247(2)- Paragraph 247(2)(b) complete denial of interest deductions under the UK transfer pricing rules because the loan was made without group support covenants The structure for the acquisition by the BlackRock group of the North American management business of Barclays Global Investors (“BGI”) entailed a BlackRock group LLC (“LLC4”) lending US$4 billion to a wholly-owned LLC (“LLC5”) as well as injecting substantial equity into LLC5, with LLC5 using most of those proceeds to subscribe for preferred shares of the transaction Buyco (“LLC6” – which acquired all the shares of BGI). ... In the hypothetical transaction however, the dividend flow would need to be secured so far as possible …. In confirming the denial by HMRC of all of LLC5’s interest deductions on the basis that the loan transaction between the two enterprises (LLC4 and LLC5) was not one which would have been made by arm’s-length enterprises (i.e., it lacked covenants of LLC5 and BGI to ensure the flow of dividends to LLC5 to service the loan), the Tribunal stated (at paras. 75-76): Third-party covenants that were not given as part of or in support of the actual transaction cannot be considered to be part of the hypothetical transaction as this materially changes the surrounding circumstances and alters the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions in question. … [A]n independent lender would not have made a $4 billion loan to LLC5 without such covenants being in place and that important finding should itself have determined that there was no comparable arm’s length transaction. ...

. … Mr. Barrs finds himself faced with an interest bill that far exceeds those of the taxpayers who made their requests for relief in 2004. ... Given that the independent third-level review officer failed to engage with the request for greater relief in the open years to ensure equitable treatment, his decision must be set aside. … Failure to engage with an important argument advanced by a party will generally render an administrative decision unreasonable [citing Vavilov] …. ...

The decision-maker could also emphasize the need to protect the integrity of the appeal process …. It stands to reason that a remission order should not normally be used as an alternative avenue of appeal for a taxpayer who has failed to pursue the remedies available under the Income Tax Act, let alone as a means of overriding a settlement to which the taxpayer has agreed. … Internal disagreement alone does not prove the outcome of the objection and appeal process to be wrong …. ...

In reversing the Tax Court and in finding that the non-capital losses were deductible, Webb JA noted that, under Stewart, the test of whether “the activity is being carried out in a commercially sufficient manner to constitute a source of income” (Stewart, at para. 60) was only engaged “if there is a hobby or personal element to the activity in question” (Brown, at para. 26), and stated (at paras. 27, 29): … Mr. Brown’s decision to provide these management services as a result of his wife’s inability to continue to manage the gallery, does not mean that there is a personal or hobby element to his management services activity …. ... It is possible to find a personal reason why any person is carrying on a particular activity. … Since there was no personal or hobby element in Mr. ...

The principal argument of Quintal that the payments received by him from Élan were not includible in his income pursuant to TA s. 87 (similar to ITA s. 12(1)(x)) was that those amounts were not received by him “in the course of earning income from … property”: the intention was that the policy would be cancelled before he had any right to surrender the policy for any positive amount. In rejecting this submission, Gosselin JCQ stated (at paras. 47, 49, TaxInterpretations translation): The TA requires a life insurance policyholder to include in computing income on the disposition of an interest in the policy the amount by which the proceeds of disposition of the interest exceed the adjusted cost basis of the interest. … The Court notes, however, that the cash surrender value actually increased as soon as the first excess premiums were paid to the insurer, which deposited them in the Policy's investment account in search of financial performance resulting in interest on those investments, even though the cash surrender value could not be cashed out by Mr. ... Quintal by Élan were inducement payments since without them … he would never have purchased such an insurance policy at such a cost. ...

If the Reply were to stand, the scope of discoveries would be unmanageable …. ... Making repetitive pleadings (and also adding a Schedule that “did not contain any material facts as it [was] drafted with generic words – para. 108). ... The inclusion of evidence on which the Crown intended to rely (e.g., the inclusion of Schedules which had the look of working papers – para. 166). ...