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Moreover, it has still not reassessed … Mr. Prince. In the alternative, … if the letter of December 17, 2018 was, in effect, a decision that the CRA was reassessing the Applicant, then the Federal Court would be denied jurisdiction by the effect of section 18.5 of the FCA due to the availability of an appeal of the decision. … Either way, I do not have jurisdiction. ...

After the assessment was vacated pursuant to a consent judgment, CRA issued a Notice of Reassessment showing the cancellation of the penalty and a refund of the $1M but denying any refund interest on the basis that s. 164(3) requires a taxation year to be specified in order for interest to be paid – and a s. 163.2 penalty is not calculated by reference to any particular taxation years. ... The onus, however, cannot be on the taxpayer to identify which taxation year(s) ‑ whether any, some or none ‑ apply to the Minister’s penalty assessment, particularly when, as here, the Reassessment itself indicates a taxation year on its face. ...

Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1433-- summary under Section 18.5 Summary Under Tax Topics- Other Legislation/Constitution- Federal- Federal Courts Act- Section 18.5 taxpayer could not challenge a CRA residency determination that had not yet been assessed in the context of a VDP application that had not yet been accepted or declined The taxpayer, who left Canada for Chad in 2004 (followed by a stint in Iraq) and returned to Canada in January 2010, filed a voluntary disclosure application in July 2015 pursuant to which he filed tax returns for 2004 and 2010 to 2014 – but not for 2005 to 2009, taking the position that for those years he was a non-resident. ... Powell Ltd., at para 31). … [H]e cannot judicially review this particular tax process when there has been no assessment and no discretionary decision. … Once the assessments are issued by CRA and if the Appellant wishes to file an objection and appeal, then the Tax Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with whether he is a resident of Canada or not. ...

Before dismissing the application, Ahmed J stated (at paras. 45, 49): I agree with the Applicant that legislation may be inconsistent with section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 if it creates financial obstacles that impose undue hardship on potential litigants …. However, in light of the Applicant’s gross earnings and numerous related companies, I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s argument that the Appeal Payment Provisions cause it undue hardship. … Trial Lawyers is distinguishable … because the Appeal Payment Provisions are remedial, not punitive. ...

She stated (at para. 120-121): A legitimate expectation arises when a government official makes “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” representations within the scope of their authority to an individual about an administrative process that the government will follow: … Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 …. ... The Court may only grant appropriate procedural remedies to respond to a legitimate expectation …. ...

After noting (at para. 24) that in Connolly “the applicant had provided little detail as to why he made the mistake that resulted in his over-contribution and did not appear to have made any inquiries, whether with his accountant, his bank or his employer, to confirm his RRSP contribution room … [so that] the Federal Court of Appeal concluded that his error likely could not be said to have been a reasonable one”, Aylen J dismissed the taxpayer’s application for judicial review of the two-level decision of CRA declining to waive the tax, stating (at para. 26): While the Applicant asserts that his error was an honest mistake and that he did not knowingly intend to over-contribute, the test to be met under section 204.1(4) is the reasonability of the error made, not the innocence of the Applicant …. ... The onus was on the Applicant to ensure that he did not over-contribute to his RRSP and if there was any lack of clarity or understanding as [to] the contribution room available to him, the Applicant was expected to seek advice …. ...

Section 259 … simply does not lay out any criteria for the exercise of the Minister’s power to designate an entity as a municipality. By refusing to consider circumstances that fell outside the four corners of the information sheet, the Minister’s delegate essentially treated the latter as if it superseded the broad discretion granted by section 259 of the Act. … As the Minister’s delegate fettered her discretion, the decision is unreasonable. After noting that a regulation defining “government funding” for purposes of determining the relevant rebate rate for some of the non-municipal entities referred to in s. 259 was not relevant to designations as a municipality, Grammond J stated (at para. 39) that “[i]t is … difficult to see why the precise form of assistance matters and why creativity in structuring the relationship between government and providers of municipal services should be discouraged” and (at para. 40) that “no suggestion was made that designating the Society as a municipality would give rise to any form of tax unfairness.” ...

Later, CRA rejected a further Lemay submission that CRA could accept its additional refund claims by virtue of ss. 164(1)(b) and 152(3.4) – on the basis inter alia that s. 125.7(5)(a) limited the amount of the CEWS subsidy to the amount initially claimed by the taxpayer. ... In rejecting the claim that there was no chance of success, Régimbald J stated (at paras. 28, 30, TaxInterpretations translation): [I]t is not clear, in light of sections 125.7(5), 152(3.4) and 164(1)(b), considered together and which are the subject of the application for judicial review, that the ITA does not allow the Minister to accept an amended prescribed form as requested by the plaintiff. … [T]he defendant has therefore not discharged its burden of demonstrating that it is clear and obvious that the interpretation proposed by Lemay has no reasonable chance of acceptance …. ...

., 83 DTC 5095, [1983] CTC 90 (FCTD)-- summary under Paragraph 239(1)(f) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 239- Subsection 239(1)- Paragraph 239(1)(f) It was stated, in connection with a case where the accused had corroborated the V-day value of land with false documentation, that: "I do not conceive how any precise finding of value dependent on the opinion evidence of experts in land valuation could be arrived at beyond a reasonable doubt [:] R. v. Gardner (1982) 66 C.C.C. (2d) 477 (SCC) '... the facts which justify the sanction are no less important than the facts which justify the conviction. ...

After noting (at para. 20) the Vavilov test that the administrative decision under review must “exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” and (at para. 39) the Saipem test of “a rational connection … between the information sought and the administration and enforcement of the ITA,” Fothergill J stated (at para 43, 45-47): No explanation has been provided for the absence of any time limits on the information sought in the Requirement, although the previous requests were all restricted to the taxation years under audit. No explanation has been provided for the absence of any limit on the number of agreements to be produced, the identities of the contracting parties, or the geographic regions to which they apply. … The CRA’s first request for information … was limited to agreements in force during the audit period. ... Nine criteria were provided, including location in an OECD member state, and the performance of tasks related to research, development and distribution. … The CRA has offered no explanation for the dramatic increase in the scope of the information sought in the Requirement. ...