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Therefore, the revocation notice was a factual element that was necessary in order to support the legal basis of the income inclusion …. ... Clearly, this was not a factual basis on which the reassessment was based when it was issued, or when the limitation period expired. … [T]he Minister’s position impermissibly avoids the limitation period for the 2009 taxation year. ...

In finding that s. 261(2)(b) precluded a right to rebates, and that there had been a failure to file notices of objection to the initial assessments of the self-assessed tax, Woods JA stated (at paras. 79, 81): … [A]ssessments were made of the particular tax that was paid by the Funds. ... The provision is not limited to assessments issued to persons who paid the tax. … [T]here was a remittance of tax by the Manager on behalf of the Funds. ...

. … The Tax Court impermissibly read the words “and until” into subsection 227.1(2) in order to conclude that a director’s liability does not arise under subsection 227.1(1) “unless and until the relevant preconditions in subsection 227.1(2) are satisfied”…. ... Canada, 2001 FCA 84 to be “to strengthen the Crown’s ability to enforce the statutory obligation imposed on corporations to remit source deductions” (para. 25): The interpretation adopted by the Tax Court renders this purpose nugatory and pointless. … Parliament cannot have intended the directors’ liability provision to be avoided as it was in the present case. ...

As a technical matter, s. 112(3.1) did not apply to deny any portion of this capital loss because the NSULC paid all its dividends on a separate class of preferred shares that it had issued as a stock dividend – rather than on the common shares on which the LP had realized the loss. ... When Parliament intends to restrict a particular deeming rule to only certain provisions of the Act, it clearly does so. … ...

As a technical matter, s. 112(3.1) did not apply to deny any portion of this capital loss because the NSULC paid all its dividends on a separate class of preferred shares that it had issued as a stock dividend – rather than on the common shares on which the LP had realized the loss. ... When Parliament intends to restrict a particular deeming rule to only certain provisions of the Act, it clearly does so. … ...

On the sale of the debtor’s property “despite any security interest in the property or in the proceeds thereof … the proceeds of the property shall be paid to the Receiver General in priority to all security interests.” ... Respecting the implications of this decision, she stated (at para. 85): [S]ecured lenders … may identify higher risk borrowers (which might include persons operating sole proprietorships), require borrowers to give evidence of tax compliance, or require borrowers to provide authorization to allow the lender to verify with the Canada Revenue Agency whether there are outstanding GST liabilities then known to the Agency. ...

This in turn means that the obligation to pay refunds is necessarily conditioned by the Minister’s obligation under section 275 of the ETA to confirm that they are in fact owing …. ... Rennie JA further stated (at paras 49 and 51): … I do not wish to be taken as endorsing the Minister’s arguments that the issuing of the notices of assessment deprives the Federal Court of jurisdiction to consider the Minister’s exercise of discretion under the ETA. ...

Noël CJ noted (at para. 68) that, although the 2010 assessment of 984 was a nil assessment: Aside from the fundamental distinction drawn … in Okalta, an assessment that levies tax and a nil assessment have the same legal effect i.e. both start the limitation period when issued as the original notice, both replace a prior assessment or reassessment when issued as the last notice, and both fix the tax payable for the year. ... Finally, it also did not matter that no reassessment had been issued to bring the 2003 tax payable back from zero, as per the 2010 nil assessment, to the amount initially assessed, given that inter alia “ Markevich makes it clear that an excessive refund can be assessed even if the power to issue a reassessment for the year pursuant to subsection 152(4) has expired” (para. 77). ...

Regarding the failure to satisfy the first test, Locke JA noted that the Crown did not become aware of the relevance of the additional evidence until six days before the hearing of the Tax Court motion, at which point there was no established procedure for introducing such evidence – but nonetheless found (at para. 14) that he was “not convinced that the appellant could not have sought, and possibly obtained, leave to put the evidence before the Tax Court.” In nonetheless allowing the new evidence, he stated (at paras. 21, 24): … I am conscious that the motion before the Tax Court was an interlocutory matter, and the respondent’s opportunity to adduce this evidence was limited because of the absence of a clear procedural mechanism for doing so. ...

In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that “in the settlement agreement, the reference to ‘consequential adjustments’ should be interpreted as only those adjustments that could be made under subsection 152(4.3) …, which would not include the restoration of income for his 1998 taxation year, as was done by the Minister” (para. 26), and that the Tax Court had not made reviewable error in finding that the settlement agreement allowed the Minister to make the implementing reassessment, Webb JA stated (at paras 25, 27): When the settlement was reached and the losses were recognized (subject to certain adjustments) and the carrying charges were allowed, this was, in effect, a recognition that the partnerships were valid partnerships. A further consequence of recognizing the partnerships as valid partnerships is that the amount of income that had been removed should be restored. … [T]he expression "consequential adjustment" does not appear anywhere in the text of subsection 152(4.3) of the Act, nor for that matter anywhere in the Act. ...