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In rejecting this submission, Webb JA stated that, under a textual approach (para. 43): … [S]ubparagraph [247(2)(b)(i)] raises the issue of whether the transaction or series of transactions would have been entered into between persons dealing with each other at arm's length (an objective test based on hypothetical persons) not whether the particular taxpayer would have entered into the transaction or series of transactions in issue with an arm's length party (a subjective test). … Furthermore (para. 46): If the Crown's interpretation is correct, then whenever a corporation in Canada wants to carry on business in a foreign country through a foreign subsidiary, the condition in subparagraph 247(2)(b)(i) of the Act would be satisfied. ... In his conclusions, Webb JA stated (at para. 81): …[T]he rules in paragraph 247(2)(b) and (d) … do not allow the Minister to simply reallocate all of the profit of a foreign subsidiary to its Canadian parent company on the basis that the Canadian corporation would not have entered any transactions with its foreign subsidiary if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length. ...

After noting (at para. 38) that “increasing the adjusted cost base of the partnership interest by both the fair market value of the transferred properties and the elected amount gives rise to an absurd result,” Noël CJ stated (at para. 48): The Tax Court judge [found] … that the transfers, including the first, occurred after the partnership had been created. Specifically, the appellant’s partnership interest had already been acquired when the shopping centres were transferred, thereby eliminating any possibility that, in addition to the subsection 97(2) adjustment, the partnership interest could be increased under section 54 by the “cost”, i.e. the fair market value, of the transferred property …. ... As well, the Tax Court judge correctly held that the Act tracks the partnership interest as a whole rather than as individual units in “subdivision C dealing with capital gains and capital losses or in subdivision J dealing with partnerships” …. ...

In confirming the Tax Court’s dismissal of the taxpayer’s motion to compel answers to these and other questions, Locke JA first indicated (at para. 22) that it was “tempting to … [consider] that documents must be publicly available in order to be relevant to statutory interpretation,” but then also noted (at para. 30) that Upper Churchill [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297) “leave[s] room for cases where extrinsic evidence will not be relevant, but it also limits the issues to which such evidence might be relevant.” ... In this regard, he agreed (at para. 19) with the Tax Court’s view that “that earlier drafts of a final position paper do not have to be disclosed, and … that even where relevance is established, the Court has a residual discretion to refuse document production.” ... That document is hence similar to the “earlier drafts of a final position paper” which do not have to be disclosed …. ...

. … The Tax Court [under s. 171(1)] can only vacate, vary or refer an assessment back to the Minister. The opinion rendered by the Minister under subsection 247(10) … is not an assessment, although it will affect an assessment. … Even if the Tax Court could review the opinion without quashing it, since the existing opinion would remain in place (and therefore there would not be an opinion of the Minister that it would be appropriate to make the downward adjustment), on what basis could the assessment be referred back to the Minister? ...

. … Mr. Racine cannot be said to have sat in appeal from a decision he made. ... Sokol. … Dr. Sokol’s evidence was clear, compelling, and demonstrated the appellant’s knowing involvement in the scheme. … Although the above was sufficient in itself to result in the dismissal of this appeal, for the sake of completeness Gleason JA also addressed the other arguments, finding that the organization “had inadequate control over the distribution of funds in Israel” (para. 60); it did not ensure that that the agent used the charity’s resources to carry out activities on the charity’s behalf (paras. 63 and 44); it failed to keep accurate books and records by falsifying minutes of Board of Directors’ meetings and not maintaining documentation to support travel expenses, remuneration paid to fundraisers, activities in Israel and the donation scheme (para. 65); and it failed to file accurate information returns (paras. 74 and 75). ...

In rejecting this submission, Gleason JA stated (at paras. 15, 16): On its plain meaning, a deeming provision does not constitute an “election” or “appointment” …. … This textual interpretation is also supported by the interpretive presumption of consistent expression, which would require, unless the context dictates otherwise, that the terms “elected” and “appointed” be given a meaning in subsection 119(2) that is consistent with other provisions in the OBCA where these terms are used …. ...

. … Mr. Barrs finds himself faced with an interest bill that far exceeds those of the taxpayers who made their requests for relief in 2004. ... Given that the independent third-level review officer failed to engage with the request for greater relief in the open years to ensure equitable treatment, his decision must be set aside. … Failure to engage with an important argument advanced by a party will generally render an administrative decision unreasonable [citing Vavilov] …. ...

In reversing the Tax Court and in finding that the non-capital losses were deductible, Webb JA noted that, under Stewart, the test of whether “the activity is being carried out in a commercially sufficient manner to constitute a source of income” (Stewart, at para. 60) was only engaged “if there is a hobby or personal element to the activity in question” (Brown, at para. 26), and stated (at paras. 27, 29): … Mr. Brown’s decision to provide these management services as a result of his wife’s inability to continue to manage the gallery, does not mean that there is a personal or hobby element to his management services activity …. ... It is possible to find a personal reason why any person is carrying on a particular activity. … Since there was no personal or hobby element in Mr. ...

. … [T]he fact is that the same eighteen persons who formed the Partnership were the very same persons who comprised the Co-Tenancy. … [T]he agreement to pay the tenant inducement payment of $1.2 million was of no legal consequence and.. it cannot be considered an outlay or expense made for the purpose of gaining or producing income…. ...

The Queen, 74 DTC 6540, [1974] CTC 681 (FCA)-- summary under Interpretation/Definition Provisions Summary Under Tax Topics- Statutory Interpretation- Interpretation/Definition Provisions tags captured a broader range of operations than those specifically referenced In finding that the reference in the definition of “farming” to "maintaining" of horses for racing included an operation where the care and training of the horses was contracted out to independent contractors, Jackett CJ stated (at p. 6541): [T]he words “maintaining of horses for racing” were intended to apply not only to what is commonly thought of as the operation of a racing stable but also to the less pretentious business operations consisting of racing horses in circumstances where the businessman does not have his own stable and pasture premises and staff of “boys” and trainers …. This would seem to follow from the context of the definition where expressions such as ‘“tillage of the soil”, “raising of poultry” and ‘the keeping of bees” are obviously used, in each case, to refer to the whole gamut of operations constituting the particular class of business succinctly described by the words commonly used to describe it. … What was being done throughout the definition of “farming” was the adoption of short “tags” to indicate different types of operations. ...