Search - 报销 发票日期 消费日期不一致

Smith J found that the receipts were invalid, stating (at paras 31, 32 and 45): … [A] receipt is a written document delivered in exchange for the receipt of money, goods or services, reflecting the actual amount of money or the fair market value of the property or services received. It follows that a document, though it bears the title “receipt” or “charitable receipt” …, may not be treated or accepted as such if it does not accurately reflect the money paid or the fair market value of the property or services actually provided in exchange. … [A]lthough the donation receipts in question are described as “official receipts” …, they are not in fact receipts as that term is ordinarily understood. ... (para 48) “The receipt issued by [the third charity]… clearly indicates that the Appellant made a cash donation… when her evidence was that she made the bulk of the donation by cheque. … In any event, …it was an inflated donation receipt and on that basis, …invalid.” ...

In finding that the recipient of the supply of the property was Mayling, so that the appellant was liable for failure to have charged HST given Mayling’s unregistered status, Bocock J stated (at paras 32, 34, 36-37): … Factually, neither of the purported agent or bare trustee nor principal or Beneficial Owner existed when the APS was executed. … At law, Mayling was not relieved of its obligations under the APS by any identifiable document.... …[C]ases where a bare trust or agency have been found to exist, and are interpreted by CRA to exist, require some documentary or evidential disclosure of the various parties to the supplier at the time of supply. … …[N]one of…the alleged Beneficial Owners and principals, nor 840 Holdings, the alleged trustee or agent, executed the APS, was described in such capacity to the Appellant or was reliably described in other contemporaneous collateral documents as such. … Bocock J concluded (at para 40): Mayling remained the purchaser until closing and, as such, obligated to pay the consideration. … Therefore both the ETA and APS required the Appellant to collect and remit the HST. ...

. … The evidence did not show that flight attendants who commuted to the Calgary airport using their own car were more reliable and flexible than those using other means of transportation. … … I was not presented with any evidence that …quantifies the effect on Jazz’s profits or costs of the use of a parking pass by Mr. Smith and/or other flight attendants. … The only conclusion I can reach is that Jazz paid for the parking pass simply because it was required to do so pursuant to the Collective Agreement. … ...

The key considerations …are: …{H]is primary intention … to sell …at a profit as soon as a reasonable return …could be realized. ... Foote spent considerable time …monitoring markets beyond what … was required for his employment. … [H]e gleaned relevant market information as part of his daily job…. ... The nature of the gains … bears a close similarity to what he has been doing in his investment dealer positions for decades. … Mr. ...

DaSilva’s notice of assessment was to be printed. … The problem is that Mr. ... Subsection 335(6) requires that, if the Minister wants to rely on an affidavit to prove mailing, the affiant must have charge of the appropriate records and must have reviewed them. … … Ms. ... Neill. … The Respondent could easily have obtained an affidavit from Ms. ...

This is what Jayco is asking the Court to do. … In essence, Jayco is submitting that the Minister ought to have exercised her discretion differently and not taken any collection action on the GST/HST assessed. Had she done so, Jayco would not have had to obtain the letter of credit and pay interest on it. … The Minister has the power to take collection actions against a person under the ETA once a person is assessed and unpaid amounts of tax remain. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the Minister’s exercise of that power—that jurisdiction rests with the Federal Court. … The Rules are clear that disbursements will only be awarded if they are essential to the conduct of the proceedings. … The interest was not paid by Jayco to establish that the Minister’s assessment was incorrect and therefore did not arise from the appeal filed before this Court. ...

CRA took the position that the production activity referenced in Reg. 1204(1)(b) “ceased at the wellhead” – and it reassessed to the taxpayer (a participant in the joint venture) to reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s production profits by the expenses of the OLS (effectively treating them as equalling the income from transporting the crude, and then deducting the same amounts as an expense applicable to the transportation profits). CRA in particular relied on the exclusion in Reg. 1204(3)(a) for “income … derived from transporting … petroleum”. ... The OLS had no impact one way or the other on the amount of income realized by the joint venture owners from the sale of the Hibernia crude and did not in and of itself generate any income or loss for the joint venture owners. … …[P]aragraph 1204(3)(a) was intended to ensure that additional income derived from transporting/transmitting crude does not attract the resource allowance. ...

Ghumman, in computing his income from employment …, to deduct the commissions received by GFP in respect of the Policy. … According to the principle enunciated in Bilodeau, if the CRA decides, for whatever reason, not to extend [its] administrative policy … to a particular taxpayer, the taxpayer cannot expect this Court to require the CRA to comply with its administrative policy in a situation where that policy is not consistent with the ITA. Sommerfeldt J went on to find that CRA’s expressed policy was in any event inapplicable here, stating (at para. 18): [T] hat policy… applies where the individual who acquires a life insurance policy and who pays the premiums … is the person who receives the commissions. … [I]t was Mr. ...

The Queen, 2020 TCC 44-- summary under Subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 152- Subsection 152(4)- Paragraph 152(4)(a)- Subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) meaning of misrepresentation in French and English versions is prima facie different The taxpayer was reassessed for quite a number of taxation years for which the main substantive issue was whether dispositions of shares in an offshore fund were on capital account – but many of the earlier years were beyond the normal reassessment period. ... Wong J stated (at paras. 19-23): This question requires a decision as to whether the English or French version of the provision is to be preferred…. … I do not believe that this question is suitable for determination under rule 58. ... In dismissing the motion, she stated (at paras. 24-25): I cannot agree with the Appellant’s proposition … that a question of income versus capital necessarily amounts to a difference in opinion. … [T]he factual circumstances of the appeal will determine whether the issue of income versus capital is purely a difference of opinion or not. … The question of whether a misrepresentation under subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) contemplates fact only or mixed-law-and-fact, should properly remain with the trier of fact to determine in conjunction with the related substantive issues. ...

Owen J rejected the CIBC position- that such loss was deemed by s. 39(2) to be a capital loss from foreign currency and therefore was excluded from the application of the s. 40(3.6) stop-loss rule, which applied only if the loss were viewed as having arisen from the disposition of the subsidiary’s shares – indicating that this position was inconsistent with a statement in the BMO case that: “[t]he gain or loss arising as a result of a disposition of a particular property was (and still is) determined under subsection 40(1)” before any application of s. 39(2). Furthermore, Owen J disagreed with the CIBC position, stating (at paras. 72-72, 137): [S]ubsection 39(2) was not required to address foreign currency fluctuations associated with acquisitions and dispositions of property other than foreign currency because subsection 40(1) read with due regard to the need to convert the amounts identified in that subsection into Canadian dollars already addressed such fluctuations and integrated them into the gain or loss computed under subsection 40(1). … [T]his fact and the fact … that extending subsection 39(2) to dispositions of property other than foreign currency raises difficult issues together strongly suggest that Parliament did not intend that subsection 39(2) apply to dispositions of property other than foreign currency. … In conclusion … subsection 39(2) as it read in 2007 was a stand-alone provision but Parliament did not intend that the subsection apply to dispositions of property other than foreign currency. ...