Search - 德国民法典第1993条

Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, [1993] S.C.J. No. 20, at 611-12; Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. ...

He applied the test for residency set out in Re Koo, [1993] 1 FCR 286 [Re Koo]. ... Three potential tests exist: (1) the “centralized mode of living test” from Papadogiorgakis which allows some temporary absences from Canada to be counted as days of presence so long as the person has centralized his or her mode of living in Canada; (2) the “regularly, normally or customarily lives” test from Re Koo, builds upon that approach by applying a six—factor assessment to determine what absences can be counted; and (3) the “physical presence” test from (Re) Pourghasemi, [1993] FCJ No 32 [Re Pourghasemi] departs from both those tests and instead counts only the days when the person is physically in Canada. [19]   The Applicant maintains that there was no justification for the Citizenship Judge to reject the application solely because she concluded that Ms. ...

The Commission’s statement that “any” submissions were considered does not assist the Court to understand whether the Commission considered this late day explanation and rejected it, and if so, why, or whether the Commission overlooked the submission altogether in the chain of email. [36]   The longstanding general principle is that a decision-maker is assumed to have considered all the evidence, even though every piece of evidence is not addressed in the reasons, unless the contrary is shown: Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598 (QL), 1993 CarswellNat 3983 (CA). ...

Employees who must remain available during their meal break are sometimes, but not systematically, entitled to some compensation. [7]   The adjudicator also upheld three principles of the arbitration decision in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v PANS, [1993] NSLAA No 8: (1) if an employer directs an employee to perform an activity, the employee is at work and is to be paid; (2) if an employer gives an employee the opportunity to perform an activity, compensation may be paid in some circumstances; and (3)if an employee voluntarily performs an activity which in other circumstances would be “work”, the employee will not be paid because the activity was performed voluntarily. [8]   The collective agreement governing the PPS’s labour relations at the time of the grievance provides for unpaid meal breaks unless employees are required to remain at their post. [9]   As for the time needed to put on and remove the full uniform (the latter includes storing restricted equipment), the evidence before the adjudicator was largely contradictory. ... Since the time required to do so arises from the employee’s personal choice to leave the Armed Operational Precinct, the employee should not be paid (Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v PANS, [1993] NSLAA No 8). [24]   It is my view that this conclusion adequately addresses both aspects of Mr. ...

Status of the male applicant under Article 1E of the Convention [28]   The factors derived from Fleurisca v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 810, establish the criteria by which this Court may analyze judicial review of a decision based on Article 1E of the Convention. [29]   The first step is to determine whether the RAD erred in concluding that the male applicant was excluded from the Convention by application of Article 1E. [30]   Article 1E of the Convention is incorporated into Canadian law through section 98 of the IRPA, which provides that a person referred to in Article 1E of the Convention cannot be a refugee or a person in need of protection. [31]   As the Supreme Court stated in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, international protection is a surrogate that comes into play only when the applicant has no alternative. ... The RPD is presumed to have weighed and examined all the evidence submitted to it, unless it is demonstrated not to have done so (Newfoundland Nurses at para 16; Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598 (FCA) at para 1) In this case, I am satisfied that the RPD considered all the evidence, even if it does not refer directly to all its components. ...

[23]   The first step consists of determining whether the RAD erred in concluding that the applicant was excluded from the Convention pursuant to Article 1E. [24]   Article 1E of the Convention is incorporated into Canadian law through section 98 of the IRPA, which stipulates that a person referred to in Article 1E of the Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. [25]   As affirmed by the Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 1993 CanLII 105 (SCC), international protection is a surrogate that comes into play where no alternative remains to the claimant. ...

In 1993, the Plaintiff declared a net profit of $3,053.91 from farming, but that included $9,710.00 revenue from rental income, which is properly not included as income from farming. The Plaintiff therefore incurred a net farming loss of $6,656.09 in 1993. ...

I will review the causes of action the Plaintiff attempts to advance and assess whether his Amended Claim discloses any material facts supporting it. (1) Misrepresentation Claims and Breach of Contract [10] A claim of negligent misrepresentation requires a plaintiff to plead material facts capable of establishing the following (Butt v Canada, 2024 FC 983 at para 20, citing Queen v Cognos, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, [1993] SCJ No 3 (SCC) at para 34): 1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care based on a special relation between the parties; 2) The defendant made an untrue, inaccurate or misleading misrepresentation; 3) The defendant acted negligently in making the misrepresentation; 4) The plaintiff relied, in a reasonable manner, on the representation; and 5) The plaintiff suffered some detriment as a direct result of relying on the representation. [11] The legal test for a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation is similar but requires an element of intention to deceive (Fitzpatrick v Codiac Regional RCMP Force, District 12, 2022 FC 841 at para 40). ...

., [1993] 2 FC 425 (CA) in support of his argument. [11] The Applicant nevertheless raises in his written representations in reply, for the first time, that Associate Judge Horne erred because: a) the Applicant’s delay in moving his proceeding forward was a result of the Registry’s refusal to file his Applicant’s Record, and the Associate Judge did not address the Registry’s role in the matter not moving forward; b) the Court should have granted him leniency because he is a self-represented litigant; c) considering the Hennelly factors, an extension of time should have been granted to the Applicant to file his submissions on status review; and, d) the settlement proposal as a plan going forward in the litigation was improperly critiqued by the Associate Judge. [12] The Respondent has not sought leave to respond to the Applicant’s new arguments raised for the first time in his written representations in reply. ... (C.A.), 1993 CanLII 2939 (FCA) [Aqua- Gem] is misplaced in this case. ...

The appellant Del Zotto was advised on 21 April 1993 that an inquiry would be made into his financial affairs for the taxation years 1979 to 1985 inclusive and that the calling of evidence would begin on 6 May 1993 (Case on Appeal, VII, 1089). ... Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416: and to Minister of National Revenue v. Kruger Inc., [1984] 2 F.C. 535], such an attack cries out to be made. ... [FN12: <p> [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.).</p>] involved the preconditions for the issue of search warrants. 54 Like my colleague MacGuigan J.A. ...