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Bromwich J stated (at para 6): … [S]enior counsel for the Commissioner …placed particular reliance on the Full Court decision in Bennett v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Customs Service [2004] FCAFC 237; (2004) 140 FCR 101 as follows: [A]fter referring to Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1 at 13 [29] and 15 [34] … [Tamberlin J] applied those authorities …to find that legal professional privilege had been waived over an advice because the substance of the advice was conveyed in a letter sent to the solicitors for the successful appellant in order to emphasise and promote the strength and substance of the case to be made against him. ... I … do not need to resolve the question as to whether reliance stated in a part of an affidavit that is ultimately rejected as inadmissible constitutes sufficient reliance for wavier of privilege. ...

. … It is in the nature of reimbursement of cost whereby the three agents paid their proportionate share of the expenses incurred on these said systems and for maintaining those systems. … Once the character of the payment is found to be in the nature of reimbursement of the expenses, it cannot be income chargeable to tax. …'[P]rofit' from operation of ships under Article…9 … would necessarily include expenses for earning that income and cannot be separated, more so, when it is found that the business cannot be run without these expenses. ...

The Court referred inter alia to the statement in Commissioner of Taxation v Raymor (NSW) Pty Ltd (1990) 24 FCR 90 (at 101) that: Once … it is appreciated that an outgoing may be deductible notwithstanding that it may be defeasible, there can be no logical reason why an outgoing pursuant to a contract may not be deductible notwithstanding that the ultimate price payable upon delivery of the goods the subject of a contract may be varied upwards or downwards to reflect the increased cost of the goods. In finding that the trust’s share of the Settlement Amount was incurred by it on June 30, 1999, the Court stated (at paras. 103, 110): [T]he Tribunal [below] relied on the fact that, under the Contract of Sale, the Glendale Property Syndicate was entitled to terminate the contract if an insolvency event occurred in relation to [the purchaser] as a basis for concluding that “it was not known whether the Contract of Sale would proceed” …. However, the cases discussed above do not suggest that, without more, this type of contingency is enough to conclude that an outgoing is not incurred upon execution of a contract. … Neither approval [by the Department of Health and Aged Care] of the Purchaser as an Approved Provider nor approval of the transfer of the Approved Places from Prime Life Corporation to the Purchaser was a condition for payment of the balance of the purchase price. ...

Prior to that decision, the appellant in that case had appealed the denial by the ARQ of the input tax refunds claimed by it for QST on those invoices under the equivalent provisions under the Quebec Sales Tax Act, to the Court of Quebec – and also stated that (at para. 25) “I am convinced that the appellant did not truly acquire the supplies for which it claimed ITCs in its net tax calculation.” ... To have a right to the claimed input tax refunds, the appellant had to establish that it had acquired the supplies for which it claimed the refunds and provide invoices issued by the suppliers that conformed to the requirements under the QSTA and the Regulation. … Since all the supplies had a value of $150 or more, the invoices were required to contain a description sufficient to identify each supply. However, none of them had such a description. … The new evidence would not provide any invoice that could qualify for the desired refunds. ...

The two upper units (9092 and 9094, each representing 23% of the triplex), had been rented out by him to third parties until 2007, but he took the position that thereafter they represented personal use property of the taxpayer – although, for 14 months, he rented out one of the units to a friend at his stated cost of $400 per month- and, with the stated objective of improving the salability of the triplex, in 2011 he announced that 9094 was available for rent and leased it shortly before the sale of the triplex. ... Each must not be a distinct and autonomous unit; each must instead complement the other and lose to some extent its separate identity for the benefit of the whole. … [N]o transformation or modification of much significance was made to the Triplex in order for the three units to be linked in some manner to each other. … The units preserved their distinct character…. ...

However, Mobile and the ARQ subsequently signed a protocol reaffirming the points in contention for all the reassessed years – and subsequently to that, the notice of appeal was amended to reference the second notice of reassessment (no. 1386). ... He further stated (at para. 34): [F]rom the receipt of the notice of reassessment, the taxpayer had 90 days to object to it, not in order to contest something new … but to reiterate his contesting of the subject of the notice no. 1144, being the assessment already under appeal. In finding that, in light inter alia of the signed protocol, Mobile should be considered to have objected to the second reassessment (no. 1380), Cameron JCQ stated (at para. 44): The Minister … not only had acknowledged receipt of the written statement of the intention of the taxpayer to object to the assessment in force in 2012, but he agreed with the opposing party and with the Court to bring the debate to an early hearing on its subject matter. ...

However, it was precluded by statute from going back more than three years with its refund claims – but there was no such time limitation where a repayment of VAT was claimed based on there being “a decrease in consideration for a supply.” Before rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that its change in calculating the consideration for its supplies involved a “decrease in consideration,” so that it could go back more than three years, Lord Legatt stated (at para. 30) that it was “clear that there can be only one correct method of calculating the taxable element of fees charged to customers for playing cash bingo and … this was the session by session method and not the game by game method.” ... In this regard, he stated (at para. 39): I recognise that the fact that a single composite price is charged is not decisive and there may be cases in which it better reflects commercial reality to regard customers who pay a single price as intending to purchase two or more distinct services …. ...

Power was admissible), Gogan J stated (at paras. 83, 84, 87, 93): … None of Power’s work can be characterized as de facto investigation. ... In this case, I am satisfied that any evidence obtained came as a result of Power’s audit inquiries.... … I find that the predominant purpose of the investigation did not turn to criminal or penal liability until after the completion of Power’s interviews with each of the accused. … ...

Accordingly, Taxation Act s. 99 (equivalent to the ½ step-up rule in ITA s. 13(7)(e)) did not apply to reduce the capital cost to 501 of the acquired software. ... The fact that a deduction, in the abstract, could have been allowed in respect of a property cannot, however, permit that property to be characterized as a purely depreciable property to SherWeb, when the evidence demonstrated that it had lost that character by reason of the various expenditures on programmers' salaries, and the SR&ED credits that were accorded to it year after year. … One cannot escape the fact that, to SherWeb, the Software has never been treated as a depreciable asset, and so continually until the time "immediately before the transfer" to the respondent. Regarding an ARQ submission that the Reg. 1102(1)(d) equivalent was intended only to preclude a double deduction (for SR&ED and CCA) and not to avoid the ½ step-up rule, the Court stated (at para. 34): Regarding the appellant's position that the deduction of salaries over the years as an expense does not preclude the Software being depreciable property, it must be remembered that the salaries were deducted as an expense paid to maintain the profitability of the business activities which were, as such, an expense on income account even though the sums spent on the initial creation of the Software could have qualified as capital costs. ...

Revenue and Customs v Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC, [2022] UKUT 199 (TCC), overruled on transfer-pricing analysis but aff'd on other grounds at [2024] EWCA Civ 330-- summary under Paragraph 247(2)(b) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 247- New- Subsection 247(2)- Paragraph 247(2)(b) complete denial of interest deductions under the UK transfer pricing rules because the loan was made without group support covenants The structure for the acquisition by the BlackRock group of the North American management business of Barclays Global Investors (“BGI”) entailed a BlackRock group LLC (“LLC4”) lending US$4 billion to a wholly-owned LLC (“LLC5”) as well as injecting substantial equity into LLC5, with LLC5 using most of those proceeds to subscribe for preferred shares of the transaction Buyco (“LLC6” – which acquired all the shares of BGI). ... In the hypothetical transaction however, the dividend flow would need to be secured so far as possible …. In confirming the denial by HMRC of all of LLC5’s interest deductions on the basis that the loan transaction between the two enterprises (LLC4 and LLC5) was not one which would have been made by arm’s-length enterprises (i.e., it lacked covenants of LLC5 and BGI to ensure the flow of dividends to LLC5 to service the loan), the Tribunal stated (at paras. 75-76): Third-party covenants that were not given as part of or in support of the actual transaction cannot be considered to be part of the hypothetical transaction as this materially changes the surrounding circumstances and alters the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions in question. … [A]n independent lender would not have made a $4 billion loan to LLC5 without such covenants being in place and that important finding should itself have determined that there was no comparable arm’s length transaction. ...