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In rejecting this claim, Russel J stated (at paras. 12-14): CIBC World Markets [2012 FCA 3] … affirmed that the Minister of National Revenue can only assess tax consistent with his/her view of the underlying facts and law. … Here, DTI’s settlement offer … was simply a “let’s split it down the middle” settlement offer. ...

Ghumman, in computing his income from employment …, to deduct the commissions received by GFP in respect of the Policy. … According to the principle enunciated in Bilodeau, if the CRA decides, for whatever reason, not to extend [its] administrative policy … to a particular taxpayer, the taxpayer cannot expect this Court to require the CRA to comply with its administrative policy in a situation where that policy is not consistent with the ITA. Sommerfeldt J went on to find that CRA’s expressed policy was in any event inapplicable here, stating (at para. 18): [T] hat policy… applies where the individual who acquires a life insurance policy and who pays the premiums … is the person who receives the commissions. … [I]t was Mr. ...

Green’s adaptive functioning … is an exercise in assessing whether her mental illness markedly impacts her adaptive functioning as an overall matter. ... … I am satisfied … that it does and that, at least since 2015, it has done so all, or substantially all, of the time. ... Green in coping with her anxieties, but has led to other problems, such as failing school, loss of employment, self-harm activities, reluctance to pursue therapy, and taking on too many projects. … ...

. … So long as the business is one that may be “carried on” (i.e., not an “adventure in the nature of trade”) all businesses — without statutory exception — fall within the scope of subsection 146.2(6) of the Act, including a business of trading qualified investments. ... It had already done so in the context of a different statutory scheme when it amended the RRSP legislation in 1993 to make such an exception for RRSPs. … As directed by Mr. ...

The taxpayer acknowledged that the related expenses claimed by him did not qualify under the terms of the adoption tax credit (“AETC”) provided under s. 118.01, but argued that he was entitled to the credit because s. 118.01 infringed his equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter – and submitted that the remedy should be the expansion of the AETC to cover his claimed expenses. ... Hogan further stated (at paras. 22, 30 and 34): [T]he Appellant’s claim also fails because limiting the AETC to adoption-related expenses does not perpetuate or exacerbate any preexisting disadvantage or prejudice within the meaning of section 15 of the Charter. … The AETC was tailored to cover adoption expenses because Parliament simply wanted to encourage domestic and international adoptions in the interest of vulnerable children. … [T]he inclusion of surrogacy expenses … is inconsistent with the raison d’être of the AETC designed to promote adoptions. … [I]n the event the AETC does create a distinction on an analogous ground, the distinction is not discriminatory because the AETC has an ameliorative purpose that specifically targets a disadvantaged group identified by the analogous ground. ...

In rejecting the appellants' arguments that the Part III assessments were statute-barred, Smith J stated (at paras. 93-94): … The Appellants cannot argue that the nil reassessments are statute-barred and then ask the Court to extrapolate from that and conclude that the Part III Reassessments that are the subject matter of these appeals are also statute-barred and “therefore invalid and without legal force.” ... Moreover, … nothing prevents the Court … from reviewing the validity of transactions that are alleged to have triggered the subject capital gains and capital losses and that are alleged to form the basis for the additions made to the capital dividend accounts. Before going on to find that the purported acquisition by the appellants of trust units that had a high tax basis (whose alleged disposition generated the capital losses) were a sham, he stated (at para. 95): If I am wrong in so concluding, then I find that the Part I Reassessments were not statute-barred and that the Minister was entitled to issue them because … the Appellants had made a misrepresentation that was attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default or fraud, as required by subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) of the ITA. ...

" See summary under s. 9 – capital gain v. profit – real estate. ...

The Queen, 2018 TCC 262-- summary under Subsection 165(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 165- Subsection 165(1) objection can be made after the proposal letter and before the notice of reassessment – but must state “I object” On May 11, 2015, the taxpayer was sent a letter by Mr. ... Payne did not qualify as a notice of objection, and that the taxpayer was out of time for an extension under s. 166.2(5)(a), Sommerfeldt J stated (at paras 17, 18): …[T]o be a notice of objection, a document “must include an actual objection to an assessment,” or at least some indication that the particular taxpayer is objecting to an assessment. … [The taxpayer's] letter of April 27, 2015 … does not contain any statement taking issue with the CRA’s categorization of those expenses. … Unfortunately, I have been unable to find anything in the letter to indicate that [the taxpayer]... was objecting to a reassessment. ...

Tool & Die Company Limited to W.S.W. Tool & Die Inc., the writ of execution and report of nulla bona were in the former company name. ...

. … Estoppel cannot override the law. … It is an established principle that the Minister has a duty to assess tax on the facts as she finds them in accordance with her understanding and interpretation of the law. … ...