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This occurred – the offer of another public company (“Inco” – the 25% minority shareholder) was accepted by the Diamond Fields shareholders, thereby triggering the payment by Diamond Fields of the break fee. The break fee did not qualify as proceeds of disposition of a Falconbridge right to merge, as she did not consider there to be such a right: Diamond Fields could not promise the acceptance by its shareholders of the Falconbridge offer nor could it fetter the fiduciary obligations of its board – there was no capital gain. ...

Masse DJ nonetheless found that the taxpayer was carrying on business, stating (at para. 40): … He certainly could demonstrate better business practices and I note that his record keeping leaves much to be desired but I still conclude that he conducted his activities with a level of commerciality sufficient to constitute a business. …. His ventures have seen prior successes and he … is continuing to pursue similar opportunities in hopes of repeating his prior success. Although the taxpayer’s expenses were only documented in his spreadsheets (he did not provide any invoices, receipts etc.), Masse DJ allowed a significant portion of the claimed expenses – but disallowed others, for example, only allowing the expenses of the taxpayer’s cell phone but not his two land lines (stating, at para. 47, that “it is more reasonable to dedicate one telephone for … for business use.”) ...

After adverting to the Jarvis doctrine, he stated (at paras. 112-114, 120-121): [T]he primary goal of the intervention of the evening of June 12, 2014 was not merely to conduct a tax audit, but above all to avoid a destruction of evidence. … In such a case, an Anton Pillar order can constitute a judicial remedy …. A judicial authorization however is required [therefor] …. [A] requirement certainly cannot be used to disguise a seizure made without judicial authorization. In such circumstances, section 8 of the Charter … was infringed by the ARQ…. ...

., 83 DTC 5095, [1983] CTC 90 (FCTD)-- summary under Paragraph 239(1)(f) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 239- Subsection 239(1)- Paragraph 239(1)(f) It was stated, in connection with a case where the accused had corroborated the V-day value of land with false documentation, that: "I do not conceive how any precise finding of value dependent on the opinion evidence of experts in land valuation could be arrived at beyond a reasonable doubt [:] R. v. Gardner (1982) 66 C.C.C. (2d) 477 (SCC) '... the facts which justify the sanction are no less important than the facts which justify the conviction. ...

He noted (at para. 88) that Johnston, [1948] S.C.R. 486, had not said “anything about … the shifting of the persuasive burden to the Minister,” that this was “explained by the fact that only one party can bear the persuasive burden in respect of an issue such as the correctness of an assessment” and that comments of L’Heureux Dubé J in Hickman to a different effect “were obiter dicta ” (para. 93). ... In such circumstances, it is not unfair to the Appellants to allow the Minister to assume what went on behind the curtain. … By participating in the Programs without further inquiry, the Appellants accepted the risk that the facts behind the curtain were not what they expected them to be. I therefore conclude that the Minister’s assumptions of fact … are to be taken as true … and that in accordance with the principles stated in House, the taxpayer must present at least a prima facie case to demolish those assumptions of fact. … As Eisbrenner was unable to do so with respect to the donation by him of the certificates, the denial by the Minister of charitable credits for their donation was confirmed. ...

Smith J indicated (at para. 522) that: [T]he T3GR Return was the prescribed form intended by CRA to meet the filing requirements of RRSP trustees pursuant to paragraph 150(1)(c) and subsection 207.2(1) of the Act and section 204 of the Regulations and … it was intended as a streamlined process for the reporting of group RRSPs involving hundreds of thousands of plans under one specimen plan. Smith J noted (at para. 523) that the T3GR form “specified that ‘to report taxable income (…) trustees must complete a T3 … Return’,” and found (at para. 525) that “the T3GR Returns were not intended to override a trustee’s other reporting obligations arising from the Act, notably the obligation to file a T3 Return pursuant to paragraph 150(1)(c) or to report taxable income arising from subsection 146(10.1),” and (at para. 533) that the assessments made by CRA based on the T3GR returns were made “only in connection with the taxable plans and not in connection with the non-taxable plans that were listed for information purposes only, including the RRSP Trust.” ...

Miller J: “had concluded that a reassessment will be considered valid if the intention of the Minister at the time of [its] making…was to pursue verification;” and had found that that “there is no law…to the effect that a protective assessment is invalid if issued for the sole purpose of leaving the door open to conduct or continue an audit” (- and she went on to indicate that Karda was similiar); and noted (at para. 129) that it was necessary to issue the reassessments in order to implement the accord with RTA respecting its directly incurred SR&ED expenditures. Respecting an RTA submisssion that, under s. 152(1), the MInister was required to make a determination of the amount of tax before issuing the reassessments, D'Auray J stated (at para 154, Tax Interpretations translation): In my view, RTA confuses the validity and correctness of an assessment. … [I]n... ... Miller J. … explained that in the Anchor Pointe decision the Federal Court of Appeal considered the correctness of the assessment as the product of the examination, and not the validity of the assessment as the process. … Accordingly, the reassessments were valid. ...

Before confirming the decision below to dismiss the application, LeBlanc JA found: Regarding the stipulation in Art. 25, para 1 of the Canada-Switzerland Treaty that “an exchange of information will only be requested once the requesting Contracting State has pursued all reasonable means available under its internal taxation procedure to obtain the information,” he stated that “[t]he true intentions of the parties, as they emerge from extrinsic materials when it comes to Article 25 (namely to promote the exchange of information to the maximum extent possible with a view, notably, of preventing tax evasion and avoidance), are reflected … in the actual language of that provision, coupled with that of the Interpretative Protocol" which, in Art. 2(c) thereof, "stated that the notion of 'foreseeable relevance' is intended 'to provide for exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent', provided the requesting State does not engage in 'fishing expeditions' or request information 'unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer'" (para. 28). Furthermore, “it was reasonably open to the CRA … to proceed with the … RFIs at the time it did in view of the fact that Messrs. ... Regarding the applicants’ submission that the specific listing in the Protocol, of types of information that could be requested, established a “ceiling” for such requests, LeBlanc JA stated (at paras. 47, 49) that “paragraph 2(b) of the Interpretative Protocol establishes a threshold, not an upper limit” and that “on a reasonableness analysis … there is no issue with the fact that the CRA provided the Swiss Authorities with more information—essentially background information—than what was minimally required by paragraph 2(b) of the Interpretative Protocol.” ...

Leblanc JA noted: (at para. 46, TaxInterpretations translation) that the “text of subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 … does not provide further guidance on whether the unpaid or unpaid ‘amount’ on which interest and penalty may be charged is gross or net [of rebate entitlements]” (at para. 50) that the rebate provisions in this case were intended by “Parliament … to remedy a situation that would otherwise be inequitable to non-registrant ‘builders’" who were unable to claim input tax credits for their GST costs (see para. 68), (at para. 64) that if the respondent had not reported the transaction and instead been assessed by CRA under s. 191(3), CRA would have been required under s. 296(2.1) to grant the rebate amounts Leblanc JA then stated (at paras. 66, 69): To paraphrase … Humber College, it would be incongruous, to say the least, if provisions purporting to assist a taxpayer caused more harm to a well-meaning taxpayer than to a less well-meaning one …. This cannot be the result that Parliament intended in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …. I do not believe that Parliament, in enacting subsection 280(1) and section 280.1 …, had in its mind that the determination of the "amount" to be paid or remitted for the purposes of calculating interest and penalty for late filing of the GST return could, in circumstances such as these …, be made without regard to any rebate otherwise payable to the taxpayer. ...

After stating (at para. 61) that “subsection 94.1(1) … contemplates in express terms that an instrument that derives its value from fluctuating portfolio investments can be a debt” and (at para. 87) that a narrow construction of “debt” would go contrary to the purpose of the above provisions of “annual imputation of income while … foreign investments are in place,” Noël CJ found that future crystallization of the amount due was sufficient, and concluded (at para. 91): When regard is had to the text, context and purpose of paragraph 94.1(1)(a), a debt arises for purposes of this provision when an amount or credit is advanced by one party to another party; an amount is to be paid or repaid by that other party at some point in the future in satisfaction of the advance and this amount is fixed or determinable or will be ascertainable when payment is due. As these three conditions are present here … this suffices to dispose of the appeal …. ...