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In rejecting the Bank’s position, Woods JA indicated: Given that “Parliament seeks certainty, predictability and fairness in tax legislation … [i]f Parliament did not intend to impose interest when a loss carryback is claimed as a result of an audit adjustment, it is likely that Parliament would have provided for this with explicit language” (para. 39). ... It was “likely that Parliament knew that subparagraph (b)(iv) could function in a manner similar to a penalty … [and] that substantial interest could accrue under subparagraph (b)(iv) if the carryback request resulted from an audit” (para. 50). Although the Crown’s position could “result in different treatment between loss carrybacks and …. loss carryforwards … Parliament enacted a specific provision dealing with loss carrybacks, and it chose not to adopt an analogous provision for loss carryforwards” (para. 53). ...

Purpose is ascertained objectively (Ludco …). While subjective manifestations of purpose may sometimes be relevant, the taxpayer’s stated intention … is not determinative. The taxpayer’s conduct is generally more revealing than “ ex post facto declarations” of the taxpayer …. ... Gains and losses arising from hedging derivative contracts take on the character of the underlying asset, liability or transaction being hedged …. ...

No judicial orders were mentioned in the Reply – apart from the … divorce order. ... In view of that, and the Respondent's deficient pleadings, and the Appellant's own testimony and documentation as at least slight evidence tending to support that during at least certain relevant periods he was the parent with primary responsibility for care and upbringing…, I find …the Appellant … was the person primarily responsible for the care and upbringing of JCW throughout the period of January 2013 to and including March 2015. … ...

In finding that the oil-processing equipment included in TMT 4 and 5 also so qualified, he stated (at paras. 82-83): … [T]he oil processing equipment in TMT 4 was also constructed to be used by Stark at its premises …primarily for the purpose of processing Stark’s oil for sale. … Bruce Power’s nuclear power facility … contract with Areva … [was a] situation... similar to that of the seismic equipment in Capilano International, in that Stark expected to bring TMT 4 back to its premises at Bailey’s Brook and continue primarily to process its own oil for sale, which it did. … [G]iven that the contract between Stark and Areva was only for 10 months, and given that the expected working life of TMT 5 would undoubtedly have been far greater than that, I find that the oil processing equipment in TMT 5 also comes within the principle established by Capilano International. ...

Upon their completion, the taxpayer invoiced Téléglobe for $2.7 million (which he included in computing his income – but presumably with deductions for the cost of the work performed) but issued Téléglobe a credit note for the $2 million amount of the improvement allowance. ... As in … Développement Iberville … the appellant did not establish that the work was related to the specific needs of Teleglobe and, therefore, was of no use to other tenants, and that it did not add any value to the building. Finally, the appellant argues that "[i]t is not in doubt that [the purpose of the payment] was to induce Teleglobe to sign the lease and accept the obligations involved" …. ...

In finding that such CCA claims could not be treated as having been revised, Webb JA noted (at para. 36) that “ Nassau Walnut … drew a distinction between an election and a designation” and found (at para. 41) that “the comments in Nassau Walnut with respect to an election, and the inability of a taxpayer to change an election absent a specific provision in the Act permitting such a change, are applicable in this case.” He further stated (at paras. 38, 49): The choice made by the Trust in deciding what amount of CCA to claim in each year is akin to an election as described above by this Court. … If the Trust would have had sufficient income within the relevant time period to use the non-capital losses, then it would have benefited from carrying these non-capital losses forward to the year of profitability. In effect, the Trust would have been entitled to use several years of CCA to reduce its income, rather than only the CCA for the year in which it had a profit. … If the Trust is permitted to revise its earlier claims for CCA, this would defeat the purpose chosen by Parliament of having non-capital losses only available for a particular period of time. ...

Stratas JA noted that Rule 109 required that “the proposed intervener’s submissions … must be useful to ‘the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding’” (para. 6), that “[t]he originating document before the Court... defines the factual and legal issues in the proceeding” (para. 8) and that “[f]or this reason, interveners have to take the issues as they find them and cannot raise new issues” (para. 9). ... Here, the parties had not put in issue the Minister’s designation of DAC as a CCPC in its notice of reassessment (presumably a designation pursuant to s. 89(1) – public corporation – (c)(ii)), whereas QPG wished to intervene on the issue of whether such a designation overrode the legislative criteria imposed by the Act for determining CCPC status. ... Before dismissing the motion to intervene, Stratas JA stated (at paras. 25-27): The issue raised by QPQ … seeks to reinvent the theory of the case. ...

In confirming the decision of the Minister to revoke the registration of the Foundation under s. 168(1)(e) (and before going on to find that the decision of the Minster to revoke under s. 168(1)(b) on the grounds that the consulting fees had not been established to satisfy the requirement for the Foundation to devote all of its resources either to charitable activities or as gifts to qualified donees), Woods JA stated (at paras 37-39, and 43): Prescient Foundation … pointed out that revocation should be limited to instances of “material or repeated non-compliance” …. [T]he Foundation failed to provide any records that demonstrated what consulting services …[Mr.O] provided for the fees he received. … [A] bald reference to consulting projects in an invoice that cannot be corroborated with other evidence does not satisfy the records requirement of the Act. It was reasonable for the Minister to conclude that the failure to maintain supporting documentation to enable verification of the consulting fees paid to … [Mr.O] justified the revocation of the registration, especially since … the Foundation showed no willingness to comply in the future…. … This Court has held that if a charity’s books and records are insufficient for the CRA to assess whether the charity is in compliance with its obligations under the Act, this may be sufficient ground upon which to revoke the charity’s charitable status …. ...

Burton v Commissioner of Taxation, [2019] FCAFC 141-- summary under Subsection 91(4) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 91- Subsection 91(4) credit “in respect of” income only included the taxable ½ of capital gain The taxpayer was an Australian resident who was taxed at the 15% long-term U.S. capital gains rate on his gains on disposal of U.S. oil and gas drilling rights. ... In affirming the decision below to confirm the Commissioner’s denial of a FITO for half of the U.S. tax, Logan J stated (at para. 86): As a matter of ordinary language flowing from the text of s 770-10 … it is only the net capital gain which is … included in Mr Burton’s assessable income. … There is no contextual warrant for construing “included in” as extending to an amount which is used for computation of an amount that is included in assessable income. ...

In finding that this requirement was satisfied, Newey LJ stated (at para. 21): HMRC's case … runs counter to the ordinary meaning of the words "period of ownership". ... A purchaser would, as a matter of ordinary language, be described as "owner" only once the purchase had been completed. … Lord Walker said this on the subject in Jerome v Kelly [2004] UKHL 25 … at paragraph 32: … Neither the seller nor the buyer has unqualified beneficial ownership. ... Newey LJ further found that s. 28 of the TCGA, which provided that the disposal and acquisition of an asset under a non-conditional contract occurred at the time the contract was made, did not “dictate the conclusion that the ‘period of ownership’ of a dwelling-house for the purposes of section … 223 must run from the date of the contract under which it was bought” (para. 25). ...