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In further finding that (even if there had been a misrepresentation) no carelessness or neglect had been established, he stated (at paras. 37, 46, and 49): … [T]he potential significance, for GST purposes, of the fact that PHS’s intended use of the Property differed from that of Sunset would only have been apparent to a person with extensive knowledge of Part IX of the Act, and familiarity with the change of use provisions in subsection 206(4) of the Act. ... Tehrani had neither, and I do not believe it reasonable to expect a lay business person to be knowledgeable about such matters. … … [T]o expect Mr. ... Aridi … found that it was not sufficient to show negligence on the part of the taxpayer’s professional advisor in making the misrepresentation, and that the taxpayer must also be shown to have acted in a negligent or careless manner. ...

. … Kossow … concluded that cases similar in nature should receive the same treatment…. …[T]he Global program was litigated before the Tax Court in Mariano (which was a lead case). … There is no cogent reason why I should not follow the decision by Justice Pizzitelli. … My ruling should be and will be consistent with Mariano concerning donative intent. ...

McDonald J found that CGI could not rely on s. 227(10.1) in the alternative to access a refund beyond the two years, stating (at paras 64, 65 and 67): …[S]ubsection 227(10.1) … gives the Minister discretion and states that the Minister “may” assess at any time. In Canada (Attorney General) v Abraham, 2012 FCA 266, [Abraham] the FCA … concluded that this provision did not confer a statutory right to an assessment. … Here … CGI has not demonstrated a refusal on the part of the Minister to exercise her discretion.... CGI … filed its Notice of Application for Judicial Review… only a few days after the request for an assessment. ...

Before annulling this decision of the ARQ and returning the file to the ARQ for a fresh decision, Moore JCS stated (at paras. 28-29, 31-35, TaxInterpretations translation): Section 94.1 of the Tax Administration Act gives the Agency broad discretion and allows it to cancel up to 100% of the interest charged on late payment of amounts owing: "The Minister may … cancel, in whole or in part, any interest, penalty or charge exigible under a fiscal law.” On the other hand, the Interpretation Bulletin, written to guide the exercise of the discretion described in section 94.1, only provides for the cancellation of a portion of the interest charged in the context of a wash transaction. … The second page of the Agency's August 17, 2015 letter reads: "Revenu Québec acknowledges that [the associated corporation] could have claimed inputs earlier if it had been invoiced at the right time and that no loss to Revenu Québec resulted. That is why we waived, when issuing notices of assessment, interest exceeding the 4%. rate [...] […] The interest limited to 4% imposed on you is applicable to this type of transaction for all mandataries.... ...

. … Creating legal (or equitable) relationships to give effect to a tax plan is not the perpetration of a sham. ... Paris regarding the legal relationships created under Québec law. … … [E]ven if the Appellant’s sole reason (motive) for creating the Trust and transferring the Class F Shares to the Trust was to save tax, that is not in and of itself evidence of a sham. … Own J further found (at para. 75): I have considerable difficulty understanding the basis of the Respondent’s submission that the creation of the Trust was legally ineffective. ...

. … Thus, when section 93.1.6 of the T.A.A. provides that, in the case of an objection to an assessment, “ the Minister shall (…) reconsider the assessment and (…) make a reassessment, and send the Minister's decision to the person by mail,” one should instead read “to the person and to its designated representative, if any ”…. ...

After noting (at para. 11) that the ordinary meaning of “refrigerator” was informed by dictionary definitions that “mention the cooling of food, but … also … contemplate cooling other items,” and (at para. 7) that there was “no dispute … that the industry does not treat wine coolers as refrigerators,” and before dismissing the appeal, Locke JA stated (at para. 20): I do not wish to suggest that the ordinary meaning of a term should always apply even where it has a meaning in the industry. But there is a presumption to that effect, and that presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the industry meaning of the term in question differs from the ordinary meaning. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ ...

. … However … the only right that the partners have, both before and after dissolution, in relation to each asset is a right to the account and distribution after sale of the proceeds of that asset …. ...

In the Court of Appeal, Stratas JA stated (at para. 3) that “ Oceanspan is … directly on point … [and] binds us, just as it bound the Tax Court.” ...

After referring to the Honeywell characterization of a waiver as relating to a bargain under which the taxpayer foregoes the benefit of the normal reassessment period and the Minister acquires the right to assess beyond that period but only respecting the specified matter, C Miller J stated (at paras. 285-286): For an assessment to reasonably relate to a matter in a waiver … it must reasonably relate to the bargain …. There was no bargain between the parties at the time of signing the … waivers that related in any way … to a GAAR application. … The GAAR is a powerful tool in the government’s toolbox which should only normally be viewed as a separate matter, requiring specific mention in a waiver. ...