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A preliminary issues was whether VAT should have been accounted for at the time when the vouchers were sold or when they were redeemed, having regard to s. 1(2) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (the “1994 Act”), which provided that “VAT on any supply of goods or services … becomes due at the time of supply” and s. 6(3) of the 1994 Act providing that generally a supply of services is to be treated as taking place at the time when the services are performed (to be read along with generally similar VAT Directive language). Lord Drummond Young found (at paras 28, 33) respecting this issue, that a supply of services was made only at the time that particular records were downloaded: [T]he search function cannot be considered an end in itself; it is no more than a means towards the customer’s ultimate end, namely viewing and downloading documents about the family that is being researched. …. … The consideration for the payments made by customers to obtain PAYG credits is the ability to view or download particular items on the taxpayer’s website, and does not extend to the general search facility that is available both to customers and to the public. … ...

The remuneration would have been paid for services rendered as part of the commercial activities of Look or the termination of those activities …. … [T]here would be a connection between the litigation to establish (after the registrant has stopped making taxable supplies) that there was an amount of overpaid compensation (and collecting that amount) and the termination of the commercial activity of the registrant because that compensation would be related to services rendered while the registrant was making taxable supplies. Therefore, there is a connection between the termination of Look’s commercial activity and the legal services acquired in relation to the litigation against the Former Executives that would be sufficient to permit Look to claim the input tax credits …. ... Because subsection 141.1(3) of the Act is the more specific provision that only applies in certain situations, it will override subsection 141.01(2) …. ...

The definition of “resident” or “resident of Australia” as found in s 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (1936 Act) provided: resident or resident of Australia means: a person, other than a company, who resides in Australia and includes a person: … who has actually been in Australia, continuously or intermittently, during more than one half of the year of income, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the person’s usual place of abode is outside Australia and that the person does not intend to take up residence in Australia; Before finding that the taxpayer was not specifically deemed to be resident in Australia under the (ii) branch of the definition above, Logan J found that she did not reside in Australia under the general wording in the preamble of the definition, stating (at paras 31 and 34): … Ms Stockton was a paradigm unsettled itinerant during her time in Australia in the 2017 income year. As a matter of deliberate choice, she had no settled employment or place of abode in Australia. … … Here, the only habit or pattern in Ms Stockton’s choice of accommodation was that of opportunism antithetical not just to settling in any one locale but to settling anywhere at all in Australia while she was here. ...

. … … Neither Manulife nor Westcoast asked a health care provider to provide health care services to an employee of Westcoast, nor did Westcoast arrange for health care services to be provided on its premises. Westcoast was not made aware of the specific health care services provided to its employees or their family members …. ... In dismissing Westcoast’s appeal he concluded (at para. 69): Westcoast has failed to demonstrate a relationship between its activities and the consumption or use of the Subject Services by its employees and their families, as required by subsection 175(1) …. ...

After agreeing with Pamel J below that such documents were part of the court file and thus accessible to the public under Rule 26 unless a confidentiality order was obtained, Montigny JA went on to reject the taxpayer’s submission (in reliance on Gernhart) that making the certified record public as a matter of course violated section 8 of the Charter, stating (at para. 70, 72 and 75, TaxInterpretations translation): Anyone engaging the courts in an action … must expect that large parts of his or her private life will become publicly accessible. This is the case under Rule 26, as well as under paragraph 241(3)(b) of the ITA, which provides that the confidentiality of information provided to the Minister does not apply in legal proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the Act. … The documents were not transmitted by the Minister automatically but at the request of Mr. ... Rémillard's own request that the Minister transmitted the relevant documents to the Court Registry. … … Mr. ...

Principally at issue was whether the Attorney General had standing as an “interested party,” which was relevantly defined in ABCA s. 206.1 to “mean … (a) … a creditor of a dissolved corporation … or (d) a person designated as an interested person by an order of the Court.” ... The liability does not become a debt until the taxes are assessed and a Notice of Assessment is issued (sections 158, 227, and 248(2) …. and cf Brogan Family Trust …). ...

Before dismissing the application, Ahmed J stated (at paras. 45, 49): [L]egislation may be inconsistent with section 96 … if it creates financial obstacles that impose undue hardship on potential litigants …. However, in light of the Applicant’s gross earnings … I am not persuaded … that the Appeal Payment Provisions cause it undue hardship. … Trial Lawyers is distinguishable … because the Appeal Payment Provisions are remedial, not punitive. ...

This integration can be seen in the way in which Talison Lithium itself described the Greenbushes operations in its “Annual Information Form” …. the foregoing passage [in the AIF] draws no distinction between the activities of extraction, said to be mining by the respondents, and the activities of processing. … … The term “mine”, as a verb, is defined by s 8 of the Mining Act to mean any manner or method of “mining operations” and that term refers to a number of different means of refining a mineral. ...

And went on to provide: However, you cannot deduct a loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that: it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature; … The Court dismissed the appeal, finding (at paras 39, 42 and 48): The activities conducted by the taxpayer pursuant to the Distribution Scheme were conducted by him in implementing and administering the Distribution Scheme. Such activities lacked the character of activities conducted as a business. … … [T]he taxpayer, in administering the Fund, was not turning his talent to account for money but was administering a court-approved scheme for the distribution of a settlement sum agreed upon by parties to a class action. ...

In rejecting this submission, Gleason JA stated (at paras. 15, 16): On its plain meaning, a deeming provision does not constitute an “election” or “appointment” …. … This textual interpretation is also supported by the interpretive presumption of consistent expression, which would require, unless the context dictates otherwise, that the terms “elected” and “appointed” be given a meaning in subsection 119(2) that is consistent with other provisions in the OBCA where these terms are used …. ...