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In rejecting this submission, MacPhee J stated (at para. 19): An implied contract … does not meet the requirements of the Act in order to make a deduction of support payments. ... The parties continued through the 2018 taxation year to consider themselves bound by their 2011 separation agreement. … … I am guided by the plain meaning of the words of the Act …. ...

Furthermore, his situation is distinguishable from that of a taxpayer who makes regular returns to Quebec to visit spouse and children …. … Mr. ... However, the … [quoting Thomson] “spatial bounds within which he [spent] his life” were within Alberta throughout the Period ….. ...

After noting that the pleadings of both parties effectively required him to treat the Appellant as making a single compound supply to Access, Graham J found, notwithstanding the provision of the cash by the Appellant to the cardholder, that such single supply was a taxable supply, stating (at paras. 138, 155, 158): … I find that [the cardholders] … paid the surcharge fee to Access for arranging for the transfer of money, not to the Appellant for transferring the money. … Access benefited from having the Appellant transfer the money. ... This was the predominant element of the supply it received …. … [T]he predominant element of the single compound supply made in the Subsequent Periods was the exclusive right to place and operate ATMs at the Resort and to process all transactions arising therefrom. This licence is a taxable supply …. Graham J also found (at para. 18), that of the words in para. ...

. … c) The usual activities of a money lending business of this nature were not consistently present. There was no negotiation of financial terms with the borrowers, no revision of legal documentation reflecting the appellants’ direction and discernment and the lending opportunities were offered by a single third party and, at that, only on a take it or leave it basis; … d) … ACI … acted as the primary party engaged in the relevant trade or undertaking and was not a mere agent or bare trustee facilitating the operation of Susan and Barry’s money lending business. … e) Had the loans not ultimately defaulted, the Appellant was willing and did continue to advance funds solely for the purpose of earning interest, rather than turning the loans over for a profit in the nature of a business. … Words and Phrases loan ...

After stating (at para 37) that “ medical appointments in paragraph 118.3(1.1)(d)… would not include an appointment where there is actual treatment or testing that is part of the treatment,” Jorré J went on to find that the taxpayer spent more than 14 hours per week on qualifying therapy, as required by s. 118.3(1)(a.1), stating (at paras 41, 42, 44 and 48): … The medical formula is given in very precise doses four times a day and administering it is no different from administering any other prescription medication. … [T]he time spent relating to the blood tests and to the administration of the formula can be counted as part of administering the therapy. … … While Phe is an element of nutrition, the activities necessary to assure precise delivery every day of 300 milligrams of Phe to the child, and no more than 300 milligrams, are much more akin to the administration of a medication than to the management of a diet. … [M]easuring and controlling Phe intake is properly characterized as administration of the therapy and not as control of X’s diet with the consequence that the correct way to apply these rules [in subsection 118.3(1.1)] is to consider that the time spent determining the amount of Phe to be consumed and actually consumed, including the time spent logging Phe intake, should be considered as part of the 14‑hour a week average. ...

GFP produced 10 episodes of the first season, but then was informed, two years after the preliminary ruling, that CAVCO’s opinion, after having viewed episodes, was to deny the CPTC on the basis that the Production had the features of a “game, questionnaire or contest” and was, therefore, excluded under Reg. 1106(1) – excluded production- s. ... Pentney J dismissed the application for judicial review, stating (at paras 70, 72, 74): … [I]t is clear that the opinion provides only a preliminary indication, based solely on the information provided by the producer, and that the final decision is based on an assessment of the actual production itself. … There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the decision was not made in good faith, that it constituted an abuse of power or that it otherwise violates the objectives of the legislation. As indicated in Zone 3, the “architecture” of the statutory scheme requires the Minister to determine whether a production is excluded; this is exactly what was done. … … I accept that in view of the architecture of the system, to use the expression of Justice de Montigny in Zone 3 at paragraph 31, those who want a certificate must spend money to embark on a production, with no guarantee that they will receive the benefit of a tax credit. … ...

In finding that the donated works’ FMV was their purchase price rather than their higher appraised value, he stated (at paras. 74, 90, 96): Although the participant experts did their best to explain why the donated value was higher than the price actually paid, … I refer … to the statement … in Klotz “…it is devoid of common sense and out of touch with ordinary commercial reality”. ... It appears … that the appraisers deliberately turned away from other markets. … [T]hey did not comply with the USPAP standards. … (1) they did not refer to prior sales of the property; (2) there is no reference to providence; (3) there was multiples of the same print bought and dated; (4) there was no reference to the price paid by the donors; (5) the use of the art was not considered; and (6) no consideration was given to the impact of the flooded market place. ... I believe this was done solely for the purposes of documenting the tax shelter being sold to the public. … [T]he appraisals … are unreliable and not credible…. ...

. … The evidence did not show that flight attendants who commuted to the Calgary airport using their own car were more reliable and flexible than those using other means of transportation. … … I was not presented with any evidence that …quantifies the effect on Jazz’s profits or costs of the use of a parking pass by Mr. Smith and/or other flight attendants. … The only conclusion I can reach is that Jazz paid for the parking pass simply because it was required to do so pursuant to the Collective Agreement. … ...

DaSilva’s notice of assessment was to be printed. … The problem is that Mr. ... Subsection 335(6) requires that, if the Minister wants to rely on an affidavit to prove mailing, the affiant must have charge of the appropriate records and must have reviewed them. … … Ms. ... Neill. … The Respondent could easily have obtained an affidavit from Ms. ...

The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the CCTB during those years, but referred the matter back to the Minister so that “taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalties under the Act and also a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act ” may be “seriously consider[ed].” In striking this referral part of the judgment, De Montigny JA stated (at paras 32, 33 and 36): … It is only when the Tax Court allows an appeal that it can refer the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. Nor is it for the Tax Court to interfere with the discretion of the Minister, if only by suggesting that the Minister “may” seriously consider taxpayer relief in the form of a waiver of any applicable interest and penalty under the Act, and a remission of taxes pursuant to the Financial Administration Act …. … While he was entitled to express his views about the impact of the CRA’s error and the fact that relief should be considered in his reasons, he should have limited himself, in the judgment, to dismissing the appeal. … ...