Search - 包建铎违纪违法案件以案促改以案促治专题组织生活会 个人对照检查

. … [D]espite the usual meaning associated with the expression "housing unit", it should not be construed as preventing a person from benefiting from the full tax exemption respecting a capital gain realized on the disposition of a building that includes more than one unit, if in fact the individual has lived in the entire building. ... The three of them lived together and even when she or her son had friends over, it was no different. … Her bedroom was upstairs and the bathroom that she mainly used also was upstairs. The two floors were connected by two staircases …. [T]he only difference from another two-storey single-family home was that the building had two kitchens, one on each level, and was originally divided so that it housed two units. … … Why should it be necessary to demolish the kitchen on the first floor, and why should the building have only one kitchen, so that it could qualify as a principal residence? ...

This follows as a matter of contract from the fact that PepsiCo and SVC were the parties to the EBAs and SAPL’s payment obligations under the EBAs were owed to them. … PepsiCo and SVC nominated PBS to be the seller of the concentrate under the EBAs for the relevant years. ... In these circumstances, the relevant portions of those payments (being the portions that were consideration for the use of, or the right to use, the relevant items) “came home” to PepsiCo/SVC … by being applied as they directed. The relevant portions were therefore income derived by PepsiCo/SVC. … Further, in the circumstances, PepsiCo and SVC … were entitled to receive the payments under the EBAs and directed SAPL to pay PBS. ...

A preliminary issues was whether VAT should have been accounted for at the time when the vouchers were sold or when they were redeemed, having regard to s. 1(2) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (the “1994 Act”), which provided that “VAT on any supply of goods or services … becomes due at the time of supply” and s. 6(3) of the 1994 Act providing that generally a supply of services is to be treated as taking place at the time when the services are performed (to be read along with generally similar VAT Directive language). Lord Drummond Young found (at paras 28, 33) respecting this issue, that a supply of services was made only at the time that particular records were downloaded: [T]he search function cannot be considered an end in itself; it is no more than a means towards the customer’s ultimate end, namely viewing and downloading documents about the family that is being researched. …. … The consideration for the payments made by customers to obtain PAYG credits is the ability to view or download particular items on the taxpayer’s website, and does not extend to the general search facility that is available both to customers and to the public. … ...

The definition of “resident” or “resident of Australia” as found in s 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (1936 Act) provided: resident or resident of Australia means: a person, other than a company, who resides in Australia and includes a person: … who has actually been in Australia, continuously or intermittently, during more than one half of the year of income, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that the person’s usual place of abode is outside Australia and that the person does not intend to take up residence in Australia; Before finding that the taxpayer was not specifically deemed to be resident in Australia under the (ii) branch of the definition above, Logan J found that she did not reside in Australia under the general wording in the preamble of the definition, stating (at paras 31 and 34): … Ms Stockton was a paradigm unsettled itinerant during her time in Australia in the 2017 income year. As a matter of deliberate choice, she had no settled employment or place of abode in Australia. … … Here, the only habit or pattern in Ms Stockton’s choice of accommodation was that of opportunism antithetical not just to settling in any one locale but to settling anywhere at all in Australia while she was here. ...

Principally at issue was whether the Attorney General had standing as an “interested party,” which was relevantly defined in ABCA s. 206.1 to “mean … (a) … a creditor of a dissolved corporation … or (d) a person designated as an interested person by an order of the Court.” ... The liability does not become a debt until the taxes are assessed and a Notice of Assessment is issued (sections 158, 227, and 248(2) …. and cf Brogan Family Trust …). ...

This integration can be seen in the way in which Talison Lithium itself described the Greenbushes operations in its “Annual Information Form” …. the foregoing passage [in the AIF] draws no distinction between the activities of extraction, said to be mining by the respondents, and the activities of processing. … … The term “mine”, as a verb, is defined by s 8 of the Mining Act to mean any manner or method of “mining operations” and that term refers to a number of different means of refining a mineral. ...

And went on to provide: However, you cannot deduct a loss or outgoing under this section to the extent that: it is a loss or outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature; … The Court dismissed the appeal, finding (at paras 39, 42 and 48): The activities conducted by the taxpayer pursuant to the Distribution Scheme were conducted by him in implementing and administering the Distribution Scheme. Such activities lacked the character of activities conducted as a business. … … [T]he taxpayer, in administering the Fund, was not turning his talent to account for money but was administering a court-approved scheme for the distribution of a settlement sum agreed upon by parties to a class action. ...

Kendal and the CRA to gather the evidence, draft the final Information, and essentially, do charge approval. … … Mr. Kendal and therefore his employer the CRA “caused everything to be done which could be done wrongfully to set the law in motion” against the Samaroos …. ... Kendal … wrote the Prosecution Report as an advocate not an investigator. ...

Before reversing the decision below to confirm these reassessments, the Court of Appeal stated (at paras. 13, 23, TaxInterpretations translation): The appellant was not required to make out a prima facie case that the 7.89% rate was unreasonable but, rather, that the assumption, on which the respondent relied in assessing it, that the 10% interest rate deducted from its income for the taxation years in issue was not "reasonable in the circumstances," … was prima facie … unsound. … In these circumstances where the judge erred in law by imposing an incorrect burden of proof on the appellant, it is open to the Court, this time applying the correct standard of proof, to draw its own conclusions from the evidence [citing Ludco, at para. 34]. Since the 10% rate actually used fell within what the above evidence indicated was a reasonable range, such a prima facie case had been established – so that the onus shifted to the ARQ, which had “failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 10% interest rate was unreasonable within the meaning of TA section 420.” ...

In finding that the taxpayer had failed to establish his residence in Quebec on December 31, 2013, Breault JCQ stated (at paras. 57-58, 64, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]o use the expressions … in … Thomson and Reeder cases … Mr. ... [His] visits to Quebec (during the relevant period) … were clearly only temporary and limited in nature. ... [T]he alleged intention to return to Quebec … is more a reflection or strategy after the fact than something demonstrably supported by proven and probative facts. ...