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After stating (art para. 11) that “as directed by … Fenwick, the question remains: what is the essential nature of the claim involving the taxpayer?”, Bocock J allowed the appeal, finding (at paras. 16 and 18): Factually, there is no question that the initial lawsuit spawned the subsequent one. … The primary issue within that second lawsuit is the entitlement and quantum of remuneration payable by the employer to the employee. ... The policy based integrity of paragraph 8(1)(b) is protected. … The initial lawsuit logically and expressly cascaded into the second. ...

Before agreeing with the position of the Minister that the “gratuity” was part of the consideration for the supply under the contract, Bocock J referred inter alia to U.K jurisprudence that: [V]oluntary gratuities are not subject to VAT because voluntary gratuities are: ‘[N]o part of the contract that the customer should pay a charge for service ….’ He dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal, on the basis that the gratuities were not voluntary, stating (at paras. 27-28): Subsection 133(b) combined with subsection 138(a) … suggests that tips included in an agreement are part of the overall supply of prepared meals, which is subject to HST. … The ETA defines “consideration” as “any amount that is payable for a supply by operation of law.” ...

After indicating (at para. 27) that the only “notable difference” between this case and Westcoast Energy was that in Westcoast Energy the “appellant sought to use the deeming effect of subsection 175(1) as a basis for claiming input tax credits rather than the public service body rebate,” Wong J went on to find that here s. 175(1) did not apply, stating (at paras. 30 – 31): Here, the Services are of a particularly personal and individual nature, designed to be consumed by the person purchasing the supply. … [I]t is difficult to reasonably conclude that the Services were used by the appellants’ employees in the course of their employment activities, as I would expect them to access these types of services on their personal time. … [T]he connection between the use of the Services and the employee’s employment activities is even more tenuous when the employee’s family member receives the supply. ...

And further (at paras. 165, 201): [I[f the Tax Court finds that the Minister did not form her opinion under subsection 247(10) properly … the Tax Court may refer the assessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment, applying the proper principles. … The determination by the Minister mandated by subsection 247(10) is, in my view, part of the act of determining a taxpayer’s tax liability, just as determining whether an expense is reasonable, whether unrelated persons deal with each other at arm’s length, or whether repayment terms are bona fide. ... The Minister must form that opinion as part of the assessment process: an assessment can be issued only after that opinion is formed. … The power bestowed under subsection 247(10), unlike other discretionary powers the Minister has under the ITA, is not permissive, or a power to waive an amount owing or a matter of compliance. No provision of the ITA expressly precludes an appeal of an assessment made after the Minister exercises her power under subsection 247(10). … On the appeal of an assessment, can the appeal be allowed on the basis that the Minister did not exercise her power under subsection 247(10) correctly? ...

The Queen, 94 D.T.C 1934, [1994] 2 CTC 2033 (TCC)-- summary under Subsection 160(2) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 160- Subsection 160(2) After comparing the wording of ss.160(2) and 152(1), McArthur TCJ. stated (p. 1935): "... I am satisfied that the words 'at any time' provide a freedom to assess without the restrictions of '... with all due dispatch' regardless of the lapse of time since the assessment at issue is an original assessment. ...

Bowman A.C.J. found that a de facto director could be liable, but that "one must be very careful about what one means by the expression ' de facto director'. ... However one wishes to define de facto director — either as one who occupies, whether by usurpation or default, the role of director or one in whose election there is some defect — it is clear that Mr. ...

Bowman A.C.J. found that a de facto director could be liable, but that "one must be very careful about what one means by the expression ' de facto director'. ... However one wishes to define de facto director — either as one who occupies, whether by usurpation or default, the role of director or one in whose election there is some defect — it is clear that Mr. ...

. … If failing to respond to the demand does not matter, why is the condition in paragraph 162(2)(b) needed at all? ... Before vacating the penalty (subject to the $25,000 informal procedure limit) notwithstanding that the taxpayer had not established a due diligence defence, Jorré J stated (at para. 75): … [G]iven that the Respondent did not plead that it made an assumption or finding of fact that the Appellant failed to comply with the time limit in the demand, there was no onus on the Appellant to prove that he did. … ...

Lafleur J declined to extend the Wells case, and dismissed the motion, stating (at para 36, 37, and 39): … I fail to see in the omission of the mention of the 2002 taxation year and the 2002 Reassessment in the Notice of Appeal a mere clerical error. I am of the view that the addition of the 2002 Reassessment to the Notice of Appeal would be a fundamental measure. … I am aware that the underlying facts are similar and it would be improbable for the Appellant to have decided to appeal from the 2001 Reassessment without appealing from the 2002 Reassessment. However, that is of no relevance. … I am of the view that the principles governing amendments of pleadings have no application in the present case. ...

. … Professional fees are income and bad debts are expenses. To suggest the statutory methodology of completing each line may be ignored, provided the “effective result” of net income or taxable income is the same, makes the reporting of income non-compliant, misleading and absurd. … …In short, Mr. ... …Absent … specific evidence regarding the analysis and determination of one single 2003 bad debt claimed, the provisions of the Act have not been fulfilled and no bad debt expense may be deducted in 2003: Delle Donne v. ...