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After noting (at para. 20) the Vavilov test that the administrative decision under review must “exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency” and (at para. 39) the Saipem test of “a rational connection … between the information sought and the administration and enforcement of the ITA,” Fothergill J stated (at para 43, 45-47): No explanation has been provided for the absence of any time limits on the information sought in the Requirement, although the previous requests were all restricted to the taxation years under audit. No explanation has been provided for the absence of any limit on the number of agreements to be produced, the identities of the contracting parties, or the geographic regions to which they apply. … The CRA’s first request for information … was limited to agreements in force during the audit period. ... Nine criteria were provided, including location in an OECD member state, and the performance of tasks related to research, development and distribution. … The CRA has offered no explanation for the dramatic increase in the scope of the information sought in the Requirement. ...

., that “unnamed persons” meant “unknown to the Minister” rather than “unnamed in the RFI” (para. 34), Southcott J stated (paras. 65, 74): [Judicial] explanation describes ss 231.2 (2) and (3) as affording protections against abusive investigations to the unnamed persons, not to the party who is the recipient of the requirement …. I also find particularly compelling the Respondent’s argument that the decision-maker could hardly have been expected to pursue an application under s 231.2(3), in an effort to satisfy the Court that the persons the Minister wished to investigate were ascertainable, when the identities of those persons were actually known to the Minister. … I find that it was reasonable for the decision-maker to have issued the RFIs without seeking judicial authorization in advance. ... As to some of the RFIs seeking material dating back 21 years, he stated (at para. 141) that “there is no statutory time limit within which to make a request for information under … s 231.2(1).” ...

. … [T]he Minister is not clear as to whether she is refusing outright to exercise her discretion to reassess 443 Inc, or whether she is simply crystalizing and making “final” her earlier proposal to postpone her decision on processing the Amended Returns until the common issue [regarding whether the GAM fees were income from a source] has been dealt with. … As drafted, the Decision is open to two different interpretations, and as such, must be set aside as being unreasonable. ... He had earlier noted the statement in IT-335R2 regarding s. 56(2) that “it is normally the … CRA … practice not to assess the same income twice. ...

The Queen, 83 DTC 5071, [1983] CTC 60 (FCTD)-- summary under Land Summary Under Tax Topics- General Concepts- Fair Market Value- Land Given that the "rented opinions" of the land appraisers used in this case were unreliable, the plaintiff's original method of calculating the V-Day value of land should be adopted, which was to prorate the gain which accrued between the dates of purchase and sale on a straight line basis: V-Day value = original cost + (total gain x number of months between purchase date and V-Day divided by number of months between purchase date and sale date). ...

Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FC 1014, aff'd 2021 FCA 189-- summary under Subsection 141.01(5) Summary Under Tax Topics- Excise Tax Act- Section 141.01- Subsection 141.01(5) flexibility in choice of ITC allocation method for non-FIs Before turning to s. 141.02 and finding that the Minister had reasonably rejected the registrant’s proposed allocation method presented under s. 141.01(18), Walker J stated (at para. 14): The ETA does not require a specific allocation method or the use of specific accounting systems that would separate each property or service that a business uses in its provision of taxable and exempt supplies (Magog … 2001 FCA 210 at para 17 …). ...

. … [T]he purpose of subsection 220(2.1) is to blunt the unfairness that sometimes arises by strict application of the filing and notice requirements in the ITA. The Minister’s discretionary power under subsection 220(2.1) should not be unduly limited or fettered through an unduly narrow interpretation which the Minister unreasonably adopted and applied in this case. … Respecting an argument of the Minister (at paras. 57-58) that “subsection 165(3) explicitly requires a notice of objection before there can be a reassessment” and that “the discretion to waive a notice of objection under subsection 220(2.1) would be nonsensical due to lack of a remedy,” he stated (at paras. 58-59): Subsection 165(3) does not state that without a notice of objection, the Minister shall not or cannot reconsider an assessment, and there are situations under the ITA where the Minister is explicitly given the power to reassess without a notice of objection. … Moreover, subsection 220(2.1) specifically enables the Minister to request a document that has been waived. ...

The Minister refused on the basis that Cybernius’ T2 corporate income tax returns for 2013 and 2014 had not been filed – and that the credits also could not be used as Cybernius’ corporate income tax returns had not been filed within three years of the end of each relevant year. ... After finding that the Minister should not have retained the credit because there were outstanding notices of objection, McVeigh J further found (at para 48, 52, 53): … I find the decision not to grant the re-appropriation to be further unreasonable given that the decision was part of a continuous course of conduct and Cybernius became fully compliant during this time. Section 221.2(1) provides the Minister the discretion to re-appropriate amounts if the taxpayer does not have any outstanding returns. … Given that Cybernius is fully compliant, it is unreasonable for the Minister not to exercise their discretion to ensure the collection of the payroll source debt by using an existing tax credit. ...

. … Cameco has not allowed the oral interviews that they had done in previous years given the numbers requested and the fact that the subject matter of the audit is similar, if not identical as the ongoing litigation before the Tax Court of Canada. ... She then stated (at paras. 43, 44 and 50): Parliament could not have intended for there to be no restraint on how the Minister questions employees of a corporation. … The Minister’s interpretation imposes a much broader form of examination for discovery than allowed before the Tax Court of Canada without any of the procedural safeguards. The Minister arrived at a different answer than Cameco regarding transfer pricing and it is the role of the Tax Court of Canada to sort out who is correct. … The time and cost involved in allowing the Minister to interview more than 25 Cameco personnel scattered across the world is not proportional to the information being sought since the Tax Court of Canada will determine the issues that are the focus of the requested interviews. ...

After noting (at paras. 13-14) that, consistently with s. 2(b) of the Charter, “open and transparent judicial proceedings are fundamental principles of the Canadian legal system,” Noël J found that the Certificate was not adequate support for the s. 37 applications, stating (at paras 16, 20, and 22): …[T]he Certificate … does not give me a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that the public interest claim is justified. ... Considering that at this stage in the proceeding, no one except for the Minister or the Applicant has viewed the substance of the information being protected, it would be “inconceivable” to render a decision of such importance without seeing the undisclosed information. … Considering that the Certificate contains only generalized assertions, to be able to adequately assert its privilege, the Applicant should file with the Court on a confidential basis an un-redacted copy of the redacted documents that would relate to the public interest being claimed and any other documents or affidavits that may be appropriate to adequately support the validity of the alleged privilege. ... …[A] certificate is not an affidavit, which usually in the optics of fairness, affords the adverse party the opportunity to cross-examine a witness on their submitted evidence. … ...

After the assessment was vacated pursuant to a consent judgment, CRA issued a Notice of Reassessment showing the cancellation of the penalty and a refund of the $1M but denying any refund interest on the basis that s. 164(3) requires a taxation year to be specified in order for interest to be paid – and a s. 163.2 penalty is not calculated by reference to any particular taxation years. ... In rejecting the Crown’s argument that this naming of a taxation year in the Notice of Reassessment was an error, Diner J referred to s. 152(8), indicated (at para. 86) that it applies “equally to reassessments as it does to assessments,” and then stated (at para. 87): Therefore, on a strict reading of the text of the statute, the 2016 Reassessment is presumed to be valid and binding …. ... But it is another for the Minister to then herself claim that the minor error undermines the validity of her own document to avoid adherence to it, when all other data points of the form are entirely accurate …. ...