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At the time of entering into the forward, he also monetized about half of his BNS shareholding through a loan from a bank (TD Bank) affiliated with the forward counterparty to which he pledged his shares and the forward contract – but then repaid the loan in 2004. ... MacDonald’s … shares. In the course of arriving at this conclusion, she indicated that: A derivative contract is a hedge if its purpose is to “hedge exposure to a particular financial risk such as the risk posed by volatility” (para. 19) “Purpose is ascertained objectively …. ... (para. 36) Options (along with forwards) were “one of the “two basic types of derivatives” (para. 18), so that the principle that “Gains and losses arising from hedging derivative contracts take on the character of the underlying asset, liability or transaction being hedged …. ...

In rejecting the Trust’s position that the Calgary branch was deemed under s. 462(2) to be a distinct entity that, thus, was situate outside Quebec, Rowe J stated (at para. 79) that “s. 462(2) is to provide a practical means by which the bank as a whole will be fixed with notice … [and] is premised on the idea that a branch is part of the bank.” In rejecting the trust’s alternative position that the demand was valid even without regard to s. 462(2), he stated (at paras. 85-86, 88): Alberta Ltd. claims that because the Demand letter is sent to Calgary, this where the administrative seizure must take place. … [I]t is a sounder approach to focus on the place where enforcement of the Demand may be sought as the determinative point in characterizing the exercise of the coercive power at issue. ... Given that National Bank operates in Quebec, the Court of Québec could make an order against National Bank for failure to comply with the Demand pursuant to s. 39.2 of the TAA. … It would be absurd if the procedural requirements imposed by s. 462(2) … were understood to affect the ARQ’s authority to issue a formal demand to a bank that operates within its territorial jurisdiction. ...

. … [P]rovincial inability is established in this case. … First, the provinces, acting alone or together, are constitutionally incapable of establishing minimum national standards of GHG price stringency to reduce GHG emissions. … Second, a failure to include one province in the scheme would jeopardize its success in the rest of Canada. … Moreover, the matter’s impact on the provinces’ freedom to legislate and on areas of provincial life that would fall under provincial heads of power is qualified and limited. ...

., 2018 SCC 8 " and that: “As Rothstein J. wrote, because of this fiduciary relationship,’“[t]he beneficial owner of property has been described as ‘the real owner of property even though it is in someone else’s name’ ‘ (Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 …).” (at para. 49) that: “Another core attribute of beneficial ownership is certainty as to the property that is subject to the trust ….” ...

…It would be incoherent — and indeed, unjust — for shareholders to benefit from limited liability while at the same time gaining a right of action in relation to faults committed against the corporation in which they hold shares…. The corporate veil is impermeable on both sides; just as shareholders cannot be liable for faults committed by the corporation, so too are they barred from seeking damages for faults committed against it …. ...

., 2021 SCC 30, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 571-- summary under Interpretation/Definition Provisions Summary Under Tax Topics- Statutory Interpretation- Interpretation/Definition Provisions detailed listing of items covered in the 2nd part of a means and includes definition had a limiting effect In commenting on the means and includes definition of a security interest in s. 224(1.3), Côté J stated (at para. 63): I agree with [Justice Rothstein in Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond] … that the list of examples provided is not exhaustive. However, the examples remain illustrative of the types of interests that Parliament had in mind and are clearly united by a common theme or class because Parliament employed a compound “means... and includes” structure to establish its definition: “ security interest means any interest in, or for civil law any right in, property that secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes... ”. ...

He then stated (at paras 62, 63, 64, 73 and 76): … [A] demand for payment by the Crown does not “crystallize” the amount of the debtor’s or the secured creditor’s liability to the Crown. That liability is determined by the amount deemed to be held in the subsection (1) trust which in turn determines the extent to which property of the debtor is deemed to be held pursuant to the subsection (3) trust. … Subsection (1.1) provides that at or after the time of bankruptcy, subsection (1) does not apply to any amounts that were collected on account of tax prior to that time. ... Subsection 67(2) makes it clear that Parliament intended to do away with the deemed trusts in bankruptcy. … By eliminating these trusts in bankruptcy, Parliament put the Crown on the same footing as unsecured creditors. ...

The Court upheld the open court principle as protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression and as an essential feature of our democracy, even though “public scrutiny … can be the source of inconvenience and even embarrassment to those who feel that their engagement in the justice system brings intrusion into their private lives.” ... Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. ... Kaiser J dismissed the appeal, finding (at para. 107}: The conclusion that the Trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest ends the analysis. … Words and Phrases open court presumption ...

In the course of so finding, he indicated (at paras. 73-73) that s. 67(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act reflected that “Parliament put the Crown on the same footing as unsecured creditors” in a bankruptcy – with an exception for employee source deductions, which “is explained by the fact that source deductions are amounts which belong to the employee in question … [and] this money does not belong to the employer anymore.” ...

. … [S]. 227(4.2) provides that “a security interest does not include a prescribed security interest”, and thus specifically envisions that the deemed trust will not have absolute priority. ... What must therefore be determined is whether a court-ordered super-priority charge under the CCAA falls within that definition. … After noting the definition of security interest in s. 224(1.3) (referenced in s. 227(4.1),) she further stated (at para. 62): … [T]he list of illustrative security interests makes it clear that a super-priority charge created under the CCAA cannot fall within its meaning. ... The fact that Parliament chose to provide a list of examples whose nature is so unlike that of a court-ordered super-priority charge demonstrates that it must have had a very different type of interest in mind when drafting s. 224(1.3) … She also stated (at para. 72): [C]ourts should still recognize the distinct nature of Her Majesty’s interest and ensure that they grant a charge with priority over the deemed trust only when necessary. … In the concurring reasons of Karakatsanis J (writing for herself and another Justice), she agreed that s. 227(4.1) does not satisfy the requirements for a trust, and then stated (at paras. 172-173): First, given my conclusion about the content of the Crown’s right under s. 227(4.1) of the ITA for the purposes of the CCAA (requiring that it at least be paid in full under a plan of compromise), ranking a priming charge ahead of the Crown’s deemed trust does not conflict with the ITA provision. ...