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—The learned trial judge in his reasons for judgment Says:— The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint in the present action is that in order to escape the results of the decision in the Crystal Dairy case, 56 B.C.R. 103; [1941] W.W.R. 342; [1941] 2 D.L.R. 279, the defendant Board adopted a colourable scheme whereby to make it appear that milk was actually being sold by the producers to the defendant Milk Clearing House Limited and resold by the Clearing House to the distributors at prices fixed by the Board whereas there was in fact intended to be no sale at all. ... Under paragraph 2 of section 4 of the Act, the Lieutenant- Governor in Council was empowered to establish, amend and revoke schemes for the control and regulation within the province of any natural products, and was also authorized to consti- tute marketing boards to administer such schemes. ...

Blanchette, [1926] 2 D.L.R. 844, 40 Que. K.B. 370; Hul-Clark- Francis Ltd. v. ... C.B.C., [1941] 2 D.L.R. 551, 70 Que. Q.B. 65: and we must say the same of the case decided by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Regina Industries Ltd. v. ...

The Great Western Railway Company [2]. Both English and American authorities lay down the general principle, that when a statute is passed imposing a tax, its provisions are not merely directory but imperative and require to be strictly complied with. ... (Section 34 and sub-sections 1, 2 and 3). A non-resident whose name is not entered on the roll has the same right of appeal against the assessment of his land as is permitted to a resident. ...   [1] See case as reported in 25 U.C.C.P., 169, and in 26 U.C.C.P., 323. [2] 16 U.C.Q.B., 500. [3] 32 Vict. c. 36, secs. 19, 20, 176; [4] 16 U.C.Q.B., 500; [5] L.R. 8 Q.B., 348; [6] 2 C. ...

APPEAL by special leave from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario [1] dismissing the appellant’s appeal from the decision of the Ontario Municipal Board [2] in assessment appeal proceedings under the Assessment Act (Ont.) ... A similar provision limited to the Board is contained in s-s. (6) of s. 80, this provision having been enacted at the time of the creation of the Board in 1906 by c. 31, the relevant provision being s. 51, s-s. (2). ... In s-ss. (2) and (3), the considerations entering into the ascertainment of that value in the case of both vacant land and land having buildings thereon are given. ...

The initial arrangement was that General Electric would defer payment of accounts for goods purchased from it by the appellant, carrying them on open account and at an interest rate of 2 per cent. ... And for this purpose I think that the company must be treated as a non-trader, because the Butterley case ([1956] 2 All E.R. 197) makes it clear that these payments are not trading receipts.’’ ... Particularly in the absence of a fixed exchange rate, a liability incurred by a Canadian debtor in terms of a foreign currency must always contain a contingent element and what the appellant did, in reality, in revaluing its U.S. dollar liability at the end of each fiscal period, was merely (1) to state from time to time in its balance sheet, a revised estimate of the Canadian dollar equivalent of what it owed to its parent company in U.S. dollars and (2) to write down the amount of that indebtedness as originally entered in its books and treat the resulting ‘‘gain’’ as a capital profit, apportioned over three years. ...

Subsections (1) and (3) of section 83A of the Income Tax Act, under which the appellant claims the right to deductions, read as follows as applied to the 1965 to 1968 taxation years: 83A (1) A corporation... may deduct, in computing its income under this Part for a taxation year, the lesser of (a) the aggregate of such of the drilling and exploration expenses... as were incurred during the calendar years 1949 to 1952, to the extent that they were not deductible In computing income for a previous taxation year, or (b) of that aggregate, an amount equal to its income for the taxation year minus the deductions allowed for the year by subsections (8a) and (8d) of this section... (3) A corporation... may deduct, in computing its income under this Part for a taxation year, the lesser of (c) the aggregate of such of (I) the drilling and exploration expenses... as were incurred after the calendar year 1952 and before April 11, 1962, to the extent that they were not deductible in computing Income for a previous taxation year, or (d) of that aggregate, an amount equal to its Income for the taxation year minus the deductions allowed for the year by subsectlons (1), (2), 8 a) and (8d) of this section... ... The mere right existing in the members of the community or any class of them at the date of the repeal of a statute to take advantage of the repealed statute is not a right accrued: Abbott v Minister of Lands, [1895] AC 425, 431; Western Leaseholds Ltd v MNR, [1961] CTC 490; 61 DTC 1309 (Exch); Director of Public Works v Ho Po Sang, [1961] 2 All ER 721 (PC). ... Even if the appellant is regarded as a predecessor corporation, the accumulated drilling and exploration expenses may nevertheless be deducted by the appellant because (1) the prohibition expressed in the concluding paragraph of subsection (8a) extends only to “the aggregate determined under paragraph (e)”; (2) such aggregate in each of the years 1965 to 1968 is nil by reason of the necessity under subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) thereof of determining such aggregate in the first instance “for the taxation year in which the property so acquired was acquired by the successor corporation”, ie 1960; (3) subparagraphs (iii) and (iv) of paragraph (8a)(e) have been construed by this Court in Hargal Oils Ltd v MNR, [1965] S.C.R. 291 at 295-6; [1965] CTC 50 at 53; 65 DTC 5029 at 5031, where it was held that the “aggregate” is to:... consist of expenses not deductible by the predecessor corporation In the taxation year in which the property was acquired by the successor corporation, but which would have been deductible by the predecessor corporation in that taxation year, “but for the provisions of... this subsection;”. (4) this passage presupposes the existence of the qualified predecessor and a qualified successor corporation in the taxation year in which the transfer of property took place and the amount to be included in the aggregate can only be determined in the taxation year in which the transaction occurred; (5) in the 1960 taxation year subsection (8a) was not applicable to appellant and there cannot be in that taxation year either a successor corporation or a predecessor corporation nor any “aggregate” to which the concluding paragraph of subsection (8a) can be related in subsequent taxation years; (6) the repealing enactment is made applicable to the 1962 and subsequent taxation years and cannot be given earlier effect in determining what is to be included in the “aggregate”. ...

In cross appeals from the judgment of the latter the taxpayer was appealing the disallowance of items 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 and the Minister was appealing the allowance of items 3, 4 and 11. ... Items 2 and 6 had not, it was held, been made pursuant to any agreement at all, with the same result. ... HELD (per curiam): (i) That the word “undertook” in Section 83A(7) did not imply a legally enforceable obligation to undertake (items 1, 5, 9, 10 and 12); (ii) That expenditures made prior to the formal execution of the agreement made with respect thereto were contemplated by and covered by that agreement (items 2 and 6); (iii) That the application of the taxpayer’s expenditures on the purchase of shares pursuant to agreement was not equivalent to reimbursement of the expenditures and they could not be said not to have been “incurred” by the taxpayer nor could the taxpayer be regarded as an agent or contractor for somebody else in respect thereof (items 3, 4 and 11); (iv) That the taking of shares in a new corporation to be formed was not susceptible of differentiation from “a right to purchase” such shares within the meaning of Section 83A(7) (c) (items 7 and 8); (v) That all the items of expenditure were disallowed by Section 83 A (7); (vi) That the appeal of the taxpayer be dismissed; (vii) That the appeal of the Minister be allowed except as to item 5, part of item 6 and item 9, as to which the Minister had made admissions, agreeing to vary the assessments. ...

Phillips urged the analogy of a loan by way of bonds or debentures repayable, say, in 1 or 2 years. ... Kelly, [1943] 2 All E.R. 119 at 122 where, however, it is pointed out that the case stated in McKrnlay s case does not appear to contain any basis for a finding that the original purchase of the lire was a speculation. ...

Mary’s Parish (Kitchener) Credit Union Ltd. and City of Kitchener, [1968] 2 O.R. 820; Smith v. ... Mary’s Parish (Kitchener) Credit Union Ltd. and City of Kitchener, [1968] 2 O.R. 820. ...

Male, [1891] 2 Q.B. 1, the taxpayer had loaned not as a permanent investment but, as stated in paragraph 6 of the statement of facts, ‘‘only in connection with the current dealings and transactions of the customer with the’’ taxpayer. ... Tate de Lyle, Ltd., [1954] 2 All E.R. 413, the taxpayer expended the sum of £15,330 in financing a campaign in opposition to nationalization. ...