The Chief Justice and Thurlow, J (delivered from the Bench):— Except in one respect, we adopt and rely on the reasons for judgment of the Associate Chief Justice.

Judson, J (concurred in by Abbott, Ritchie and Spence, JJ):—The Tax Appeal Board held that Income Tax Regulation 1101(1) was ultra vires as conflicting with subsection 20(2) of the Act. In doing so it followed a line of its own decisions going

Thurlow, J (others concur):—This is an appeal from a judgment of the Trial Division* [1] which allowed an appeal from a judgment of the Tax Appeal Board (reported [1970] Tax ABC 1137) and restored assessments of income tax for the years

Abbott, J (orally for the Court):—It will not be necessary to call on you Mr Ainslie.

Jackett, CJ (concurred in by Thurlow, J) (delivered from the Bench):—This is an appeal from a decision of the Trial Division dismissing an appeal by the appellant from its assessment under Part I of the Income Tax Act for the 1961

Walsh, J:—Plaintiff’s motion to substitute Her Majesty the Queen as plaintiff in place of the Minister of National Revenue in this case was contested by defendant. In making this motion plaintiff relies on the judgments in the cases of Mastino Developments

Kerr, J:—These appeals were heard together. They are in respect of income tax assessments of the appellants for their 1966 and 1967 years. They concern a profit that was made by the appellants on a parcel of 21 acres of vacant land that was purchased

Heald, J:—This is an application by Notice of Motion for an order directing and requiring the defendant in both of the above styled actions to produce and show to counsel for the plaintiffs the income tax returns for the fiscal years ending in 1964, 1965

Heald, J:—This is an appeal from respondent’s reassessment of the appellant’s income tax returns for the 1965 and 1966 taxation years. The pleadings put in issue the profit derived from three separate real estate transactions:

Collier, J:—This is an appeal from an assessment by the respondent which in effect disallowed the appellant’s contention that its income for its fiscal year ending February 28, 1967 was exempt from taxation by virtue of subsection 83(5) of the income