Docket: T-705-24
Citation: 2025 FC 692
Toronto, Ontario, April 15, 2025
PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Battista
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BETWEEN: |
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ILIR RAMIZI |
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Applicant |
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and |
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CICC - COLLEGE OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP CONSULTANTS |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] Ilir Ramizi attempted to become a Regulated Canadian Immigration Consultant (RCIC) but failed the qualifying examination four times. After his most recent attempt, he asked the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants (CICC) to allow him to rewrite the examination based on alleged procedural deficiencies he experienced in the examination writing process. His request was denied. In this application, he challenges that denial.
[2] For the reasons below, there was no breach of procedural fairness in Mr. Ramizi’s exam writing process or in the denial of his request to rewrite the exam. The decision is also reasonable and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Background
[3] The basic prerequisites for becoming an RCIC are:
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-The completion of an educational qualification;
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-An approved language test result demonstrating fluency in English or French which is less than two years old at the time of writing the qualifying examination (if designated educational programs have not been completed); and
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-Passing the CICC’s Entry-to-Practice examination (EPE).
[4] Mr. Ramizi met the first two qualifications but was unable to pass the EPE after four attempts.
[5] Mr. Ramizi’s last attempt to pass the EPE occurred in December 2023. When the CICC communicated the test results to Mr. Ramizi in an email dated January 25, 2024, it indicated that he was not eligible to write the exam at the next testing date because his language tests would be more than two years old, and he had exhausted four attempts to write the exam.
[6] Mr. Ramizi then requested an opportunity to retake the EPE at the next sitting based on his poor experience with examination proctors and his personal circumstances.
[7] The CICC responded by relying on its original decision, adding that Mr. Ramizi also needed to complete a new graduate diploma program. CICC policy requires that the EPE be written within three years of a candidate’s completion of their required educational credential.
[8] Therefore, the current obstacles to Mr. Ramizi’s ability to write the EPE are his expired language test and the lack of an educational credential obtained within the last three years.
[9] The broader but equally important factual and legal contexts for this application concern the authority of the CICC in admitting and regulating Canadian immigration consultants. This authority is grounded in legislation, the CICC’s governing by-law, regulation, and CICC policy.
[10] The CICC is a national administrative body established by the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Act, SC 2019, c 29, s 292 (CICCA). The purpose of the CICC is “to regulate immigration and citizenship consultants in the public interest and protect the public”
CICCA, s 4). It carries out this purpose by, among other things, “establishing and administering qualification standards, standards of practice and continuing education requirements for licensees”
(CICCA, s 4(a)-(b)). This legislation can be seen as the most recent of historical efforts to ensure stronger regulation of immigration consultants to protect the public interest (Canadian Society of Immigration Consultants v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 669 at para 13).
[11] Following the hearing of this matter, my review of the legislation raised a question regarding the status of the CICC as a public decision maker amenable to judicial review (Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26 (Highwood) at para 14; Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 (Air Canada) at para 60). However, given that no jurisdictional issue was raised by the parties, given that this Court has previously assumed jurisdiction over one of the CICC’s decisions (Moonshiram v College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants, 2024 FC 1212) and given the important public law issues concerning the legislative mandate of the CICC, it is in the interests of justice for the Court to resolve the issues raised. In addition, after reviewing Highwood and Air Canada, I am satisfied that the decision in question is one that is amenable to judicial review.
[12] The CICC’s governing legislation authorizes the Board of the CICC to make by-laws to carry out its activities, including the establishment of licenses as well as conditions and restrictions placed on licenses (CICCA, s 80(1)(n)-(o)). Based on its authority to enact by-laws, the CICC enacted By-Law 2021-2 (By-Law). This By-Law authorizes the CICC’s Board to develop regulations concerning courses of study and examinations and evaluations for licensees (ss 3.1, 14.1, 18.1).
[13] The Entry-to-Practice Regulation (Regulation) was enacted pursuant to the By-Law (Regulation, s 1.1). The Regulation requires consultants to pass the EPE before being admitted to practice and authorizes the CICC’s Registrar to determine the EPE process, including documentation requirements, and to publish this process on the CICC’s website (ss 3.1, 3.3).
[14] Section 10.4 of the Regulation states that a candidate who fails the EPE four times cannot attempt the exam again within one year following the date of the last examination. Section 10.5 of the Regulation specifies that the CICC may require a candidate who fails the EPE four times to “complete appropriate educational courses or programs before being permitted to attempt the EPE again.”
[15] The CICC’s “Entry-to-Practice Exam (EPE) Info” was published on its website when Mr. Ramizi wrote his examinations. It represented CICC policy governing qualifications to establish a practice as an immigration consultant. This policy included a statement indicating that:
- You may attempt the exam a maximum of 4 times.
- If you are unsuccessful on your 4th attempt, you are only eligible to apply again after:
⸰ Completing a waiting period of one year after your 4th attempt; and
⸰ Completing or re-completing the Graduate Diploma Program – either Queen’s University Graduate Diploma in Immigration and Citizenship Law or the D.E.S.S. (En réglementation canadienne et québécoise de l’immigration) offered in French by the University of Montreal.
[16] The EPE Guide, also found on the CICC website, states “[y]ou may attempt the exam a maximum of 4 times. All attempts must be made within 3 years of the date on which you completed your qualifying education program.”
III. Issues and Standards of Review
[17] There is one preliminary issue and two substantive issues raised by this application:
A. The preliminary issue is whether the Court should decline to decide the application on the basis that it is moot, or futile because there is no effective remedy. This issue will be resolved based on the legal principles governing the doctrine of mootness and remedy.
B. The first substantive issue is whether procedural fairness owed to Mr. Ramizi was breached through the examination process and in the decision prohibiting him from another attempt at writing the exam. Procedural fairness issues ask whether an applicant had the opportunity to present their case and “know the case against them”
(Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 56).
C The second substantive issue concerns the reasonableness of the CICC’s decision disallowing Mr. Ramizi from another attempt at writing the examination until he complied with its policy to wait one year and to obtain a new educational credential. This issue will be determined based on the principles of reasonableness described in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (Vavilov).
IV. Analysis
A. Should the Court decline to determine the matter based on mootness or ineffective remedy?
[18] It is unlikely that Mr. Ramizi would have an effective remedy if this application is granted. However, the matter is not properly classified as moot for that reason.
[19] The parties addressed whether this matter was moot or futile based on a lack of effective remedy for Mr. Ramizi if he was successful in his application for judicial review. The concern is that even if the CICC’s decision is quashed based on a breach of fairness or unreasonableness, it would be pointless to remit the matter for redetermination because Mr. Ramizi would still be blocked from writing the examination due to the fact that his educational credential, completed on August 16, 2021, is more than three years old.
[20] The Respondent argued that the matter is moot because Mr. Ramizi’s requests for relief cannot provide him with his desired goal at this time. However, in my view, the Respondent’s concern about ineffectiveness of remedy is conceptually and practically distinct from mootness.
(1) The doctrine of mootness
[21] The doctrine of mootness “is a common law principle in which a court declines to hear and determine a matter because there is no genuine controversy between the parties that has practical effects on the rights of the parties”
(Nshimyumuremyi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1352 (Nshimyumuremyi) at para 17, citing Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Borowski) at 353).
[22] The decision in Borowski was an appeal involving constitutional challenges to sections of the former Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34 (Criminal Code) (at 348). However, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) struck down these provisions in separate litigation after the appeal was started (at 348, 352). The SCC concluded that the appeal was moot because the disappearance of the impugned Criminal Code sections caused the dispute, lis, or substratum of the litigation to disappear (at 357).
[23] Borowski’s review of mootness jurisprudence illustrates circumstances giving rise to mootness, for example: the repeal of an impugned by-law, the cessation of a strike during which a contested injunction was issued, and the death of a party challenging a parole revocation hearing (at 354-355). All of these changed circumstances were found to remove the essence of the dispute.
(2) The limited compatibility of mootness with the nature of judicial review
[24] In my view, the doctrine of mootness has a tenuous compatibility with the nature of judicial review (Nshimyumuremyi at para 41).
[25] It is in the nature of judicial review that a lis or live controversy between the parties rarely disappears after proceedings have begun. That is because judicial review involves the review of a previously made decision for its legality.
[26] The outcome of judicial review rarely conclusively settles the rights of the parties; that is because the object or “substratum” of judicial review is the dispute over a decision’s validity. SCC jurisprudence confirms that the role of a reviewing court is to evaluate the merits of a challenged administrative decision and determine whether the decision is reasonable, correct, or consistent with a legislated standard of review (Vavilov at paras 16-17). Unless the decision is reconsidered or a change in legislative authority occurs, the dispute about this validity does not generally disappear through a change in factual circumstances arising after the decision.
[27] Furthermore, absent constitutional or procedural fairness disputes, a court on judicial review is generally confined to the record of evidence, issues, and submissions of the parties. A reviewing court cannot admit evidence that goes to the merits of the decision (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 at para 19). In the absence of limited exceptions, the reviewing court determines the validity of the decision based only on the factual record before the decision maker (Vavilov at paras 83, 125-126). Without a basis for admitting new evidence, there is no way for a court on judicial review to assess factual circumstances alleged to give rise to mootness or to speculate on what the factual matrix could be at the time of redetermination.
[28] Given that judicial review does not require the determination of factual issues which could change between disposition of the judicial review application and reconsideration, “courts have generally refused to speculate about possible outcomes”
(Donald JM Brown, QC and The Honourable John M Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) (loose-leaf updated 2025, release 1), c 3 at 35 [citations omitted]). The SCC has cautioned that it is not for the court to speculate on circumstances which may or may not exist upon redetermination in the process of judicial review: “the legislature has entrusted the matter to the administrative decision maker, and not the court, to decide”
(Vavilov at para 140 [citation omitted]). The Federal Court of Appeal has also recently repeated a caution that “[a] court should not decline to overturn a decision based on ‘speculation as to what the result might have been’”
(Shull v Canada, 2025 FCA 25 at paras 31-33 [citation omitted]).
[29] In the present case, for example, Mr. Ramizi could be in the process of requalifying his educational credential, and my refusal to remit would deprive him of demonstrating his ability to rewrite the EPE at the present time. In Nshimyumuremyi, I declined to speculate about whether the applicant had remained outside of Canada or returned to Canada since the initiation of the judicial review application (at para 34).
[30] Finally, the application of mootness carries the risk of undermining the “good governance” function of judicial review:
Judicial review is directed at the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of the procedures employed and actions taken by government decision makers. It is designed to enforce the rule of law and adherence to the Constitution. Its overall objective is good governance.
(Canada (Attorney General) v Telezone Inc, 2010 SCC 62 at para 24).
[31] In public law, there is a public interest in identifying unfair or unreasonable decisions made by public authorities. In this sense, the public is an interested party to a decision made by a public authority. The potential ability of public decision makers to remove justiciable issues from a court’s scrutiny by raising or “manufacturing” mootness risks the good governance goal of judicial review. In Nshimyumuremyi, for example, I was concerned that mootness would insulate possible statutory and international law breaches from scrutiny (at paras 39-48).
[32] The SCC recognized a basis--although “ill-defined”, in the SCC’s words--for the deployment of judicial resources in cases that raise an issue of public importance for which a resolution is in the public interest (Borowski at 361). In my view, the goal of judicial economy should yield to the goals of transparency and accountability in public decision-making when mootness is raised in judicial review proceedings (Nshimyumuremyi at paras 22, 39-41).
(3) A moot dispute is distinct from a futile remedy
[33] The foundation for mootness as explained in Borowski is the disappearance of a dispute or lis. The first step is “to determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared and the issues have become academic”
(at 353). If this determination is made, the second step is for the court to decide whether to “exercise its discretion to hear the case”
(and determine the merits) notwithstanding the disappearance of the dispute (at 353).
[34] One of the relevant factors in exercising this discretion is whether “the court’s decision will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties”
(Borowski at 360). The determination of a practical remedy, therefore, is relevant at the second stage, which allows the case to be heard and determined notwithstanding its mootness. This underscores the conceptual distinction between mootness and effectiveness of remedy:
While akin to the doctrine of mootness, the notion that “no useful purpose would be served,” or that an adjudication would be “futile,” relates to the efficacy of any relief that a court might grant, rather than to the loss of the substratum of the application or appeal. Generally, where the remedy sought would serve “no useful purpose,” or involved something impossible to implement in law or fact, judicial review proceedings have been dismissed.
(Brown and Evans, supra at 3:35 [emphasis in original, citations omitted]).
[35] The prospect of an ineffective or futile remedy does not involve the disappearance of a dispute, and therefore does not relieve a court from resolving disputed issues in a judicial review application prior to considering the distinct issue of remedy. The SCC suggests this by recognizing circumstances in which, after determining that a decision should be quashed, a court could recognize that an outcome is inevitable and decline to remit the matter for reconsideration (Vavilov at paras 139-142). The appropriate course of action for a reviewing court faced with an inevitable outcome is declining to remit, rather than declining to decide, according to Vavilov.
[36] The distinction between mootness and ineffective remedies is also supported by the Federal Court of Appeal’s (FCA) description of the judicial review process (Budlakoti v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration, 2015 FCA 139 (Budlakoti), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36591 (January 28, 2016)). Justice David Stratas described “three distinct analytical steps in any judicial review”:
1. Preliminary objections, including why the judicial review or its issues should not be heard. For example: the matter is moot, the matter is not public, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the matter or the relief, the basis for review was not raised but should have been, the judicial review is premature, adequate other forums, or issue estoppel.
2. The merits of the judicial review: is there a warranted basis for a remedy?
3. The remedies: what are the appropriate remedies, the Court considering whether to award a remedy at all?
(Budlakoti at paras 28-30).
[37] Pursuant to this analysis, mootness is a preliminary objection that precedes the determination of the merits of judicial review. If mootness is not established, a court proceeds to determine the merits, then proceeds to consider remedy.
[38] It distorts the judicial review process described by the FCA if a court leaps to the third stage of the process, evaluates potential remedies, then turns to retroactively resolve the preliminary issue of mootness, leaving the merits unresolved.
[39] In the present case, the parties dispute the legality of the decision, specifically, the fairness and reasonableness of the decision prohibiting Mr. Ramizi from rewriting the EPE at this time. As a judge on judicial review of this decision, I must resolve this dispute. It is only after the dispute is resolved that the issue of remedy arises.
(4) “Futile” remedies in judicial review
[40] In my view, prior to dismissing a judicial review application based on an ineffective or futile remedy, it is appropriate for the Federal Court to take into consideration the Court’s powers under section 18.1(3)(b) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 to “refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate”
or to issue declaratory relief.
[41] In the present case, for example, if the Court found a breach of fairness, the Court could quash the CICC’s decision and remit the matter for reconsideration with a direction that the CICC consider his request based on the circumstances that existed at the time he made the request, with an unexpired educational qualification. Such a direction would ensure that he is not prejudiced by the passage of time since the breach and render the remedy effective (see for example, Elahi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 858 at para 26, in which Justice Richard Mosley remitted the matter to the tribunal with a direction that it “apply the law as it read when the applicant initiated her appeal and it was first determined … Not to do so would render the remedy which the applicant obtained on this application a nullity and deny her natural justice”
).
[42] Furthermore, declaratory relief, despite its limited value in the form of “consequential relief” and potential resemblance to the doctrine of mootness (The Honourable Mr. Justice Malcolm Rowe, KC & Diane Shnier, “The Limits of the Declaratory Judgment” (2022) 67:3 McGill LJ 295 at 305, 308-9), may serve the goals related to accountability for the exercise of public power described in Vavilov (at paras 15, 79, 81, 93, 95). As stated by Justice David Corbett (dissenting):
Myers J. declines to address the substance of this application because, in his view, there is no point, since there should be no remedy granted in any event. My colleague Mew J. substantially agrees with me that the applicant is right in respect to the substance of its application, and that there is a point in this court so finding – but he would not grant a declaration – or any remedy – because it would be pointless. For me this stretches deference past the breaking point. If it is worthwhile making our finding, then it is worthwhile declaring the finding that we have made. In our Parliamentary system, the Executive in a majority government has enormous power and authority to govern. But it is not unbounded. It is courts that enforce those boundaries. I would keep it that way.
(Greenpeace Canada v Minister of the Environment (Ontario), 2019 ONSC 5629 at para 67).
[43] To conclude, this matter is not moot because a continuing dispute exists between the parties regarding the decision’s validity. If Mr. Ramizi prevails in demonstrating that the CICC’s decision was unfair or unreasonable, the appropriate remedy will then be considered. However, the possible inevitability of the result does not result in the mootness of the dispute.
B. Was procedural fairness breached by the CICC?
[44] Mr. Ramizi challenges the February 23, 2023, decision as procedurally unfair based on these alleged procedural deficiencies:
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-Delays in his start time in the December 2023 EPE and previous examination sessions;
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-The CICC’s failure to provide him with his preferred writing times when he tried to book EPE sessions;
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-Delays he experienced in getting the EPE proctor’s attention before and during his washroom breaks, and the proctor’s failure to conduct a security check upon his return from the washroom break;
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-His expectation that he would be allowed to rewrite the test at the next testing date based on CICC communications inviting him to try again when they communicated his most recent test results.
[45] To resolve Mr. Ramizi’s claim, it is first necessary to determine the content of the duty of fairness owed to him by the CICC, then determine whether the duty of fairness was met based on the process that was followed (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Baker) at para 29).
(1) The content of the duty of fairness owed by the CICC
[46] The duty of procedural fairness owed by the CICC can be determined by applying the factors identified for this purpose by the SCC in Baker. Acknowledging that the content of the duty of procedural fairness is contextual, the SCC described several considerations to determine the level of participatory rights required in a particular statutory, institutional, and social context:
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the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it: essentially, the closer the nature of the decision and the process is to a judicial model, the higher the procedural protections;
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the nature of the statutory scheme and the “terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates”
: the role of the decision being made in the context of the statute, and avenues for recourse are relevant considerations within this factor;
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the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected: “The more important the decision is to the lives of those affected and the greater its impact on that person or those persons, the more stringent the procedural protections that will be mandated”
(para 25);
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the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision: if a person has been legitimately led to believe that a certain process or result will ensue, greater procedural protections will be applied; and,
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the choices of procedure made by the agency itself: appropriate deference should be given to the expertise as well as institutional constraints of an agency.
(Ali v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1085 at para 20, citing Baker).
[47] Applying these factors to the decision-making process applied by the CICC to candidates seeking to become RCICs through the licencing process, I conclude that the duty of fairness owed by the CICC in its admission decisions is at the low end of the spectrum.
(a) The nature of CICC’s decision and process
[48] The decision in question is whether Mr. Ramizi should be allowed to rewrite the examination even though he does not meet the criteria to do so. The nature of the decision being made is an administrative one, concerning the requirements to become an RCIC. The process is also administrative in nature, with none of the markers of a judicial or adjudicative process, such as the right of candidates to make submissions, an adversarial context, a right to be represented by counsel, or a right to appeal. This points to a low level of procedural fairness.
(b) The nature of CICC’s governing statute, the CICCA
[49] The nature of the statutory scheme and statutory requirements to which the CICC operates also indicate a low level of procedural fairness. As stated above, the statute, CICCA, has as its purpose the regulation of immigration consultants in a manner that protects the public interest (s 4).
[50] Parliamentary intention can be discerned by examining matters described in legislation compared to matters left to the discretion of administrative bodies or decision makers (Vavilov at para 110). The CICCA demonstrates Parliament’s preoccupation in protecting the public interest through the regulation and discipline of immigration consultants. Much of the legislation is dedicated to describing in detail the complaints and discipline process (CICCA, ss 43-55, 57-70, 77-82). Broad powers are delegated to the CICC in the enforcement of disciplinary matters, and a minimal portion of the legislation concerns the rights of RCICs subject to the discipline process (see CICCA, ss 62-63).
[51] Regarding standards of admission to the profession, the legislation is essentially silent, delegating broad authority to the CICC in establishing admission practices and policies. Autonomy and independence granted to an administrative body’s governance of its affairs point to more relaxed duty of fairness (Michalski v McMaster University, 2022 ONSC 2625 at para 81; Ola Display Corporation v Canada (National Research Council), 2013 FC 423 at para 34).
[52] For example, the legislation provides the CICC’s Board with a wide-ranging authority to enact by-laws “respecting any matter necessary to carry on the activities of the College”
(s 80(1)), including with respect to licenses and licensing requirements (s 80(1)(n)-(o)). Furthermore, the By-Law provides the authority for enacting regulations and policies (s 3.1), sets out the eligibility criteria for licensees (s 10), and provides the parameters for the governance of professional conduct and disciplinary proceedings (ss 24-41). This includes the power to issue licenses, which is only a mandatory obligation on the Registrar once a candidate meets the eligibility requirements set out in the by-laws (CICCA, s 33).
[53] This larger statutory and regulatory context illustrates the CICC’s role in defining who is a qualified licensee and the procedures in place for licensing, considering the public interest of ensuring high quality licensees, as well as the CICC’s wide control and independence in the licensing process.
[54] In summary, the CICC’s governing statute, the CICCA, provides an indication of Parliament’s intention regarding the regulation of immigration consultants. Parliament retained back-end quality assurance by specifying details of the complaints and discipline process in the legislation. It delegated broad powers to the CICC to carry out front-end quality assurance through the formulation and enforcement of policies related to admission to the profession.
[55] Moreover, in balancing professional regulation and the rights of individuals to practice as RCICs, the legislation signals a clear emphasis on protection of the public interest by establishing a robust discipline and complaint regime, giving relatively little attention to rights to enter and maintain an immigration consultant practice, and providing great autonomy to the CICC in the development of its admission policies.
(c) The level of importance of the CICC’s admission decisions
[56] The CICC’s admissions decisions relate to the requirements and timing of when an individual can take required steps in an attempt to enter the profession. It is not a final decision concerning whether an individual can enter the profession. No limitation is placed on the number of attempts a candidate can make to qualify as an RCIC as long as eligibility criteria is met through a candidates’ own efforts and determination. These decisions involve a low level of importance to individuals.
(d) The legitimate expectations of RCIC candidates
[57] The requirements to enter the profession are published in the CICC’s Regulation, EPE Guide and on the CICC’s website. The visibility and transparency of these policies do not give rise to candidates’ legitimate expectations that other processes will be followed. This points to a low level of procedural fairness.
(e) The CICC’s choice of procedures
[58] Through passage of the CICCA, Parliament left the choice of procedures in the RCIC admission process, including exam taking and retaking, in the hands of the CICC. Deference should therefore be accorded to the CICC on its choices for the procedures regarding the taking and retaking of the EPE. As held by the SCC, “important weight must be given to the choice of procedures made by the [CICC] itself and its institutional constraints”
(Baker at para 27 [citations omitted]). This weighs in favour of a lower duty of fairness in the process for taking or retaking the EPE.
(2) Application of the CICC’s duty of fairness to Mr. Ramizi
[59] Applying the CICC’s low duty of fairness to Mr. Ramizi’s circumstances reveals no breach of procedural fairness in the examination administration or decision-making process. In particular:
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-As stated by the Respondent, Mr. Ramizi “had the opportunity to sign up for EPEs in advance, test out his technology to avoid delays, write his EPEs with the full time permitted, and receive written reasons of each decision not to pass him”
;
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-There is no evidence that Mr. Ramizi’s opportunity to take the EPE examinations was not in accordance with the CICC’s Regulation and EPE guide;
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-Mr. Ramizi’s examination was checked and it was confirmed he had not met the standards for passing the EPE. He was not guaranteed a pass on his examination, nor was he guaranteed that he could retake the exam. There is no evidence that he was given a test that differed from other test-takers and there is no evidence that he was singled out for ineligibility in the decision that he could not reapply for the exam;
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-Regarding the delays in the start times of his December 2023 and other examinations, there was no “clear, unambiguous and unqualified”
representation that candidates would necessarily start the EPE within 45 minutes of logging in to ProctorU (Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 (Agraira) at paras 95-97) and in any case it is the proctor who commences the exam, rather than the CICC;
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-Regarding Mr. Ramizi’s preferred writing times, the doctrine of legitimate expectations did not guarantee that Mr. Ramizi would be able to take the exam of his choice. In any event, the CICC informed him well in advance of the June 2023 exam about its requirements, and the CICC did not count his non-attendance as an exam attempt;
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-Regarding the delays before and during his washroom breaks, the EPE guide clearly indicates in unqualified terms that the exam time will not be paused while candidates use the restroom. Such a procedure is a representation that this procedure will be followed when someone is taking the EPE (Agraira at para 94);
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-The CICC’s invitation for Mr. Ramizi to write the exam again on February 21, 2024, was a generic expression of well wishes, and did not commit the CICC to allowing Mr. Ramizi to rewrite the exam at the next available date in circumstances contradicting its policies regarding prerequisites for writing the exam.
[60] For these reasons, there has been no breach in the duty of fairness owed by the CICC to Mr. Ramizi.
C. The CICC’s decision is reasonable
[61] To assure Mr. Ramizi of the thoroughness of this review of the CICC’s decision, I have examined the reasonableness of the decision even though he did not explicitly raise this issue. I have found the decision to be reasonable.
[62] As mentioned throughout this decision, the CICCA grants the CICC the authority to enable any regulations and policies it desires to ensure that candidates meet educational and examination-based requirements to become a licensed candidate under subsection 33(1) of the CICCA and section 10 of the By-Law. Furthermore, section 10.5 of the Regulation provides the Registrar with the discretion to require a candidate to re-enrol in appropriate educational courses before retaking the EPE.
[63] The February 23, 2024, decision found Mr. Ramizi ineligible to take the EPE until he obtained a new diploma from Queen’s University or Université de Montréal. The February 23, 2024, decision is a decision under section 10.5 of the EPE Regulation, and it is a reasonable exercise of discretion considering the CICC’s authority to require education it deems necessary to be a licensed candidate. That exercise of discretion complied with the rationale of the CICCA, By-Law, and Regulation which required candidates to meet defined eligibility requirements (CICCA, s 80(1)(n); By-Law, s 10; Regulation, s 3.1, 3.3), the CICCA’s purposes of regulating consultants by “establishing and administering qualification standards, standards of practice and continuing education requirements for licensees”
(CICCA, s 4), and the overall statutory and regulatory requirements for setting examination requirements.
[64] In my view, the decision is therefore justified considering its legal and factual constraints (Vavilov at para 99). The CICC reasonably found that Mr. Ramizi did not meet the educational requirements for retaking the EPE exam as set out by the CICC.
V. Conclusion
[65] This matter is not moot because a live dispute about the fairness and reasonableness of the CICC’s decision exists. While the Respondent alleges that a remedy would be futile if the CICC’s decision is quashed, an issue of the choice of remedy does not arise because the CICC’s decision is not unfair or unreasonable.
[66] Parliament has demonstrated an intention to protect the public through the passage of the CICCA. In that legislation it provided broad powers to the CICC in the development of policy and standards governing the admission of candidates to practice as RCICs. The duty of fairness owed by the CICC to candidates is low and that duty was met in Mr. Ramizi’s case. The CICC’s decision is also reasonable, and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
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