Docket: IMM-8229-24
Citation: 2025 FC 508
Toronto, Ontario, March 19, 2024
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Aylen
BETWEEN: |
MELAINE MANJONG |
Applicant |
and |
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] The Applicant, a citizen of Cameroon, arrived in Canada in July 2019 and applied for refugee status. However, he was ineligible to have his refugee claim referred to the Refugee Protection Division as he had previously made a claim for refugee protection in the United States of America.
[2] He submitted an application for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA], which was based on an asserted fear of persecution as an Anglophone minority in Cameroon without an identification card [ID]. In support of his application, the Applicant relied on the following:
His ID expired in 2017. He applied for a renewal and was issued a three-month validity receipt that expired in February 2018. Following the expiration of his ID, the Applicant was often stopped and checked by the police for his ID and would be taken to the police station each time for further inquiries. Each time he had to pay the police for his release.
On May 13, 2018, while travelling in an overcrowded bush taxi, the Applicant was apprehended by military men who, due to his expired ID, suspected him of being a separatist fighter of Ambazonia. The men handcuffed the Applicant and took him to his house in the village. They took his wallet and his phone and searched his house. When they could not find any compromising information, the men beat, kicked and flogged him, threw water on him and rub him in the mud. The men decided to take him to their headquarters in Yaoundé. After a short drive, the men stopped at a bar beside the road. While stopped, the Applicant was able to escape.
Two days later, the Applicant was informed that his house in the village had been burned down by unknown individuals and that same evening, he noticed that two uniformed men were standing in front of his house, so he fled to his sister’s home.
With the help of his family, he left Cameroon in June 2018, and ultimately fled to the United States where he made a refugee claim and was placed in detention. As the Applicant felt insecure in the United States, he decided to come to Canada.
While in detention in the United States, the Applicant was informed that his uncle was killed by the military because his uncle had been identified as one of his relatives. He was also informed that the wife of the late uncle was also killed by the military.
[3] After conducting a mandatory hearing under section 113.01 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], the Officer held that the determinative issue was the Applicant’s lack of credibility due to inconsistencies, omissions and contradictions related to essential aspects of his application. The Officer concluded that the Applicant had not established that he faced a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA or a risk to life or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture under section 97 of the IRPA as an Anglophone minority returning to Cameroon without a valid ID. The Applicant now seeks judicial review of the negative PRRA dated February 27, 2024.
[4] The sole issue for determination is whether the Officer’s decision was reasonable.
[5] The applicable standard of review is that of reasonableness. When reviewing for reasonableness, the Court must take a “reasons first”
approach and determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified [see Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at paras 8, 59]. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker [see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 15, 85]. The Court will intervene only if it is satisfied there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency [see Adeniji-Adele v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 418 at para 11].
[6] The Applicant asserts that the Officer’s decision was unreasonable on two grounds: (i) the Officer erred in finding that the Applicant lacked credibility; and (ii) the Officer failed to properly assess the Applicant’s subjective fear.
[7] Turning to the credibility findings, the Officer’s credibility findings were based on: (a) a number of inconsistencies, omissions and contradictions in the Applicant’s evidence; and (b) the Officer’s consideration of other evidence (such as the affidavits and the death certificate) that could have, but did not, overcome the credibility concerns relating to the Applicant’s own evidence, all of which the Applicant asserts was flawed.
[8] In considering the Applicant’s submissions regarding these asserted errors, it must be recalled that credibility findings made by an Officer are part of the fact-finding process and are to be given significant deference upon judicial review. Frontline decision makers have the advantage of hearing witnesses testify and observing their demeanor [see Matharoo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 664 at para 42]. Accordingly, this Court must refrain from impermissibly re-weighing and reassessing the evidence considered by an officer absent exceptional circumstances [see Azenabor v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1160 at para 6; Vavilov, supra at para 125].
[9] Overall, I am satisfied that all of the Officer’s credibility determinations were reasonable. It was open to the Officer to consider the Applicant’s shifting and contradictory accounts of key aspects of his narrative. The Officer relied on a series of reasonable and clearly identified concerns that were grounded in the evidence and were based on a review of the original documents and the Applicant’s testimony. While the contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions when considered individually may be insufficient to ground a negative credibility finding, I find that, when considered cumulatively, they permitted the Officer to reasonably reach a negative conclusion about the Applicant’s credibility, as the inconsistencies were sufficiently serious and central to the claims advanced by him [see Tovar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 598 at para 19; Desravines v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1117 at para 14; Sary v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 178 at paragraph 20; Quintero Cienfuegos v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1262 at paragraph 1; Sohel v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1217 at para 54 citing Sun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 387 at para 22].
[10] With respect to the police ID checks, in his written submissions before the Officer, the Applicant noted that whenever he was stopped by the police, he would be taken, each time, to the police station because he did not have a valid ID and that, each time, he would give money for his release. However, at the hearing, the Applicant stated that he was stopped by the police and asked for money, without mentioning being taken to the police station. When asked to explain this discrepancy, the Applicant stated that he was not taken to the police station “all the time, but many times”
. The Officer found the Applicant’s responses to the questions were vague and general and consequently drew a negative inference. The Applicant submits that the Officer erred in their conclusion that he was not credible with regard to his statements about the police checks, as the Applicant asserts that his submissions never stated that he was taken to the police station each time he was apprehended. However, as noted by the Respondent, the Applicant stated the following in his personal declaration:
…I then asked them if they could extend the validity of the receipt because I couldn’t travel around the country or do any important transaction and each time I was being controlled by the police anywhere, I would be taken to the police station for further inquiries because I couldn’t be identified, and I lost a lot of money to be released each time…I had to continue suffering this trauma with the police all the time.
(underlining added)
[11] While the Applicant filed supplemental materials in support of his PRRA application (with the assistance of counsel) that provided further evidence regarding these interactions with the police, I find that the supplemental materials do not render unreasonable the Officer’s concern regarding the difference between his testimony and his written evidence. I see no error in relation to the Officer’s consideration of this evidence and agree that the Applicant’s evidence at the hearing was vague and general, particularly given the central role that these events played in his claim.
[12] With respect to the events surrounding the May 13, 2018 attack, the Officer found inconsistencies between the Applicant’s written submissions and oral testimony regarding key aspects of the attack by the military men (the manner of attack, the number of men involved and photos of the resulting injuries) and the events that followed (the burning down of his house and the retrieval of his passport to leave Cameroon). The Applicant takes issue with all of the Officer’s inconsistency findings and the Officer’s overall treatment of his evidence related to these events. However, I find that there is nothing unreasonable regarding the Officer’s findings, particularly given that the May 13, 2018 attack and the events thereafter were central elements to the Applicant’s claim.
[13] For example, the Applicant had submitted photos which he asserted showed his scars from injuries sustained during the attack. However, when questioned by the Officer as to how the scars could have been caused by the attack when the Applicant had testified that he only sustained bruising with no bleeding during the attack, the Applicant stated that the scars were not actually from the May 13, 2018 attack. By way of further example, the Applicant stated that he left Cameroon with his passport but that he did not have it with him on May 13, 2018. As the Applicant had stated that he never returned to his home after the attack as it was being watched by the military, the Officer asked him how he managed to get his passport. The Applicant responded that he sent one of his sisters to his home to retrieve it at night. However, when asked for further details, the Applicant was unable to confirm which of his sisters he had sent. The Officer did not accept this evidence, which I find reasonable in the circumstances.
[14] I find that many of the Applicant’s arguments related to the Officer’s consideration of the evidence regarding the May 13, 2018 attack merely amount to a request to the Court to reweigh the evidence and reach a different result, which is not the role of the Court on an application for judicial review.
[15] With respect to the affidavit evidence, the Applicant included in his application an affidavit from one of his sisters and an affidavit from his stepmother. The affidavits generally described the events the Applicant described in his written submissions. The Officer found that the affidavits were not sufficient to overcome the concerns regarding the Applicant’s credibility and to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was arrested and tortured by the military men or identified or suspected as a separatist supporter of the Anglophone region.
[16] The Applicant asserts that it was an error for the Officer to conclude that the affidavits from his family members were not sufficient to overcome the credibility concerns, as this Court has repeatedly held that the dismissal of evidence produced by a claimant's family members or other relations on the sole grounds that this evidence is self‑serving is a reviewable error. However, the Officer’s determination regarding the affidavits was not based solely on the fact that the affidavits were from family members. The Officer also noted that the affiants had no first-hand knowledge of the events recounted in their affidavits. As such, the affiants were merely recounting the events as described to them by the Applicant, whom the Officer had already found to be lacking in credibility. As such, the Officer’s determination that this evidence could not overcome the credibility concerns with the Applicant’s evidence was entirely reasonable.
[17] With respect to the deaths of the Applicant’s uncle and aunt, the Applicant stated that both relatives had been killed by the military because they were identified as his relatives. In support of this assertion, the Applicant relied on the uncle’s death certificate, two affidavits from family members regarding the deaths and the Applicant’s narrative. The Officer found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the deaths of the Applicant’s relatives were in fact due to their relation to the Applicant. The Officer found the Applicant’s own evidence to be speculative, that the death certificate could not corroborate the Applicant’s assertion and the letters were similarly speculative as to the reason for the deaths, thus being of minimal probative value.
[18] The Applicant asserts that the Officer’s treatment of all the aforementioned evidence was flawed. However, as is evident from a review of the Applicant’s written submissions on this application, the Applicant’s arguments are not grounded in any direct evidence but are based on the premise that is more likely than not that the military men killed his relatives as the military men would certainly go looking for the Applicant. I agree with the Officer that the Applicant’s premise is speculative and thus I see no flaw in the Officer’s treatment of this evidence.
[19] Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated that the Officer’s lack of credibility finding was unreasonable.
[20] Turning to the second issue, the Applicant submits that the Officer ignored country condition evidence that demonstrates that Anglophones are exposed to discrimination in Cameroon, particularly in their access to education, employment and to social services. According to the Applicant, it was an error for the Officer to rely on other documents suggesting that the persons who are at risk of being the target of violence, disappearance, threats or intimidation in Cameroon are human rights defenders, independent journalists, and people who express opinions against the government. The Applicant further asserts the fact those groups of people are at risk does not mean that the Applicant would not also be at risk, especially when the authorities already suspect him to be a separatist. Moreover, the country documentation indicates there are concerns related to the absence of identity documents, namely that the authorities frequently stop travelers to verify ID.
[21] I find that there is no merit to the Applicant’s arguments. It must be recalled that under sections 96 and 97, it is not sufficient to simply refer to the general situation in a country without establishing links to a claimant's personal circumstances. The assessment of the risk of persecution or harm that a claimant might face if returned to their country must be related to the claimant's situation [see Garces Canga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 749 at para 52].
[22] I find the Applicant’s statements that he would be subject to torture, detention and arrest as an Anglophone minority is not supported by the evidence. The evidence shows that the conflict is limited to the two mainly English-speaking provinces of Cameroon. The Applicant’s evidence is that he and his family live in the Francophone region (Yaoundé), where, as noted by the Officer, his sister indicates they have lived peacefully for 40 years. Moreover, given the Officer’s credibility concerns, there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to find that the authorities suspect that the Applicant is a separatist and that he would be targeted while in Yaoundé.
[23] The Applicant takes issue with the Officer’s assessment of the evidence, arguing that the Officer improperly placed more weight on evidence less favourable to the Applicant. However, as noted above, it is not the role of the Court to reweigh evidence on an application for judicial review. Nonetheless, I note that the Officer did not ignore the evidence that Anglophones may be subject to discrimination in Francophone regions and accepted that that is the case based on the current country conditions documentation. However, the Officer found that this evidence did not rise to the level of persecution as it was tempered by the objective evidence stating that Francophones and Anglophones generally lived peacefully. Moreover, while the country condition evidence does indicate that Anglophone minorities may be subject to discrimination while residing in Francophone regions, there was no nexus between this objective evidence and the Applicant’s personal circumstances as required by sections 96 and 97. As previously mentioned, it was not enough for the Applicant to simply refer to the general situation of the Anglophone minority in Cameroon without establishing links to his personal circumstances.
[24] Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated any flaw in the Officer’s assessment of the Applicant’s subjective fear.
[25] As the Applicant has failed to demonstrate a basis for the Court’s intervention, this application for judicial review shall be dismissed.
[26] The parties have not raised a question for certification and I agree that none arises.
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