Nwosu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 424

Date: 20250307

Docket: IMM-5050-24

Citation: 2025 FC 424

Toronto, Ontario, March 7, 2025

PRESENT: Justice Andrew D. Little

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1] In this judicial review application, the applicant seeks to set aside a decision of Refugee Appeal Division (the “RAD”). By decision with reasons dated February 9, 2024, the RAD concluded that the applicant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the “IRPA”).

[1] The applicant is a citizen of Nigeria. He applied for refugee protection on the basis of imputed political opinion. The applicant claims he is a target of both a separatist organization and the Nigerian state.

[2] Credibility was the decisive issue on the appeal to the RAD. The RAD found discrepancies and contradictions between the applicant’s oral testimony and the narrative in his Basis of Claim (“BOC”) and inconsistencies between those sources and other evidence filed by the applicant including a letter from his daughter and a letter from his lawyer in Nigeria. For example, the applicant advised that the police had visited his home when he was not present and that the police left a letter of invitation with his daughter for a meeting. However, the applicant’s daughter advised that the police came to the home and orally requested a meeting, but did not leave a “letter of arrest” for the applicant. The lawyer advised that the police left an “oral invitation” with the daughter for the application to appear at the police station and that he suspected “some foul intentions” because the police did not leave a “written letter of invitation”.

[3] The applicant submitted photographs as new evidence on his appeal to the RAD, but the RAD concluded that the photographs did not meet the statutory requirement for new evidence in IRPA subsection 110(4). As there was no new admissible evidence on appeal, the RAD refused to hold an oral hearing under subsection 110(6).

[4] In this Court, the applicant contended that the RAD’s decision was unreasonable under the principles in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653.

[5] Having considered the applicant’s submissions and carefully reviewed the RAD’s reasons, I conclude that there is no basis for the Court to intervene. The RAD’s decision was reasonable.

[6] With respect to the new evidence on appeal to the RAD, the applicant submitted that the RAD failed to “properly consider” the photographs, essentially disbelieved that the applicant could not obtain the photographs before the RPD rendered its decision, and did not follow the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.

[7] Proposed new evidence before the RAD must meet both the express statutory requirements in IRPA subsection 110(4) and the factors set out in Raza (credibility, relevance, newness and materiality) as approved in Singh: see Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230, at paras 38–49, 64; Raza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, at paras 13-15.

[8] The RAD stated the requirements for new evidence in subsection 110(4), citing Singh and Raza, and followed those requirements when it applied the law to the circumstances. It found that the photographs predated the RPD decision and that the applicant did not explain why he could not have submitted the photographs in the weeks after the RPD hearing, but before the RPD rendered its decision.

[9] There is no merit in the applicant’s submissions to the Court that the RPD erred by failing to ask the applicant for the photos during the hearing or that the RAD erred by failing to ask him why he did not submit them before the RPD’s decision. The onus was on the applicant to show the RAD why the photographs met the requirements for new evidence on appeal.

[10] As there was no admissible new evidence on appeal, the RAD reasonably declined to hold a hearing, as IRPA subsection 110(6) expressly contemplates.

[11] On the merits of the appeal, the RAD provided thorough reasons for its conclusion to dismiss the appeal from the RPD. The RAD found, like the RPD, that the applicant’s claim for IRPA protection should be refused on the basis of a lack of credibility.

[12] On a judicial review application, the Court does not lightly interfere with credibility findings that are made and justified by the RAD. In Shabaz Bhatti v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 2010, Justice Strickland summarized the applicable legal principles on credibility findings by the RAD:

[23] … as a starting point, it is significant to note that credibility assessments generally “command a high degree of judicial deference upon judicial review, considering the role of trier of fact conferred to the administrative tribunal” (Pham v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 470 at para 19, citing Lawani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 924 at paras 15–16 [Lawani]). The accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions regarding crucial elements of a refugee claim can support the conclusion that the applicant lacks credibility (Lawani, at para 22, citing Sary v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 178 at para 19 and Quintero Cienfuegos v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1262 at para 1). Further, a lack of credibility regarding central aspects of a refugee claim can also extend to other elements of the claim (Lawani, at para 24, citing Sheikh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] FCJ No 604 (FCA) (QL) at paras 7–8). And, conclusions concerning an applicant’s credibility can be based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality. A decision-maker can reject evidence if it is inconsistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole, or where inconsistencies are found in the evidence (Lawani, at para 26, citing Shahamati v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No 415 (FCA) (QL) at para 2 and Mohamed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1379 at para 25, amongst others).

[Underlining added.]

[13] The applicant’s submissions did not show that the RAD committed a reviewable error in its analysis of credibility, either by failing to follow any binding legal principle or by failing to respect the factual constraints that applied to its decision: Vavilov, esp. at paras 85, 91-97, 103, 105-106 and 194.

[14] From paragraphs 14 to 46 of its reasons, the RAD analyzed four adverse credibility findings made by the RPD that were challenged by the applicant on the appeal. The applicant submitted that these findings focused on small inconsistencies in the evidence that did not affect the core of the applicant’s claim for protection under the IRPA. The respondent submitted that the RPD and RAD identified multiple grounds to question the applicant’s credibility and that credibility findings must be given significant deference on judicial review.

[15] In my view, the RAD reasonably concluded that the credibility issues were of sufficient importance to the core of the factual basis of the applicant’s claims for IRPA protection. The RAD methodically explained the evidentiary basis for each of its adverse credibility findings. The RAD provided well-considered reasons that explained in detail the RPD’s reasoning and conclusions, the applicant’s arguments on appeal to the RAD, why the RAD agreed with the RPD (or disagreed in part), and why the RAD did not accept the applicant’s explanations for the discrepancies. It was open to the RAD to reach its conclusions about the inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence.

[16] There were two points on which the RAD disagreed with the RPD. The RAD articulated why it concluded that the errors did not undermine the overall correctness of the RPD’s decision on the broader issue at stake. The applicant has not demonstrated a basis to conclude that the RAD committed a reviewable error in those two findings.

[17] Some of the applicant’s submissions reargued the merits of the applicant’s position on credibility. This is not a basis for the Court to conclude that the RAD’s decision was unreasonable. The Court is not permitted to engage in its own assessment of the merits of the appeal to the RAD or the credibility issues decided by the RAD and the RPD: Vavilov, at paras 83, 125.

[18] The applicant’s written submissions referred to legal principles applicable to implausibility but did not identity any specific implausibility findings by the RAD. The applicant did not pursue this line of argument at the hearing, presumably because the RAD did not characterize any evidence as implausible.

[19] The application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed.

[20] The parties did not raise a question to certify for appeal and there is none.

JUDGMENT in IMM-5050-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application is dismissed.

2. No question is certified for appeal under paragraph 74(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

"Andrew D. Little"

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: