Date: 20241205

Docket: T-432-24

Citation: 2024 FC 1975

Toronto, Ontario, December 5, 2024

PRESENT: Associate Judge John C. Cotter

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

UPON MOTION by the defendant dated April 2, 2024, and filed on that date as part of the motion record of the defendant [Defendant’s Motion Record], made in writing pursuant to Rule 369 (any reference in these Reasons to a Rule is to those in the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules]) for:

1. An Order amending the style of cause to remove the Attorney General of Canada as a defendant;

2. An Order striking out the Statement of Claim in its entirety, without leave to amend, and dismissing the action pursuant to Rule 221 of the Federal Courts Rules;

3. In the alternative, an Order extending the deadline for the service and filing of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence to 30 days from the date of the Court’s Order;

4. An Order granting the Defendant its costs of this motion; and

5. Such further relief as Counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit.

AND UPON reviewing and considering the Defendant’s Motion Record, including the statement of claim in this action [Claim];

AND UPON reviewing and considering the “MOTION RECORD OF THE PLAINTIFF” dated and filed April 5, 2024 [Plaintiff’s First Motion Record];

AND UPON reviewing and considering the plaintiff’s “RESPONDING MOTON RECORD” filed September 11, 2024 [Plaintiff’s Second Motion Record], which was permitted to be filed pursuant to the Direction of Associate Judge Crinson dated September 11, 2024, and which also provide that the issue of the admissibility of any evidence or submissions therein is reserved for the discretion of the motions judge;

AND UPON noting that in the Plaintiff’s First Motion Record, the plaintiff states that “the plaintiff, agrees to amend the style of cause to remove the Attorney General of Canada as a defendant” (see page 1), and upon concluding that the defendant’s request for an Order amending the style of cause to remove the Attorney General of Canada as a defendant should be granted;

AND UPON considering:

[1] For the reasons set out below the Claim is struck out, without leave to amend, as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. As a result, it is not necessary to consider the alternative relief sought, namely that it is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.

[2] The Plaintiff’s First Motion Record and the Plaintiff’s Second Motion Record warrant some comment. Although neither of them is compliant with the Rules, I have reviewed and considered them both. A few points to note:

1. The Plaintiff’s First Motion Record, filed in response to the defendant’s motion to strike, improperly purports to include a motion by the plaintiff for various relief, including:

1. An Order to further The Reasonable Cause of Action as set fourth in the Statement of Claim as Plaintiff in Applicant’s Memorandum of fact and law.

2. An Order to further the Statement of Claim and give further written representation of the nature of the offences, to exercise jurisprudence, with depth of discernment about about the condition(s) allowed to manifest of subject to the nature of the offences, conditional upon unsolicited use of personal information, without option to dispose of that information; request Judgment for amount in it's entirety, without leave to amend; and such amount of more than $370 (three hundred and seventy billion).

3. An Order to dismiss the Defendant’s Motion to Strike in it’s entirety; without leave to amend and dismissing all action pursuant to rule 221(1) of the Federal Court Rules on grounds subject to defendant frivolous pursuit; and infringement; not exercised in good faith and not worthy of consideration in and Honourable Court.

[…]

2. The Plaintiff’s Second Motion Record is also problematic. In the plaintiff’s written representations, in addition to asserting that there is a reasonable cause of action, the plaintiff seeks summary judgment. Even if the plaintiff had filed a proper motion for summary judgment, it would be of no consequence. Leaving aside the various other issues associated with the plaintiff’s request, summary judgment cannot be sought until after a statement of defence has been filed (Rule 213). As the defendant has not filed a statement of defence, any motion for summary judgment would be premature.

3. The Plaintiff’s Second Motion Record includes affidavit evidence. It is not clear on what basis the plaintiff seeks to have this affidavit evidence considered by the Court. If it is in response to the defendant’s motion to strike the Claim on the basis that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, affidavit evidence is not to be considered (Rule 221(2); see also Fitzpatrick v Codiac Regional RCMP Force, District 12, 2019 FC 1040 [Fitzpatrick] at para 15). While there are limited exceptions to this prohibition, none apply in this context and the plaintiff has not made any submissions that any exception applies. As this motion is being decided under Rule 221(1)(a) it is not necessary to deal further with the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence and the related issues (e.g., admissibility).

[3] The applicable rule on a motion to strike out a statement of claim on the ground that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action is Rule 221(1)(a), which along with Rule 221(2) read as follows:

[4] The Federal Court of Appeal in Brink v Canada, 2024 FCA 43 stated the following regarding the general principles on a motion to strike out a statement of claim under Rule 221(1)(a) on the basis that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action:

[43] […] a statement of claim should not be struck unless it is plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed, assuming the facts pleaded in the statement of claim to be true: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., 1990 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, [1990] S.C.J. No. 93 at 980; Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57 at para. 63. In other words, the claim must have no reasonable prospect of success: R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42 at para. 17.

[44] The onus is on the party who seeks to establish that a pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action: La Rose v. Canada, 2023 FCA 241 at para. 19; Edell v. Canada, 2010 FCA 26 at para. 5. The threshold that a plaintiff must meet to establish that a claim discloses a reasonable cause of action is a low one: Brake v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 274 at para. 70.

[45] Pleadings must, moreover, be read generously, in a manner that accommodates any inadequacies in the allegations that are merely the result of deficiencies in the drafting of the document: see Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, 1985 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22 at 451.

[46] Motions judges should not delve into the merits of a plaintiff’s argument, but should, rather, consider whether the plaintiff should be precluded from advancing the argument at all: Salna v. Voltage Pictures, LLC, 2021 FCA 176 at para. 77. Recognizing that the law is not static, motions judges must also err on the side of permitting novel, but arguable claims to proceed to trial: R. v. Imperial Tobacco, above at paras. 19-25; Mohr v. National Hockey League, 2022 FCA 145 at para. 48, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 40426 (20 April 2023).

[47] That said, it must also be recognized that there is a cost to access to justice in allowing cases that have no substance to proceed. The diversion of scarce judicial resources to such cases diverts time away from potentially meritorious cases that require attention: Mohr, above at para. 50; Coote v. Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company, 2013 FCA 143 at para. 13.

[5] Justice Pentney considered the application of the principles on a motion to strike where the plaintiff is self-represented in Fitzpatrick and explained:

[19] The Court generally shows flexibility when a party is self-represented, but this does not exempt the party from complying with the rules set out above: Barkley v Canada, 2014 FC 39 at para 17. The reason for this is simple – it is not fair to a defendant to have to respond to claims that are not explained in sufficient detail for them to understand what the claim is based on, or to have to deal with claims based on unsupported assumptions or speculation. Neither is it fair to the Court that will have to ensure that the hearing is done in a fair and efficient manner. A court would have difficulty ruling that a particular piece of evidence was or was not relevant, for example, if the claim is speculative or not clear. This will inevitably lead to “fishing expeditions” by a party seeking to discover the facts needed to support their claims, as well as to unmanageable trials that continue far longer than is appropriate as both sides try to deal with a vague or ever-changing set of assertions.

[20] A degree of flexibility is needed to allow parties to represent themselves and to have access to the justice system; but flexibility cannot trump the ultimate demands of justice and fairness for all parties, and that is what the Rules and the principles set out in the cases seek to ensure.

[6] As stated by Justice Gleeson in Welcome v Canada, 2024 FC 443:

[12] Pleadings must disclose a reasonable cause of action. To do so, pleadings must (1) allege facts that are capable of giving rise to a cause of action; (2) disclose the nature of the action which is to be founded on those facts; and (3) indicate the relief sought, which must be of a type that the action could produce and the Court has jurisdiction to grant (Van Sluytman at para 9, citing Oleynik v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 896 at para 5; Bérubé v Canada, 2009 FC 43 at para 24, aff’d 2010 FCA 276).

[7] Although the Claim is difficult to follow, it is useful to reproduce it in its entirety:

[8] Reading the Claim generously and considering the applicable principles discussed above, I am unable to identify any reasonable cause of action. The Claim merely sets out the relief sought for each claim asserted, but fails to plead any material facts. A statement of claim must contain a concise statement of the material facts (Rule 174). The application of this principle is seen in Cannon v Canada, 2024 FC 1746 [Cannon] where Justice Duchesne stated the following in striking out various claims (see also paras 26, 27 and 31):

[22] The Plaintiff’s allegations of false imprisonment are bald and conclusory statements that do not meet the Rule 174 and Rule 181(1)(b) requirements to plead material facts and particulars sufficient to tell the Defendant the who, when, where, how and what that gives rise to his alleged liability for false imprisonment (Mancuso v. Canada (National Health and Welfare, 2015 FCA 227 (CanLII) at paras 17 to 19; Empire Company Limited v. Attorney General of Canada, 2024 FC 810 at paras 22 and 23; Merchant Law Group v Canada Revenue Agency 2010 FCA 184 at para 34). The baldness of the statements leads to the conclusion that the Court is not to consider the allegation as true for the purposes of the analysis on a motion to strike or to give the allegation any weight in determining whether a reasonable cause of action is pleaded.

[23] As the pleading fails to allege sufficient material facts or particulars to support the alleged intentional cause of action of false imprisonment, the Court must conclude pursuant to Rule 221(1)(a) that the Plaintiff has not pleaded a reasonable cause of action in false imprisonment.

[9] On the need to plead material facts in order to disclose a cause of action, see also Lauer v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 74 at paras 10 and 27.

[10] Leaving aside the issue of whether certain of the causes of action alleged are known in law and the requisite elements, the Claim is completely devoid of any material facts to support any of the causes of action alleged and as a result, the Claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

Conclusion

[11] As a result, the Claim will be struck out pursuant to Rule 221(1)(a).

[12] In order to strike a pleading without leave to amend, the defect must be one that cannot be cured by amendment (Collins v Canada, 2011 FCA 140 at para 26; Simon v Canada, 2011 FCA 6 at para 8). The defect in the Claim which has resulted in it being struck, namely being devoid of any material facts, is not one that can be cured by amendment. Similar to the situation in Cannon the Claim “does not set out a trace or a scintilla of a sustainable cause of action that may be saved by an amendment” (at para 33). As a result, the Claim is struck without leave to amend.

[13] Similar to the approach taken by Associate Judge Duchesne (as he then was) in Suss v Canada, 2024 FC 137 at para 59, this proceeding is dismissed pursuant to Rule 168. This is because it is not possible for the plaintiff to continue the action as a result of the Claim being struck out without leave to amend.

[14] Having regard to Rules 400 and 401(1), including the factors articulated in Rule 400(3), and Tariff B, and having regard to the success of the defendant on this motion, costs are awarded to the defendant, fixed in the total amount of $500, to be paid by the plaintiff.

JUDGMENT in T-432-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The style of cause is amended to remove the Attorney General of Canada as a defendant, and the amended style of cause shall be reflected in this Judgment.

2. The statement of claim is struck out, without leave to amend, and this action is dismissed.

3. Costs of the motion shall be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant fixed in the total amount of $500.

"John C. Cotter"

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

MATTER CONSIDERED AT TORONTO, ONTARIO WITHOUT PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE PARTIES

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: