Docket: IMM-15998-23
Citation: 2024 FC 1943
Ottawa, Ontario, December 2, 2024
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
BETWEEN: |
JAGVEER SINGH |
Applicant |
and |
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] Mr. Singh’s claim for protection was assessed under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. The determinative issue before the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] was whether he had internal flight alternatives [IFAs] in Delhi, Mumbai, or Chennai. He asserts that this finding was unreasonable.
[2] The Applicant is an Indian citizen who worked as a Sikh religious musical performer. His work involved traveling to devotees’ homes to perform religious music. Through this work, he developed a romantic and sexual relationship with a married woman, MM.
[3] After MM’s family discovered the relationship, the Applicant alleges that MM’s husband, GL, threatened his safety and filed criminal complaints against him, including allegations of kidnapping and rape of MM. The Applicant attempted to seek police protection but claims he was unsuccessful due to GL’s influence, with the police allegedly siding with GL and MM’s family.
[4] Threatened, and lacking police protection, the Applicant relocated to Delhi in April 2018. He lived there without any incidents involving GL or the police for approximately seven months. During this period, he traveled to Malaysia for 12 days, successfully passing through Indian border control both upon exit and re-entry without detention or interference.
[5] The Applicant asserted fear of both the police and GL. He claims they could locate him anywhere in India through family pressure, informant networks, and information technology.
[6] The RAD’s analysis focused on the viability of the proposed IFAs, using the accepted two-pronged test. The first prong is that an IFA must be safe, and the second is that it must be reasonable for the person to relocate there. It found both were satisfied.
[7] The Applicant says that the decision is unreasonable due to various erroneous findings in the RAD’s assessment of the viability of the IFAs. In my view, the primary issues raised are the following: (1) the means and motivation of the Applicant’s alleged persecutors to locate him in the proposed IFAs; (2) the practical implications of maintaining family contact while residing in an IFA; and (3) the reasonableness of relocation given his personal circumstances, and the cumulative effect of barriers he would face. The first issue relates to the safety prong of the IFA test. The second issue engages both the safety and reasonableness prongs, as it relates to the possibility of personal safety and feasibility of keeping family ties. The third issue goes to the reasonableness prong.
[8] On the first issue, the Applicant argues that the RAD failed to properly weigh evidence of continued pursuit after his flight from India. He points to the police and “some men”
still making inquiries about his whereabouts at his family home, arguing that this demonstrates sustained motivation. He contends the RAD erred by requiring excessive detail about these visits and failed to consider how his status as a failed asylum seeker would expose him to new risks through systematic airport questioning upon return.
[9] I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s submissions. They are not supported by the type of concrete, objective evidence required by law.
[10] On the first issue, the RAD reasonably concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish a serious possibility that his alleged persecutors hold the means and motivation needed to pursue him in the proposed IFAs. The RAD did not err in requiring specific details about the alleged ongoing visits. As the burden of proof lies with the Applicant, it was reasonable for the RAD to expect concrete evidence regarding the frequency, timing, and nature of these visits. While his father’s affidavit confirms that visits occurred, it lacked the objective detail necessary to establish sustained motivation and capability for nationwide pursuit.
[11] The Applicant’s argument that modern technology and information networks make locating his nationwide location in India highly likely is unconvincing. This argument, if accepted, would effectively eliminate the availability of IFA in any case where internet and communication technology exists. The possibility of using technology to locate someone must be supported by concrete evidence of both capability and motivation of the specific party in pursuit, not mere speculation about technological possibilities.
[12] The Applicant’s successful residence in Delhi for seven months in 2018, coupled with international travel during that time without incident, contradicts claims of sustained nationwide interest by his alleged persecutors or a significant risk arising from modern technology and information networks. The RAD reasonably inferred from this evidence that the Applicant’s identity was not flagged in police databases. Moreover, the Applicant’s concerns about risks as a failed refugee claimant are without support. He provided no country condition evidence demonstrating that failed refugee claimants are systematically questioned upon return, that information about failed claims is routinely shared with local police, or that such sharing would result in targeting by local authorities. In the absence of such evidence, the RAD was entitled to find these concerns speculative.
[13] On the second issue, the Applicant submits that one of the most common police practices in India is to locate persons through family, relatives, and friends by putting pressure on them. He argues that this practice renders any IFA unsafe unless he completely conceals his whereabouts from his family and community. Citing jurisprudence including Ali v Canada, 2020 FC 93 at para 49, he submits that his family members would face risks if they refused to disclose his location to persecutors, or alternatively, he would be forced to sever all contact with them. Either option, the Applicant maintains, is unreasonable.
[14] I find that the RAD’s treatment of the Applicant’s ability to maintain family contact was reasonable. The argument that an IFA is impossible because of general police pressure on family members would effectively eliminate the availability of IFA in any case where applicants have family in their home region. This is not correct in law. While Ali holds that it is unreasonable to expect family members to risk their safety, the applicability of this principle depends on evidence of actual risks, not theoretical possibilities. The Applicant’s evidence, while establishing that police make inquiries at the family home, lacks detail that would demonstrate that family members would face serious risks if they maintained contact with him in an IFA location. Moreover, the RAD’s finding that the police lack motivation and capability for nationwide pursuit addresses this concern. Hence, the RAD reasonably found that the Applicant failed to establish that his family would face any specific risks, given the vague evidence about the nature of the visits they receive from the police and unidentified “goons.”
[15] On the third issue, the Applicant argues that the RAD misapplied the threshold articulated in Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (2000) 266 NR 380 (FCA) [Ranganathan] at para 15. He asserts that the RAD incorrectly applied a standard requiring evidence of risks that would jeopardize his life or safety, rather than the appropriate “undue hardship”
standard. He contends that to work, he would have to go out and meet people, which exposes him to risks of being found. Given his profession as a musical performer and lack of professional qualifications that would allow remote work, the Applicant argues the RAD failed to consider how he could maintain employment without endangering himself. He submits that these factors, when viewed cumulatively with other barriers, would effectively force him to live in hiding and isolation, creating an unreasonable burden.
[16] The Applicant’s argument that the RAD misapplied the test is based on a fundamental misreading of the jurisprudence. The Court in Ranganathan has explicitly set “a very high threshold”
requiring “nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant:”
Ranganathan at para 15. That case specifically distinguishes such conditions from mere hardships, such as loss of employment or reduction in quality of life. The Applicant’s concerns about having to work in public and lacking professional qualifications fall squarely within the category of hardships that Ranganathan holds insufficient to render an IFA unreasonable. These concerns fundamentally relate to economic prospects and lifestyle limitations rather than conditions that would jeopardize his life and safety. The loss of employment opportunities that do not endanger the Applicant can hardly be said to be undue hardship.
[17] For these reasons, this application will be dismissed. No question was proposed for certification.
Email this Content