Docket: IMM-12402-23
Citation: 2024 FC 1873
Ottawa, Ontario, November 22, 2024
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ahmed
BETWEEN: |
XIAOCHEN LIN |
Applicant |
and |
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant, Xiaochen Lin, seeks judicial review of a decision of a Senior Immigration Officer (the “Officer”
) of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada dated August 11, 2023 refusing his application for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA”
) pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”
).
[2] The Applicant submits that the decision is unreasonable and the Officer breached their duty of procedural fairness.
[3] For the following reasons, I disagree. The decision is reasonable and was rendered in a procedurally fair manner. This application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Facts
A. Background
[4] The Applicant is a citizen of China. He entered Canada and claimed refugee protection in 2016.
[5] In 2018, the Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”
) refused the Applicant’s claim. In 2019, the Refugee Appeal Division affirmed the RPD’s refusal.
[6] In 2020, the Applicant states that he was introduced to the Church of Almighty God (the “CAG”
) by his wife. According to the Applicant, he has attended services for the CAG since this time. The Applicant states that he is actively engaged in worship and preaching.
[7] On October 17, 2022, the Applicant submitted an application for permanent residence under the spousal sponsorship class. Around this time, the Applicant submitted a PRRA application.
[8] In a decision dated August 11, 2023, the Officer rejected the Applicant’s PRRA application. Although the Officer accepted that CAG members face persecution by the Chinese state, they did not find sufficient evidence that the Applicant was a member of the CAG. This is the decision that is presently under review.
III. Issues and Standard of Review
[9] The Applicant submits that the Officer’s decision is unreasonable and was rendered in a procedurally unfair manner. According to the Applicant, the Officer made veiled credibility findings and failed to hold an oral hearing in contravention of subsection 113(b) of IRPA and section 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. In doing so, the Officer breached their duty of procedural fairness. Additionally, the Applicant submits that the Officer used trivial details to dismiss his evidence, resulting in a decision that was divorced from the record and ultimately unreasonable.
[10] The Respondent submits that the Officer’s decision is reasonable and not in breach of the duty of procedural fairness. In the Respondent’s view, the Officer took issue with the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather than disbelieving the Applicant, the Officer merely determined that there was not enough evidence to support the full scope of the Applicant’s claims. Having made this determination, it was reasonable for the Officer to reject the Applicant’s PRRA application.
[11] The parties submit that the applicable standard of review for the merits of the Officer’s decision is that of reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 25, 86-87 (“Vavilov”
)). I agree.
[12] The issue of procedural fairness is to be reviewed on the correctness standard (Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 (“Canadian Pacific Railway Company”
) at paras 37-56; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 at para 35). I find that this conclusion accords with the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vavilov (at paras 16-17).
[13] Reasonableness is a deferential, but robust, standard of review (Vavilov at paras 12-13). The reviewing court must determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible, and justified (Vavilov at para 15). A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 85). Whether a decision is reasonable depends on the relevant administrative setting, the record before the decision-maker, and the impact of the decision on those affected by its consequences (Vavilov at paras 88-90, 94, 133-135).
[14] For a decision to be unreasonable, the applicant must establish the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). Not all errors or concerns about a decision will warrant intervention. A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision-maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). Flaws or shortcomings must be more than superficial or peripheral to the merits of the decision, or a “minor misstep”
(Vavilov at para 100).
[15] Correctness, by contrast, is a non-deferential standard of review. The central question for issues of procedural fairness is whether the procedure was fair having regard to all of the circumstances, including the factors enumerated in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras 21-28; Canadian Pacific Railway Company at para 54).
IV. Analysis
A. The Decision was Rendered in a Procedurally Fair Manner
[16] I agree with the Respondent that the Officer did not take issue with the credibility of the evidence. As stated in Khansary v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FC 1146, “the insufficiency concept is that the party has not made out a probable case to support a fact or finding, such that there is no need to consider any internal inconsistencies or extrinsic credibility issues”
(at para 32). This is precisely what the Officer has done in this case.
[17] Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the Officer does not dispute the truth of the Applicant’s evidence. They merely acknowledge the limited propositions for which the evidence stands. For example, the Officer determines that a letter of support from a CAG member was not sufficient evidence for the Applicant’s claim of being a regular participant in CAG activities. The letter states that the Applicant engaged in preaching with other CAG members and describes the Applicant’s conduct in a single church meeting. The Officer discounted this evidence not because it lacked credibility but because it was insufficient to demonstrate the claim for which it was brought.
[18] Similarly, the Officer determined that a photo of the Applicant allegedly preaching was not sufficient to demonstrate his membership in the CAG. The Officer correctly notes that “[t]here is nothing in this photo to indicate either when it was taken, or to indicate that the [A]pplicant is one of the individuals pictured or to indicate that it is a photo of a CAG activity.”
Even if there was, the photo would only indicate a single incident of the Applicant’s participation, rather than continuous engagement with the CAG as the Applicant submits.
[19] Since the Officer did not impugn the Applicant’s credibility, there was no requirement for an oral hearing. This ground for judicial review is dismissed.
B. The Decision is Reasonable
[20] I find that the Officer’s decision is reasonable. The Applicant is effectively requesting the Court to reweigh the evidence and render its own decision in the Officer’s place, a remedy that is not available on judicial review under the standard of reasonableness.
[21] The Applicant relies on Belek v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 205 (“Belek”
) and Mahmud v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 8019 (FC) (“Mahmud”
), submitting that the Officer erred by discounting the Applicant’s evidence based on its failure to corroborate certain aspects of the Applicant’s claim.
[22] However, this case is distinguishable from Belek and Mahmud. Here, the Officer did not determine that the evidence contradicted the Applicant’s claim. Neither did they discredit the evidence due to the absence of specific details. In this case, the Officer reasonably determined that, although the evidence supported the Applicant’s claims, it did so to a limited extent, as the evidence was only capable of demonstrating discrete and isolated facts rather than broader patterns of identity and behaviour.
[23] Consequently, I find no error in the Officer’s decision. As stated in McPhee v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1371, the onus lies with the Applicant to bring sufficient evidence of his claim (at para 30). Given the evidentiary record, it was reasonable for the Officer to determine that the Applicant fell short of doing so.
V. Conclusion
[24] For these reasons, I find that the Officer’s decision is reasonable and was rendered in a procedurally fair manner. The decision is transparent, intelligible, and justified in light of the evidentiary record (Vavilov at paras 15, 126). This application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. No questions for certification were raised, and I agree that none arise.
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