THOTSON,
P.:
In
this
appeal
the
appellant,
who
is
legislative
counsel
for
the
Province
of
Manitoba
and
Deputy
Superintendent
of
Insurance,
and
also
insurance
counsel,
contends
that
the
income
tax
assessment
levied
against
him
for
the
year
1943
is
erroneous
in
that
there
was
added
to
the
amount
shown
on
his
return
the
sum
of
$25
which
he
had
paid
to
the
Law
Society
of
Manitoba
for
1943,
being
the
annual
practising
fees
of
$20
and
the
special
assessment
of
$5
for
the
reimbursement
fund
for
that
year
;
he
claims
that
he
is
entitled
to
a
deduction
of
this
amount
from
the
amount
of
his
salary.
The
legal
questions
involved
are
similar
to
those
in
the
case
of
Bond
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
ante,
p
284,
in
which
judgment
has
just
been
given.
The
appellant
is
a
qualified
legal
practitioner
in
the
Province
of
Manitoba,
both
as
a
barrister
and
as
an
attorney-at-law
or
solicitor,
having
been
called
to
the
bar
and
admitted
to
the
rolls
in
June,
1914.
Since
such
call
and
admission
he
has
been
a
member
in
good
standing
of
the
Law
Society
of
Manitoba.
He
was
appointed
legislative
counsel
of
the
Province
of
Manitoba
and
Deputy
Superintendent
of
Insurance
by
Order
in
Council
No.
1064/41,
approved
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
on
October
9,
1941,
at
an
annual
salary
of
a
fixed
amount.
Subsequently,
by
Order
in
Council
No.
845/42,
approved
September
17,
1942,
he
was
made
insurance
counsel
with
such
duties
in
respect
of
legal
matters
as
might
be
specified
from
time
to
time
by
the
Attorney-
General.
The
appellant’s
duties
as
legislative
counsel
are
not
defined
by
statute
or
regulation.
While
his
instructions
came
mainly
from
the
Attorney-General
and
his
salary
comes
out
of
the
appropriation
for
the
Attorney-General’s
department,
he
also
acts
for
other
Ministers
and
departments.
The
appellant
gave
evidence
as
to
his
duties
and
they
are
fully
set
out
in
Exhibit
5A.
He
drafts
all
government
legislation
laid
before
the
Legislative
Assembly
and
examines
and
reports
on
all
other
legislation;
he
frequently
drafts
orders
in
council
and
regulations;
he
is
called
upon
by
various
departments
for
legal
advice
and
opinions
and
to
draft
and
revise
contracts,
agreements,
etc.;
he
does
some
solicitor’s
work
for
the
Attorney-General’s
department;
he
may
be
and
has
been
required
to
appear
in
Court
as
counsel
on
behalf
of
the
Attorney-General
in
constitutional
matters.
As
insurance
counsel
he
is
called
upon
to
advise
the
Superintendent
of
Insurance
as
to
matters
of
insurance
law,
and
he
attends
the
annual
conference
of
the
Superintendents
of
Insurance.
He
is
also
one
of
the
Manitoba
Commissioners
to
the
Conference
on
Uniformity
of
Laws.
It
is
obvious
that
for
the
performance
of
his
duties
he
must
have
a
knowledge
of
law
and
practice.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
sought
to
distinguish
this
case
from
the
Bond
case
(supra),
on
the
ground
that
the
duties
of
the
appellant
were
not
stated
in
the
order-in-council
by
which
he
was
appointed;
that
there
was
no
requirement
that
the
appellant
must
retain
membership
in
the
Law
Society
of
Manitoba
for
the
performance
of
his
duties;
and
that
his
duties
were
not
those
of
a
practising
lawyer.
I
am
unable
to
agree.
It
is
quite
true
that
the
duties
are
not
specified
by
any
document
but
they
are
defined
and
well
known
by
custom
and
practice
and
they
are
such
as
could
only
be
properly
performed
by
a
member
of
the
legal
profession.
Moreover,
some
of
them,
such
as
appearing
in
Court,
demand
good
standing
at
the
bar.
The
appellant
is
under
the
direction
of
the
Attorney-General
and
performs
duties
that
only
a
lawyer
could
discharge.
Moreover,
I
am
satisfied
that
if
he
did
not
pay
his
Law
Society
annual
practising
fees
and
assessments
and
in
consequence
of
such
nonpayment
were
suspended
and
struck
off
the
rolls,
his
carrying
on
of
his
duties
would
constitute
unlawful
practice
of
law
within
the
meaning
of
Sec.
53
of
the
Law
Society
Act,
R.S.M.
1940,
c.
115,
as
amended
in
1943,
Statutes
of
Manitoba
1943,
c.
29,
Sec.
3,
and
expose
him
not
only
to
penalty
but
also
to
injunction
at
the
instance
of
the
Law
Society.
It
was,
therefore,
necessary
to
the
lawful
and
continuous
performance
of
his
duties
that
he
should
continue
to
be
a
member
in
good
standing
of
the
legal
profession
;
in
that
sense,
continued
membership
in
the
Law
Society
was
a
condition
of
his
employment
for
he
could
not
otherwise
perform
all
his
duties.
Under
the
circumstances.
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
position
of
the
appellant
in
this
case
cannot
be
distinguished
from
that
of
the
appellant
in
the
Bond
case
(supra).
The
reasons
for
judgment
in
that
case
are,
therefore,
incorporated,
mutatis
mutandis,
in
this
one;
and
it
follows
that
the
appeal
must
be
allowed
with
costs.
Appeal
allowed.
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