TRUEMAN,
J.A.—The
city
of
Winnipeg,
incorporated
by
ch.
7
of
the
statutes
of
Manitoba
passed
in
the
37th
year
of
the
reign
of
Queen
Victoria,
was
continued
as
a
municipal
corporation
by
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1918,
ch.
120,
and
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940,
ch.
81,
and
amending
Acts.
See.
696
of
ch.
120
enacts,
inter
alia,
as
follows:
"‘The
council
may
pass
a
by-law
or
by-laws
to
acquire
by
purchase
or
by
and
under
the
expropriation
or
arbitration
provisions
of
this
Act,
or
otherwise,
a
sufficient
amount
of
land
for
the
purposes
of
a
*
*
*
park
or
parks,
a
pleasure
ground
or
pleasure
grounds,
or
a
public
playground
or
playgrounds
*
*
*
within
or
without
the
limits
of
said
city;
and
the
council
may
erect
such
buildings
and
make
such
regulations
respecting
the
same
as
the
council
sees
fit,
and
the
said
council
shall
have
power
to
issue
debentures
to
pay
for
such
*
*
*
parks,
or
pleasure
grounds,
or
playgrounds,
or
site
for
such
exhibition
and
buildings,
and
to
meet
the
costs
of
laying
out
and
improving
the
same
*
*
*
.
"‘(a)
The
council
may
pass
a
by-law
or
by-laws
appointing
a
commission
to
administer
the
public
playgrounds
of
the
city.
"‘(b)
The
council
may
appropriate
and
expend
on
the
road
or
roads
leading
to
such
*
*
*
park
or
parks,
or
pleasure
ground
or
pleasure
grounds
*
*
*
a
sum
*
*
*
for
the
construction,
repair
and
maintenance
of
such
’road
or
roads,
whether
the
same
be
within
or
without
the
limits
of
the
city
*
*
*
.”
See.
4
of
the
Charter
provides
that:
"‘All
lands
used
for
public
park
purposes
or
exhibition
grounds,
now
or
hereafter
owned
by
the
city,
which
are
situate
outside
the
territorial
limits
of
the
city,
shall
be
exempt
from
municipal
taxation
by
any
municipality
in
which
such
lands
are
situate.”
This
section
is
re-enacted
by
sec.
5
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940,
ch.
81.
On
May
7,
1924,
the
city
became
the
owner
in
fee
simple
of
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course,
comprised
of
specified
lands
in
St.
Boniface,
and
of
the
following
specified
lands
in
the
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital:
“Parcel
1—Lots
One
to
Nineteen,
both
inclusive,
in
Block
Two,
and
Lots
One
to
Six,
both
inclusive,
in
Block
Three,
which
lots
are
shewn
on
a
plan
of
survey
of
part
of
Lot
112
of
the
Parish
of
Saint
Boniface,
in
Manitoba,
in
the
Winnipeg
Land
Titles
Office
as
No.
2708.
“Parcel
2—All
that
portion
of
River
Lot
112
according
to
the
Dominion
Government
Survey
of
the
Parish
of
Saint
Boniface,
in
Manitoba,
lying
to
the
east
of
the
straight
production
southerly
of
the
eastern
limit
of
Rue
des
Meurons
as
said
Rue
des
Meurons
is
shewn
on
a
plan
of
survey
registered
in
the
Winnipeg
Land
Titles
office
as
No.
2708,
which
lies
to
the
south
of
the
southern
limit
of
the
land
covered
by
said
Plan
No.
2708.”
From
May
7,
1924,
the
Public
Parks
Board
of
the
city
of
Winnipeg
has
operated
the
golf
course
for
the
city
as
a
public
golf
course
open
to
anyone
paying
the
green
fees,
whether
a
resident
of
the
city
of
Winnipeg
or
not.
In
1939
and
1940
the
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital,
the
defendant
herein,
assessed
and
levied
general
municipal
and
school
taxes
upon
the
lands
described
in
said
parcels
No.
1
and
No.
*2.
In
September,
1941,
the
lands
were
sold
by
the
municipality
for
non-payment
of
taxes
to
the
defendant.
The
plaintiff
having
refused
to
redeem
said
lands,
the
treasurer
of
the
defendant
forwarded
to
the
district
registrar
of
the
land
titles
district
a
return
showing
that
said
lands
had
been
sold
to
the
defendant
for
non-payment
of
taxes.
On
November
20,
1942,
the
defendant
filed
an
application
in
the
registry
office
to
have
said
lands
registered
in
its
name
as
owner
of
the
lands.
On
or
about
December
30,
1942,
the
city
paid,
under
protest,
to
the
district
registrar
said
taxes
amounting
to
$1,751.40
and
costs.
The
action
by
the
city
seeks
to
have
it
declared
that
said
lands,
ever
since
May
7,
1924,
have
been
exempt
from
taxation,
and
for
an
order
that
the
above
sum
and
costs
be
ordered
to
be
refunded
to
the
city,
with
costs,
and
for
such
other
relief
as
may
be
required.
The
action
was
heard
by
McPherson,
C.J.K.B.
(as
he
then
was).
In
a
considered
judgment
he
held
([1944]
2
W.W.R.
217)
that
the
land
in
question
is
a
public
park
notwithstanding
that
golf
is
played
thereon
and
playing
fees
are
required
to
be
paid.
He
declared
the
levied
taxation
void
and
directed
that
the
sum
paid
thereunder
be
repaid
to
the
plaintiff
with
costs.
Sec
696,
supra,
includes,
inter
alia,
"‘park
or
parks,
a
pleasure
ground
or
pleasure
grounds,
or
a
public
playground
or
playgrounds.
‘
‘
Golf,
cricket
and
analogous
outdoor
sports
are
within
the
provision.
See
Atty.-Gen.
v.
Poole
Borough
Council,
53
T.L.R.
157,
[1936]
3
All
E.R.
852;
affirmed
[1938]
Ch.
23,
106
L.J.
Ch.
319
;
Atty-Gen.
v.
Teddington
Urban
Council
[1898]
1
Ch.
66,
67
L.J.
Ch.
23;
Down
v.
Queensland
Atty-Gen.
(1905)
2
C.L.R.
639.
The
municipality
of
St.
Vital
rests
its
contention
on
sec.
4
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
supra.
It
provides
as
follows:
"‘All
lands
used
for
public
park
purposes
or
exhibition
grounds,
now
or
hereafter
owned
by
the
city,
which
are
situate
outside
the
territorial
limits
of
the
city,
shall
be
exempt
from
municipal
taxation
by
any
municipality
in
which
such
lands
are
situate.”
The
section
was
re-enacted
in
see.
5
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940.
‘‘
All
lands
used
for
public
park
purposes’’
include
public
playground
or
playgrounds
had
they
not
been
stated
in
sec.
696,
supra,
and
many
other
phases
and
aspects
within
the
definition
of
a
park.
Exempli
gratia,
it
embraces
in
English
nomenclature
"‘a
place
of
privilege
for
wild
beasts
of
venery,
and
other
wild
beasts
of
the
forest
and
chase.’’
See
Wharton’s
Law
Lexicon,
13th
ed.,
p.
626.
In
addition
to
the
above-cited
cases
see
"‘Open
Spaces
and
Recreation
Grounds,’’
24
Halsbury,
2nd
ed.,
included
in
which
are
sports,
games
and
recreation
(pp.
122-143).
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.
RICHARDS,
J.A.
concurs
in
dismissing
the
appeal.
BERGMAN,
J.A.—The
facts
of
this
case
are
not
in
dispute.
They
are
set
out
in
written
admissions
agreed
on
by
the
solicitors
for
both
parties,
which
were
filed
on
the
trial
as
Ex.
1.
Omitting
formal
parts
and
the
lengthy
legal
description
of
the
property
here
in
question,
these
admissions
read
as
follows:
"‘ADMISSIONS
on
THE
PART
OF
THE
PLAINTIFF
AND
DEFENDANT
“It
is
hereby
agreed
on
behalf
of
the
plainiff
and
the
defendant
respectively
to
make
the
following
admissions,
and
that
these
admissions
and
the
documents
mentioned
or
referred
to
herein
may
be
used
and
read
in
evidence
upon
the
trial
of
this
action
and
for
all
the
purposes
therefor,
that
is
to
say:
"‘1.
The
plaintiff
is
a
municipal
corporation
incorporated
by
Chapter
7
of
the
Statutes
of
the
Province
of
Manitoba
passed
in
the
37th
year
of
the
reign
of
Her
late
Majesty
Queen
Victoria,
and
continued
as
a
municipal
corporation
by
virtue
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1918,
and
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940,
and
amending
Acts.
For
the
sake
of
brevity,
all
or
any
part
of
the
said
Acts
are
hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
Charter.
‘2.
The
defendant
is
a
rural
municipality
in
the
Province
of
Manitoba,
incorporated
under
the
provisions
of
the
Municipal
Act
of
the
said
Province.
"‘3.
The
plaintiff
is
now
and
has
been
since
the
7th
day
of
May,
A.D.
1924,
the
owner
of
an
estate
in
fee
simple
in
possession
of
the
following
lands
[here
the
legal
description
of
the
property
is
set
out]
which
comprise
part
of
what
is
known
as
‘Windsor
Park
Golf
Course,’
which
lands
were
acquired
by
the
plaintiff
under
the
powers
contained
in
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
“4.
The
said
Golf
Course
is
maintained
and
operated
by
the
Public
Parks
Board
of
the
city
of
Winnipeg
for
the
plaintiff
as
a
public
golf
course
open
to
anyone
paying
the
green
fees
and
obeying
the
rules
of
the
Course,
whether
a
resident
of
Winnipeg
or
not.
“5.
No
general
municipal
and/or
school
taxes
were
levied
against
said
lands
from
the
year
1924,
when
the
plaintiff
acquired
them,
until
the
year
1939.
"16.
In
the
years
1939
and
1940
the
defendant
assessed
and
levied
general
municipal
and
school
taxes
against
said
lands
as
shewn
by
the
assessment
and
tax
rolls
of
the
defendant.
"7.
On
or
about
the
28th
day
of
July,
A.D.
1941,
the
plaintiff
by
its
solicitor
notified
the
defendant
that
the
said
lands
were
not
liable
for
taxes
as
aforesaid
and
that
the
plaintiff
would
oppose
any
attempt
on
the
part
of
the
defendant
to
sell
the
said
lands
for
said
taxes
or
to
give
title
under
any
tax
sale
to
any
purchaser
or
to
the
defendant
in
default
of
another
purchaser.
"‘8.
On
the
18th
day
of
September,
1941,
the
defendant
sold
the
said
lands
for
non-payment
of
taxes
for
said
years
1939
and
1940,
and
the
defendant
purchased
said
lands
at
said
sale
and
issued
a
tax
sale
certificate
to
itself
as
purchaser
thereof.
‘
9.
The
plaintiff
failed
to
redeem
said
lands
within
one
year
from
the
day
of
said
sale
and
the
Treasurer
of
the
defendant
forwarded
to
the
District
Registrar
of
the
Land
Titles
District
of
Winnipeg,
the
district
within
which
the
lands
lie,
a
return
certified
under
his
hand
and
the
seal
of
the
defendant,
Which
shewed
:
(a)
That
the
said
lands
were
sold
at
the
said
sale
and
had
not
been
redeemed.
(b)
That
the
said
lands
were
sold
to
the
defendant
for
taxes.
"10.
On
or
about
the
25th
day
of
November,
1942,
the
defendant
filed
in
the
Winnipeg
Land
Titles
Office
an
application
to
be
registered
as
owner
of
the
said
lands
by
virtue
of
the
sale
of
same
to
it
for
taxes.
"‘11.
On
or
about
the
2nd
day
of
December,
1942,
and
pursuant
to
the
filing
of
said
application
mentioned
in
paragraph
10
hereof
the
District
Registrar
for
the
Winnipeg
Land
Titles
Office
issued
a
notice
directed
to
the
plaintiff
advising
it
that
unless
it
redeemed
said
lands
under
the
provisions
of
The
Municipal
Act
or
filed
a
caveat
or
took
other
proceedings
to
stop
the
issue
of
the
Certificate
of
Title
to
the
defendant
within
three
months
from
the
service
of
said
notice
upon
it,
a
Certificate
of
Title
would
issue
to
the
defendant,
or
to
Whom
it
might
appoint,
and
the
plaintiff
would
thereafter
be
forever
estopped
and
debarred
from
setting
up
any
claim
to
or
in
respect
of
said
lands.
"‘12.
The
said
notice
mentioned
in
paragraph
11
was
served
upon
the
plaintiff
by
the
defendant
on
the
8th
day
of
December,
1942.
"13.
On
or
about
the
30th
day
of
December,
1942,
the
plaintiff
paid
under
protest
to
the
District
Registrar
for
the
defendant
the
sum
of
$1,751.40,
being
the
amount
required
to
redeem
said
lands
from
said
tax
sale,
to
prevent
a
Certificate
of
Title
issuing
to
the
defendant,
which
said
sum
included
solicitors’
costs
in
connection
with
said
tax
application,
and
said
sum.
was
duly
paid
over
to
and
received
by
the
defendant.
‘14.
The
defendant
has
refused
to
return
to
the
plaintiff
the
said
sum
or
any
part
thereof.
"
Dated
this
8th
day
of
January,
A.D.
1944.”
I
would
supplement
these
admissions
by
pointing
out
that
the
lands
here
in
question
comprise
only
a
portion
of
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course.
The
remainder
of
the
said
course
is
situate
within
the
territorial
limits
of
the
city
of
St.
Boniface.
The
city
of
St.
Boniface
has
always
treated
as
exempt
from
taxation
that
portion
of
the
golf
course
which
is
within
its
territorial
boundaries.
The
present
action
was
brought
by
the
plaintiff
asking
for
a
declaration
(1)
that
the
property
here
in
question
is
exempt
from
taxation;
(2)
a
declaration
that
the
assessments
for
the
years
1939
and
1940
and
the
tax
sale
based
thereon
are
illegal,
null
and
void
on
this
ground
and
by
reason
of
certain
technical
objections
to
the
said
assessments;
and
(3)
judgment
for
the
return
of
the
sum
of
$1,751.40
paid
under
protest
for
the
redemption
of
the
said
lands
from
the
sale
for
taxes
in
1941.
The
city’s
claim
to
exemption
from
taxation
is
based
on
secs.
4
and
700
(14)
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1918,
ch.
120.
Sec.
4
thereof
reads
as
follows:
"‘4.
All
lands
used
for
public
park
purposes
or
exhibition
grounds,
now
or
hereafter
owned
by
the
city,
which
are
situate
outside
the
territorial
limits
of
the
city,
shall
be
exempt
from
municipal
taxation
by
any
municipality
in
which
such
lands
are
situate.’’
This
provision
has
been
carried
forward
unaltered
as
sec
5
(1)
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940,
ch.
81,
See.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter
reads
as
follows:
"
700.
The
City
may
pass
by-laws
not
inconsistent
with
the
provisions
of
any
Dominion
or
Provincial
statutes;
***
44
(14)
For
acquiring
and
holding,
by
purchase
or
otherwise,
for
the
public
use
of
the
city,
lands
situate
outside
its
limits;
and
such
land
so
acquired
shall
form
part
of
the
city.’’
This
provision
is
now
embodied
in
sec.
490
(2)
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1940.
This
action
was
tried
before
McPherson,
C.J.K.B.
(now
C.J.M.)
who
in
a
considered
written
judgment
held
([1944]
2
W.W.R.
217)
that
the
land
here
in
question
is
a
public
park
and
as
such
exempt
from
taxation
under
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter;
that
the
1941
tax
sale
was
consequently
illegal,
null,
and
void
;
and
gave
judgment
for
the
repayment
by
the
defendant
of
the
sum
of
$1,751.40
paid
by
the
plaintiff
for
the
redemption
of
the
said
lands
from
the
1941
tax
sale.
It
is
from
that
judgment
that
this
appeal
is
taken
by
the
defendant.
I
have
spent
considerable
time
in
trying
to
trace
the
origin
and
history
of
the
two
statutory
provisions
here
in
question.
I
find
that
see.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter
goes
back
much
farther
in
point
of
time
than
sec.
4.
See.
700
(14)
has
been
part
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter
only
since
1902,
but
prior
to
that
time,
at
least
as
far
back
as
1886,
it
was
a
provision
of
The
Municipal
Act
applicable
to
all
cities
in
the
province,
so
that
the
inclusion
of
it
in
The
Winnipeg
Charter
in
1902
did
not
confer
on
the
city
of
Winnipeg
any
new
right.
The
reference
at
the
end
of
see.
700
(14)
shows
that
it
comes
from
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1902,
ch.
77,
see.
703
(11),
which
is
shown
to
come
from
sec.
603
(c)
of
The
Municipal
Act,
R.S.M.,
1892,
ch.
100,
which
is
shown
to
come
from
The
Municipal
Act,
1890,
53
Vict.,
ch.
51,
sec.
376
(18),
which
is
shown
to
come
from
The
Municipal
Act,
1886,
ch.
52,
see
349
(45).
It
may
be
of
interest
to
mention
that
sec.
349
(45)
of
the
1886
Act,
which,
so
far
as
I
can
find,
for
the
first
time
conferred
on
a,city
or
town
the
power
to
pass
by-laws
for
acquiring
for
the
public
use
of
the
municipality
lands
situate
outside
the
limits
of
such
city
or
town,
concludes
as
follows:
"‘but
such
land
so
acquired
shall
not
form
part
of
the
municipality
of
such
city
or
town,
but
shall
continue
and
remain
as
of
the
municipality
where
situate.
‘
‘
This
was
changed
in
1890
by
S.M.
1890,
53
Viet.,
ch.
51,
sec.
376
(18),
to
read:
"
and
such
land
so
acquired
shall
form
part
of
the
municipality
of
such
city,
town
or
village.’’
It
was
in
this
latter
form
that
this
provision
was
incorporated
in
The
Winnipeg
Charter
in
1902
as
sec.
703
(11),
which
provides
that
"‘such
land
so
acquired
shall
form
part
of
the
City.’’
It
was,
however,
not
dropped
from
The
Municipal
Act.
It
was
continued
as
sec.
625
(&)
of
ch.
116,
R.S.M.,
1902;
it
was
carried
forward
as
see
574
(b)
of
ch.
133,
R.S.M.,
1913;
it
was
amended
in
1918
by
ch.
48,
sec.
14,
by
inserting
the
words
"‘subject
to
the
provisions
of
section
11
of
‘The
Assessment
Act’,’’
after
the
word
‘shall’?
in
the
fourth
line
thereof,
making
sec.
574
(&)
of
ch.
155,
R.S.M.,
1913,
read:
(b)
for
aequiring
and
holding,
by
purchase
or
otherwise,
for
the
public
use
of
the
municipality,
lands
situate
outside
the
limits
of
the
municipality;
in
which
case
such
land
so
acquired
shall,
subject
to
the
provisions
of
section
11
of
‘The
Assessment
Act,’
form
part
of
the
municipality/’
In
1933
The
Municipal
Act
was
completely
revised
and
a
new
Act
was
passed,
being
1933,
ch.
57.
This
provision
in
amended
form
was
carried
forward
as
see.
385
(b)
of
that
Act
and
was
in
turn
carried
forward
unchanged
as
sec.
393
(b)
of
R.S.M.,
1940,
ch.
141.
This
provision
as
contained
in
the
1933
Act
reads
as
follows
:
"1385.
Every
municipal
corporation
may
pass
by-laws
***
"‘(b)
for
acquiring
and
holding,
for
the
use
of
the
corporation,
lands
situate
outside
the
limits
of
the
corporation;
in
which
case
the
land
so
acquired
shall
be
subject
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
corporation
as
if
it
formed
part
thereof,
but
may
be
assessed
by
the
corporation
in
which
it
lies.’’
I
have
already
pointed
out
that
when
the
revised
Winnipeg
Charter
was
passed
in
1902
there
was
inserted
in
it
for
the
first
time,
as
sec.
703
(11),
the
provision
which
became
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter.
I
have
also
pointed
out
that
when
this
provision
was
inserted
in
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
the
corresponding
provision
was
not
dropped
from
The
Municipal
Act.
That,
however,
is
not
the
whole
story.
The
revised
Winnipeg
Charter
which
was
passed
in
1902
came
into
force
that
year.
The
Revised
Statutes
of
Manitoba,
1902,
came
into
force
the
following
year.
In
the
revision
of
The
Municipal
Act
contained
therein
(R.S.M.,
1902,
ch.
116)
two
important
changes
were
made
which
have
a
bearing
on
the
present
problem.
These
changes
expressly
excluded
the
city
of
Winnipeg
from
the
operation
of
The
Municipal
Act
and
made
it
inapplicable
thereto.
Sec.
2
(a)
introduced
the
provision
that
the
expression
‘‘municipality’’
does
not
include
the
city
of
Winnipeg,
and
sec.
2
(b)
provides
that
the
expression
"city”
does
not
include
the
city
of
Winnipeg.
The
same
change
was
made
at
the
same
time
in
The
Assessment
Act,
R.S.M.,
1902,
ch.
117.
See
sec.
2
(g)
and
(h)
of
that
Act.
In
the
1913
revision
this
provision
of
The
Municipal
Act
was
continued,
with
some
verbal
changes,
as
see
2
(a)
of
ch.
133,
R.S.M.,
1913.
In
the
1933
Act
it
became
sec.
2
(1)
(h)
and
has
since
been
carried
forward
unchanged
as
see
2
(1)
(j)
of
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1940.
It
reads
as
follows:
"(j)
"
Municipality
means
any
locality
the
inhabitants
of
which
are
incorporated
and
continued
under
the
authority
of
this
Act
or
of
some
other
Act
of
the
Legislature,
and
includes
a
rural
municipality
and
an
incorporated
city,
town
and
village,
as
well
as
a
suburban
municipality,
and
where
the
context
requires,
includes
the
area
comprised
in
any
municipality
;
‘‘Provided
that
except
in
the
particular
cases
where
it
is
specially
made
applicable,
this
Act
shall
not
apply
to
the
City
of
Winnipeg
or
the
City
of
St.
Boniface,
nor
shall
a
provision
of
this
Act
apply
to
any
municipality
to
which
such
provision
is
expressly
or
impliedly
made
inapplicable
by
some
other
Act
of
the
Legislature
specially
relating
to
such
municipality.
In
my
opinion
this
proviso
effectively
precludes
the
defendant
from
invoking
against
the
city
of
Winnipeg
the
power
of
assessment
conferred
by
see.
385
(b)
of
the
1933
Municipal
Act,
as
it
is
not
‘‘speciall
made
applicable’’
to
the
city
of
Winnipeg.
If
that
view
is
correct,
it
follows
that
the
provision
in
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter,
that
lands
situate
outside
the
limits
of
the
city
which
are
acquired
for
the
public
use
of
the
city
shall
form
part
of
the
city,
is
not
qualified
in
any
way
or
eut
down
by
The
Municipal
Act.
The
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital
obviously
has
no
right
to
tax
property
which
forms
part
of
the
city
of
Winnipeg,
unless
it
is
given
the
statutory
power
to
do
so.
I
believe
that
I
have
demonstrated
that
it
derives
no
such
power
from
The
Municipal
Act.
“The
property
of
a
municipality
situate
in
another
municipal
jurisdiction
is
generally
exempt,
even
apart
from
statute,
for
the
intention
to
charge
public
property
must
be
clearly
expressed:”
Manning
on
Assessment
and
Rating,
2nd
ed.,
p.
191;
In
re
Orillia
(Town)
and
Matchedash
(Twp.)
(1904)
7
O.L.R.
389,
at
400.
Mr.
McDonald
makes
a
twofold
answer
to
the
city’s
argument
based
on
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter.
He
states
this
in
his
points
for
argument
as
follows:
“Section
700,
ss.
14,
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1918,
cap.
120,
if
read
with
the
provisions
of
The
Municipal
Act
and
The
Municipal
Boundaries
Act
can
have
no
greater
meaning
than
that,
if
for
the
public
use
of
the
City,
such
lands
shall
form
part
of
the
City
for
administrative
purposes.
“This
section
deals
with
lands
acquired
by
the
City
for
‘the
public
use
of
the
City.’
They
do
not
come
within
that
.
classification,
as
being
restricted
to
the
use
of
that
part
of
the
public
only
who
play
golf
and
can
pay
their
green
fees.”
No
authority
was
cited
in
support
of
the
first
of
these
contentions,
and
I
have
not
been
able
to
find
any
reported
case
in
which
this
point
has
been
considered.
As
I
see
it,
the
point
involved
is
merely
one
of
statutory
construction.
Sec.
700
(14)
says
in
language
that
is
not
qualified
in
any
way
that
any
lands
of
the
class
described
"‘shall
form
part
of
the
city.”
Mr.
McDonald
asks
us,
in
effect,
to
interpret
this
provision
as
if
it
read
‘‘shall
form
part
of
the
city
for
administrative
purposes,
‘
‘
or
as
if
it
read
‘‘shall,
except
for
purposes
of
taxation,
form
part
of
the
city.”
In
my
opinion
it
would
be
pure
judicial
legislation
to
read
any
such
qualification
into
this
subsection.
If
the
Legislature
had
intended
to
qualify
this
provision
in
any
way,
it
would
have
been
a
simple
matter
to
insert
the
approriate
qualifying
words.
We
must
take
the
language
as
we
find
it,
and
give
effect
to
it.
I
must,
therefore,
reject
the
argument
that
sec.
700
(14)
means
that
lands
to
which
it
applies
are
made
part
of
the
city
merely
for
administrative
purposes—whatever
that
means.
The
second
submission
has
greater
substance.
Mr.
McDonald
is
correct
in
stating
that
sec.
700
(14)
applies
only
to
land
outside
the
city
which
is
acquired
or
held
‘‘for
the
publie
use
of
the
City.’’
His
point
is
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
does
not
come
within
that
classification.
This
raises
the
question
of
the
meaning
of
the
expression
“public
use’’
in
sec.
700
(14).
In
50
Corpus
Juris
it
is
said:
“The
term
‘public
use’
is
a
broad
and
flexible
one,
so
much
so
that
the
courts
have
found
it
impossible
to
frame,
as
well
as
inadvisable
to
attempt
to
frame,
a
definition
which
would
absolutely
indicate
its
limits
by
including
everything
therein
which
constitutes
a
public
use
and
excluding
everything
which
does
not
[p.
864].
*
*
*
.
However,
notwithstanding
the
impossibility
of
exact
definition,
various
efforts
have
been
made
to
define
it
in
a
general
way.
In
general
it
may
be
said
that
a
public
use
is
one
which
concerns
the
general
public
or
a
portion
thereof
as
distinguished
from
particular
individuals
or
estates.
There
are
two
views
as
to
what
constitutes
a
public
use:
One
is
that
a
use
to
be
public
must
be
a
use
or
right
of
use
on
the
part
of
the
public
or
some
limited
portion
thereof;
while
the
other
is
that
a
use
is
public
if
it
is
of
public
benefit,
utility,
advantage
[p.
865]
*
*
*
.
The
character
of
the
use
is
determined
by
its
nature,
and
not
by
the
extent
to
which
the
public
takes
advantage
of
it
[p.
866].”
In
Zircle
v.
Southern
Ry.
Co.
(1903)
45
S.E.
802,
at
803,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Appeals
of
Virginia
held,
quoting
Lewis
on
Eminent
Domain,
that
public
use
means
the
same
as
use
by
the
public.
In
Kansas
City
v.
Bacon
(1898)
48
S.W.
860,
at
863,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Missouri
held
that
a
public
park
is
a
public
use.
In
Shoemaker
v.
U.S.
(1893)
147
U.S.
282,
37
Law.
Ed.
170,
the
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
unanimously
held
that
land
taken
for
a
public
park
was
taken
for
a
public
use.
Mr.
Justice
Shiras,
who
deliveed
the
judgment
of
the
Court,
says
at
p.
297
:
"‘In
the
memory
of
men
now
living,
a
proposition
to
take
private
property,
without
the
consent
of
its
owner,
for
a
publie
park,
and
to
assess
a
proportionate
part
of
the
cost
upon
real
estate
benefited
thereby,
would
have
been
regarded
as
a
novel
exercise
of
legislative
power.
’Tt
is
true
that,
in
the
case
of
many
of
the
older
cities
and
towns,
there
were
commons
or
public
grounds,
but
the
purpose
of
these
was
not
to
provide
places
for
exercise
and
recreation,
but
places
on
which
the
owners
of
domestic
animals
might
pasture
them
in
common,
and
they
were
generally
laid
out
as
part
of
the
original
plan
of
the
town
of
city.
"‘It
is
said,
in
Johnson
f
s
Cyclopaedia,
that
the
Central
Park
of
New
York
was
the
first
place
deliberately
provided
for
the
inhabitants
of
any
city
or
town
in
the
United
States
for
exclusive
use
as
a
pleasure-ground,
for
rest
and
exercise
in
the
open
air.
However,
that
may
be,
there
is
now
scarcely
a
city
of
any
considerable
size
in
the
entire
country
that
does
not
have,
or
has
not
projected,
such
parks.
"
"
The
validity
of
the
legislative
acts
erecting
such
parks,
and
providing
for
their
cost,
has
been
uniformly
upheld.
It
will
be
sufficient
to
cite
a
few
of
the
cases.
[Eight
cases
are
cited.
I
In
these
and
many
other
cases
it
was,
either
directly
or
in
effect,
held
that
land
taken
in
a
city
for
public
parks
and
squares,
by
authority
of
law,
whether
advantageous
to
the
public
for
recreation,
health
or
business,
is
taken
for
a
public
use.
ff
Without
attempting
a
definition
of
“public
use,’’
I
have
no
hesitation
in
holding
that
land
acquired
by
the
city
of
Winnipeg
for
public
park
purposes
is
land
acquired
for
the
public
use
of
the
city
within
the
meaning
of
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter;
and,
for
the
reasons
hereinafter
set
out
in
my
discussion
of
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter,
I
have
no
hesitation
in
holding
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
is
a
public
park
and
as
such
comes
within
the
provisions
of
sec.
700
(14).
I
must,
therefore,
also
refuse
to
accept
the
submission
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
is
not
property
acquired
for
the
public
use
of
the
city.
I
now
come
to
a
consideration
of
The
Assessment
Act.
So
far
as
I
can
find,
the
express
power
to
tax
property
owned
by
a
municipality,
but
situate
within
the
bounds
of
another
municipality,
was
first
conferred
in
1898
by
8.M.
1898,
61
Vict.,
ch.
33,
see.
2,
which
enacted
this
provision
as
an
addition
to
sec.
9
of
ch.
101,
R.S.M.,
1892,
being
The
Assessment
Act.
It
was
carried
forward
as
sec.
,12
of
ch.
117,
R.S.M.,
1902,
and
again
carried
forward
as
sec.
11
of
ch.
134,
R.S.M.,
1915.
On
the
revision
of
The
Assessment
Act
in
1934,
ch.
49,
it
became
sec.
6
of
that
Act,
but
with
one
important
change.
Up
to
that
time
such
property
was
made
liable
to
taxation,
unless
exempted
therefrom
by
the
council
of
the
municipality
within
which
it
was
situate.
In
the
1934
Act
this
was
changed
to
read
simply
"unless
exempted
therefrom.’’
In
the
general
revision
of
the
Manitoba
statutes
in
1940
The
Assessment
Act
as
a
separate
Act
was
dropped
and
it
was
incorporated
in
The
Municipal
Act,
R.S.M.,
1940,
ch.
141,
at
Part
XII
(secs.
991-1204)
thereof.
See.
6
of
the
1934
Act
was
carried
forward
unchanged
as
sec.
995
of
R.S.M.,
1940,
ch.
141.
This
provision
as
contained
in
sec.
6
of
the
1934
Act
(and
see.
995
of
the
1940
Act
is
verbatim
the
same)
reads
as
follows
:
‘^.-Property
owned
by
a
municipality,
but
situate
within
the
bounds
of
another
municipality,
shall,
unless
exempted
therefrom,
be
liable
to
assessment
and
taxation
by
the
latter
municipality.
‘
‘
This
provision
is
not
as
wide
as
it
appears
to
be.
It
dates
only
from
1913.
In
The
Assessment
Act,
S.M.
1890,
53
Vict.,
ch.
53,
sec.
3
(2),
it
was
provided
that
"‘land
vested
in
or
held
in
trust
for
any
municipality’’
should
be
exempt
from
taxation.
This
provision
was
carried
forward
as
see.
3
(b)
of
ch.
101,
R.S.M.,
1890,
and
again
carried
forward
as
see.
5
(b)
of
ch.
117,
R.S.M.,
1902.
In
the
1913
revision
the
word
"the’’
was
substituted
for
"‘any,’’
and
this
exemption
was
limited
to
"‘lands
belonging
to
or
held
in
trust
for
the
municipality.’’
See
sec.
4(b)
of
ch.
134,
R.S.M.,
1913.
It
was
carried
forward
as
sec.
3
(1)
(c)
of
ch.
49,
1934,
and
again
carried
forward
as
sec.
992
(1)
(c)
of
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1940.
I
have,
however,
already
called
attention
to
the
fact
that
in
the
1902
revision
an
amendment
was
made
to
The
Assessment
Act
making
it
inapplicable
to
the
city
of
Winnipeg.
See
sec.
2
(g)
and
(A)
of
ch.
117,
R.S.M.,
1902.
A
correspoding
amendment
in
exactly
the
same
terms
was
made
at
the
same
time
to
The
Municipal
Act.
See
see.
2
(a)
and
(b)
of
ch.
116,
R.S.M.,
1902.
In
the
1913
revision
the
language
of
this
provision
in
The
Municipal
Act
was
changed
to
substantially
its
present
word-'
ing,
and
this
change
was
copied
in
The
Assessment
Act.
See
sec.
2
(g)
of
ch.
184,
R.S.M.,
1913.
In
the
1934
revision
and
consolidation
of
The
Assessment
Act
this
provision
was
condensed
to
read:
‘‘
‘Municipality’
means
a
municipal
corporation
as
defined
by
‘The
Municipal
Act,.
,f
In
the
1940
revision,
as
already
mentioned,
The
Assessment
Act
as
a
separate
Act
was
dropped
and
it
was
incorporated
in
The
Municipal
Act
and
is,
therefore,
subject
to
the
limiting
provisions
thereof
already
mentioned.
It,
therefore,
seems
to
me
that
it
follows
as
a
matter
of
course
that
since
1902
The
Assessment
Act
has
not
applied
to
the
city
of
Winnipeg
and
that
consequently
no
outside
municipality
derives
any
power
from
The
Municipal
Act
or
from
The
Assessment
Act
to
assess
or
tax
any
property
owned
by
the
city
of
Winnipeg
which
comes
within
the
provisions
of
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter.
I
have
already
held
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
comes
within
that
classification.
I
now
come
to
a
consideration
of
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter,
which
I
have
quoted
above.
It
is
of
more
recent
vintage
than
sec.
700
(14).
It
was
originally
enacted
in
1912
by
see.
4
of
ch.
99,
S.M.
1972,
but
its
source
is
not
disclosed.
In
all
probability
this
provision
was
borrowed
from
Ontario,
where
it
was
enacted
in
1893
as
an
amendment
to
The
Assessment
Act.
See
S.O.
1893,
26
Vict.,
ch.
38,
sec.
1.
It'has
been
carried
forward
in
the
successive
revisions
of
the
Ontario
statutes
and
is
now
see.
4
(9)
of
ch.
272,
R.S.O.,
1937.
The
only
reported
case
which
I
have
been
able
to
find
in
which
this
statutory
provision
has
been
considered
is
In
re
Orillia
(Town)
and
Matchedash
(Twp.),
supra,
which
is
a
decision
of
the
Ontario
Court
of
Appeal.
At
the
time
that
the
1893
amendment
to
the
Ontario
Assessment
Act
was
made
that
Act
already
contained
as
subsee.
(7)
of
the
amended
section
a
provision
which,
so
far
as
the
question
here
under
consideration
is
concerned,
served
the
same
purpose
as
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Winnipeg
Charter.
Osler,
J.A.
expressed
the
opinion
that
this
amending
provision
was
unnecessary.
He
says
at
pp.
395-6
:
"
"
This
clause
was
first
passed
in
the
year
1895,
when
sub-sec.
7
must
have
had
the
same
meaning
and
construction
which
I
think
it
now
has.
"
"
All
that
can
be
said
of
the
new
clause
is,
that
its
framer,
and
following
him
the
Legislature,
misconceived
the
scope
and
meaning
of
sub-sec.
7
in
respect
of
property
owned
by
one
municipality
within
the
limits
of
another,
quite
as
much
as
they
did
in
respect
of
property
owned
by
it
for
public
purposes
within
its
own
limits.
“The
clause
may
have
been
intended
to
remove
doubts,
or
perhaps
to
prevent
any
possible
difficulty
from
arising
in
Cases
where
park
property
was
vested
in
commissioners
for
the
municipality,
but
otherwise
it
would
seem
to
have
been
an
unnecessary
enactment.”
If
my
interpretation
of
sec.
700
(14)
of
the
1918
Charter
is
correct,
then
sec.
4
‘‘would
seem
to
have
been
an
unnecessary
enactment.’’
It
was,
no
doubt,
added
to
the
Charter
ex
abundanti
cautela
to
meet,
or
to
forestall,
some
apprehended
difficulty,
but
actually
it
relates
to
a
matter
already
completely
covered
by
sec.
700
(14).
On
the
other
hand,
even
if
my
interpretation
of
see.
700
(14)
is
incorrect,
the
city
of
Winnipeg
is
still
entitled
to
succeed
on
this
appeal
under
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter,
if
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
is
a
public
park.
It
is,
therefore,
necessary
to
determine
whether
it
is
or
is
not
a
public
park.
What
is
a
“public
park?’’
Except
for
one
previous
decision
in
this
province,
there
is
a
complete
absence
of
Canadian
authority
on
this
question.
At
any
rate,
counsel
did
not
cite
any
other
Canadian
case,
and
I
have
found
none.
Par.
4
of
the
admissions
(Ex.
1)
states
that:
“The
said
Golf
Course
is
maintained
and
operated
by
the
Public
Parks
Board
of
the
City
of
Winnipeg
for
the
plaintiff
as
a
public
golf
course
open
to
anyone
paying
the
green
fees
and
obeying
the
rules
of
the
Course,
whether
a
resident
of
Winnipeg
or
not.’
The
first
Public
Parks
Act
in
this
province
was
passed
in
1892,
being
The
Public
Parks
Act,
S.M.
1892,
55
Vict.,
ch.
31.
It
was
carried
forward
as
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1902,
and
again
carried
forward
as
ch.
163,
R.S.M.,
1913.
In
the
1933
revision
and
consolidation
of
The
Municipal
Act,
The
Public
Parks
Act
as
a
separate
Act
was
dropped
and
it
was
incorporated
in
The
Municipal
Act,
1933,
ch.
57,
as
secs.
797-848
thereof.
It
is
now
contained
in
secs.
813-864
of
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1940.
These
provisions
are
expressly
made
applicable
to
the
cities
of
Winnipeg
and
St.
Boniface.
See
sec.
797
(a)
of
ch.
57,
1933,
and
sec.
813
(a)
of
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1940.
We
were
referred
to
these
statutory
provisions
as
a
matter
of
information,
so
that
we
might
understand
the
relationship
between
the
board
and
the
city
of
Winnipeg
and
by
what
authority
the
board
operates
this.
golf
course.
We
were
referred
to
them
also
for
the
purpose
of
giving
substance
to
the
city’s
objections
to
the
assessment
on
technical
grounds.
We
were
informed
by
counsel
that
the
city
of
Winnipeg
has
a
parks
system
consisting
of
49
parks.
In
only
two
of
them
is
any
golf
played,
and
these
two
are
devoted
exclusively
to
golf.
They
are
the
Kildonan
Golf
Course
and
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course.
It
seems
to
me
that
it
is
open
to
the
city,
or
to
the
parks
board,
in
rounding
out
its
system
of
parks
to
set
aside
two
of
them
as
publie
golf
courses.
The
parks
board
has
the
statutory
power
to
provide
facilities
for
all
forms
of
recreation
and
to
charge
fees,
such
as
green
fees.
This
power
is
given
by
see.
835
of
ch.
57,
1933
(now
see.
851
of
ch.
141,
R.S.M.,
1940),
which
reads
as
follows
:
"
"
835.
The
parks
board
may
provide
facilities
for
all
forms
of
recreation
and
may,
from
time
to
time,
pass
by-laws
for
the
use,
regulation,
protection,
government,
and
operations
of
the
same
and
the
charges
for
admission
thereto
for
use
thereof.”
Golf
is
a
form
of
recreation,
and
it
is,
therefore,
within
the
powers
of
the
board
to
provide
facilities
therefor.
A
golf
course
requires
so
much
space,
and
the
danger
of
injury
from
flying
balls
is
so
great,
that
it
is
not
practically
feasible
to
include
a
golf
course
in
an
ordinary
park.
It
is,
therefore,
necessary,
or
at
any
rate
desirable,
that
it
be
set
apart.
To
hold
that
this
cannot
be
done
would
be
to
say,
in
effect,
that
see.
835
authorizes
a
parks
board
to
provide
facilities
for
all
forms
of
recreation,
other
than
golf,
by
denying
it
the
power
to
provide
facilities
for
golf
in
the
only
feasible
way.
In
my
opinion
a
parks
board
is
permitted
to
exercise
common
sense
in
carrying
out
its
statutory
powers;
and,
in
working
out
a
scheme
of
public
parks,
it
may
elect
to
devote
one
of
its
parks
exclusively
to
golf,
without
thereby
depriving
it
of
its
character
as
a
public
park.
Neither
The
Winnipeg
Charter
nor
the
public
parks
provisions
of
The
Municipal
Act
define
the
expression
"public
park.”
I
take
it
that
in
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter
the
term
public”
park
is
used
merely
in
contradistinction
to
""
private”
park,
and
that
what
we
are,
therefore,
concerned
with
is
the
meaning
of
the
term
"park.’’
I,
therefore,
refer
to
the
following
definitions
:
Stroud
9
s
Judicial
Dictionary
:
“The
modern
definition
of
‘park’
is
an
enclosed
(private
or
public)
space
of
ground
set
apart
for
ornament,
or
to
afford
the
benefit
of
air,
exercise
or
amusement.”
Oxford
Dictionary:
“An
enclosed
piece
of
ground,
of
considerable
extent,
usually
within
or
adjoining
a
city
or
town,
ornamentally
laid
out
and
devoted
to
public
recreation.
’’
Century
Dictionary
:
“A
piece
of
ground,
usually
of
considerable
extent,
set
apart
and
maintained
for
publie
use,
and
laid
out
in
such
a
way
as
to
afford
pleasure
to
the
eye
as
well
as
opportunity
for
open-air
recreation.’’
In
Riverside
(Village)
v.
Maclean
(1904)
210
II].
308,
71
N.E.
408,
at
414,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Illinois
adopted
the
following
definition
:
"A
park
is
a
piece
of
ground
in
a
city
or
village
set
apart
for
ornament,
or
to
afford
the
benefit
of
air,
exercise,
or
amusement.
‘
‘
The
best
and
most
comprehensive
definition
of
"‘park’’
which
I
have
found,
and
the
one
which
I
adopt
as
my
own,
is
contained
in
Northport
Wesleyan
Grove
Camp
Meeting
Assn.
v.
Andrews
(1908)
71
Atl.
1027,
at
1030
(Maine)
and
is
as
follows:
"‘A
‘park’
may
be
defined
as
a
piece
of
ground
set
apart
to
be
used
by
the
public
as
a
place
for
rest,
recreation,
exercise,
pleasure,
amusement,
and
enjoyment.”
Applying
this
definition
I
hold
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
is
land
used
for
public
park
purposes
within
the
meaning
of
sec.
4
of
the
1918
Charter
and
as
such
exempt
from
taxation
by
the
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital.
This
view
is
supported
by
the
decision
of
Donovan,
J.
in
Old
Kildonan
(Mun.)
v.
Winnipeg
[1943]
2
W.W.R.
268,
and
by
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Minnesota
in
Booth
v.
Minneapolis
(1925)
203
N.W.
625.
I
have
not
come
across
any
case
involving
a
publie
golf
course
which
is
opposed
to
this
view.
It
follows
that
the
assessment
by
the
defendant
of
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
and
the
sale
thereof
for
taxes
based
on
such
assessment
were
unauthorized
and
illegal
and
absolutely
null
and
void.
I
would,
therefore,
affirm
the
judgment
of
the
learned
trial
Judge
and
dismiss
the
defendant’s
appeal
with
costs.
Dysart,
J.
(ad
hoc)
(dissenting)—The
facts
of
this
case,
as
well
as
the
relevant
statutes,
are
fully
set
forth
in
the
reasons
for
judgment
of
Trueman
and
Bergman,
JJ.A.,
and
I
shall
not
do
more
than
make
the
necessary
references
to
them.
The
only,
or
at
least
the
chief,
issue
here
is
whether
or
not
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course,
which
belongs
to
the
city
of
Winnipeg,
is
a
public
park
within
the
meaning
of
see.
4
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
1918,
ch.
120.
If
it
is
such
a
park,
or
is
used
for
‘‘public
park
purposes,’’
it
is
exempt
from
taxation
by
the
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital.
By
The
Municipal
Act,
R.S.M.,
1940,
ch.
141,
see.
992
(1),
which
applies
to
the
rural
municipality
of
St.
Vital
but
not
to
the
city
of
Winnipeg:
"‘All
lands
shall
be
liable
to
taxation
by
the
municipality
subject
to
the
following
exemptions:
***
“
(c)
Lands
belonging
to
or
held
in
trust
for
the
municipality.
‘
‘
The
Winnipeg
Charter,
sec.
696,
authorizes
the
city
to
acquire
"‘lands
for
the
purposes
of
*
*
*
parks
*
*
*
pleasure
grounds
o
*
*
*
playgrounds.”
Under
this
authority
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
was
acquired.
See.
4
of
the
Charter
exempts
from
taxation
"‘all
lands
used
for
public
park
purposes
or
exhibition
grounds’’
belonging
to
the
city,
and
""situate
outside
the
territorial
limits
of
the
city.
‘
‘
The
above-quoted
legislation
makes
it
clear
that
neither
parks,
pleasure
grounds
nor
playgrounds
are
exempted
from
taxation
by
The
Municipal
Act,
and
that
the
only
lands
exempt
under
that
Act
are
those
belonging
to
the
municipality
in
which
they
are
situate.
Further,
that
the
exemption
under
sec.
4
of
the
Charter
is
not
of
parks,
pleasure
grounds,
or
playgrounds,
but
only
of
lands
used
for
‘‘public
park
purposes.”
Does
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
fall
within
the
exemptions?
If
not,
it
is
taxable
by
St.
Vital.
The
power
given
to
Winnipeg
to
acquire
and
use
lands
in
other
municipalities
extends
to
lands
which
are
not
within
the
exemption
clauses—that
is,
to
"‘pleasure
grounds”
and
"‘playgrounds.’’
One
cardinal
rule
of
construction
is
that
every
word
and
phrase
in
a
statute
must,
if
possible
and
practicable,
be
given
some
meaning
or
significance.
If
the
words
Sparks”
or
"‘public
park
purposes’’
stood
alone,
I
would
not—and
could
not—differ
from
those
who
hold
that
a
golf
course
might
well
be
included
in
the
term
‘‘parks,’’
and
so
be
exempted;
but
where
the
other
terms
‘‘pleasure
grounds’’
and
"‘playgrounds’’
are
also
used,
the
question
arises:
Does
this
golf
course
not
more
appropriately
fall
under
the
heading
of
‘‘playground’’
than
under
”parks?”
The
term
"‘public
park”
or
"
"
park”
generally
connotes
a
portion
of
land
of
considerable
extent,
provided
with
the
means
and
facilities
of
recreation
and
pleasure
for
the
public
at
large
without
fee
or
charge.
It
may
conceivably—and
often
does—
include
within
its
borders,
baseball
grounds,
lawn
bowling
grounds,
tennis
courts,
and
even
golf
courses.
‘‘Pleasure
grounds,’’
which
must
be
distinguished
from
Sparks”
in
some
way,
if
it
is
to
be
given
a
meaning
here
at
all,
might
mean
some
sort
of
a
park—one
containing
some
features
in
addition
to
or
different
from
those
of
a
park.
"Playgrounds’’
are
places
for
playing
physical
games.
The
orounds
surrounding
schools
in
use
as
recreation
places
for
pupils
are
playgrounds.
The
term
rather
excludes
many
of
the
features
which
we
might
expect
to
find
included
in
"parks’’
or
"pleasure
grounds’’—stich
as
long
quiet
walks,
vistas
of
trees,
flower
gardens
and
extensive
lawns.
The
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course,
as
is
commonly
known,
comprises
a
large
tract
of
land
devoted
exclusively
to
the
game
of
golf.
It
is
a
full
18-hole
course,
with
the
necessary
incidentals
of
club-house,
locker-rooms,
etc.
It
has
no
facilities
whatever
for
any
other
game;
it
has
no
facilities
for
general
pleasure
such
as
one
might
expect
in
a
park.
The
grounds,
apart
from
that
portion
used
for
golf,
are
insignificant
in
area,
and
are
so
scattered
and
unimproved
as
to
be
unattractive
to
the
public.
The
game
of
golf
requires
a
large
area,
improved
in
certain
ways,
and
when
played
is
of
some
danger
to
onlookers
and
those
who
might
intrude
upon
the
course.
For
that
reason,
very
few
people
attend
a
golf
course
for
the
purpose
of
enjoying
a
game
from
a
bystander’s
view-point,
except
on
rare
occasions.
Moreover,
players
of
the
game
are
required
to
pay
green
fees;
and
these
fees,
one
might
fairly
assume
in
this
particular
case,
are
sufficient,
or
more
than
sufficient,
to
defray
all
expenses
of
maintenance
of
the
course.
Thus
it
would
seem
that
the
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course—although
a
publie
course,
that
is,
open
to
any
member
of
the
public
who
cares
to
pay
the
green
fee
and
observe
the
rules
of
the
game—is
of
a
different
nature
in
its
uses
from
ordinary
public
parks.
The
exempting
language
is
of
lands
used
for
"public
park
purposes;’’
that
is,
for
the
purposes
of
a
public
park.
The
omission
of
“pleasure
grounds’’
and
‘‘playgrounds’’
from
the
exemption
must
indicate
an
intention
not
to
exempt
them—
especially
when
"‘exhibition
grounds’’
are
specifically
added
to
the
exemption.
The
cases
cited
nearly
all
turn
on
the
interpretation
of
certain
statutes,
and
are
of
very
little
assistance
to
us.
One
case,
however,
Old
Kildonan
(Mun.)
v.
Winnipeg
[1943]
2
W.W.R.
268—
a
decision
of
my
brother
Donovan,
J.—seems
nearly
in
point.
It
holds
that
Kildonan
Golf
Course
was
not
taxable
by
Old
Kildonan.
But
much
of
the
difficulty
in
that
case
turned
on
whether
or
not
the
land
was
by
statute
within
the
boundaries
of
the
city
or
within
the
municipality.
The
point
which
I
think
vital
in
this
case
was
apparently
not
raised—at
least
was
not
considered.
In
dealing
with
this
case
upon
the
footing
of
the
above-
cited
statutory
provisions,
I
assume
that
these
specific
provisions
must
be
given
effect
to,
notwithstanding
that
other
provisions
of
The
Winnipeg
Charter
might
well
include
Windsor
Park
Golf
Course
as
a
part
of
the
city
of
Winnipeg,
and
therefore
make
it
untaxable
under
The
Municipal
Act.
My
view
therefore
is
that,
inasmuch
as
this
golf
course
is
open
to
be
classified
either
as
a
playground,
pleasure
ground,
or
park,
it
seems
much
more
appropriate
to
designate
it
as
a
^playground”
than
as
a
"park.
”
On
that
view
it
does
not
fall
within
the
exemption,
and
I
would
allowed
the
appeal.
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