D.
A.
McDonald,
J.:—This
action
is
brought
by
various
produeers
and
distributors
of
milk
in
the
Lower
Mainland
area
of
British
Columbia
against
the
Lower
Mainland
Dairy
Products
Board,
and
Milk
Clearing
House
Limited,
for
a
declaration
that
orders
numbered
10,
12,
13,
14
and
15
passed
by
the
defendant
Board
pursuant
to
the
Scheme
set
up
under
the
statute,
R.S.B.C.,
1936,
ch.
165,
are
ultra
vires.
In
my
view
the
case
resolves
itself
into
two
principal
though
not
involved
questions.
The
difficulty
has
been
to
bring
these
questions
into
focus
from
the
large
mass
of
material
and
the
extensive
and
careful
arguments
which
are
before
the
Court.
The
question
of
the
sale
and
distribution
of
milk
in
the
Lower
Mainland
has
been
so
often
before
the
Courts
in
recent
years
that
it
seems
to
me
to
be
a
word
of
supererogation
to
repeat
the
history
of
this
litigation
except
in
the
briefest
way.
For
the
purposes
of
this
decision
it
is
only
necessary
to
make
the
following
observations.
The
statute
in
question
was
held
by
the
Judicial
Committee
to
be
intra
vires
the
provincial
government.
See
Shannon
v.
Lower
Mainland
Dairy
Products
Board
and
Atty.-Gen.
for
B.C.,
[1988]
2
W.W.R.
604,
[1938]
A.C.
708,
107
L.J.P.C.
115.
At
an
earlier
date,
namely,
in
1933,
a
scheme
set
up
under
the
then
existing
statute
passed
in
1929
was
held
to
amount
to
indirect
taxation
and,
hence,
beyond
the
powers
of
the
provincial
Legislature.
That
decision
is
contained
in
Lower
Mainland
Dairy
Products
Sales
Adjustment
Committee
v.
Crystal
Dairy
Lid.,
[1932]
3
W.W.R.
639,
[1933]
A.C.
168,
102
L.J.P.C.
17.
The
gravamen
of
the
plaintiffs’
complaint
in
the
present
action
is
that
in
order
to
escape
the
results
of
the
decision
in
the
Crystal
Dairy
case,
supra,
the
defendant
Board
adopted
a
colourable
scheme
whereby
to
make
it
appear
that
milk
was
actually
being
sold
by
the
producers
to
the
defendant
Milk
Clearing
House
Limited
and
resold
by
the
Clearing
House
to
the
distributors
at
prices
fixed
by
the
Board
whereas
there
was
in
fact
intended
to
be
no
sale
at
all.
The
contention
is
that
the
clearing
house
was
intended
to
operate
as
a
mere
conduit
pipe,
an
instrument
whereby
the
price
to
be
paid
to
producers
of
milk
should
be
equalized
so
that
in
effect
the
proceeds
of
milk
produced
by
producer
A.
should
in
certain
proportions
be
taken
from
him
and
handed
over
to
producer
B.,
as
had
been
in
effect
the
practice
under
the
earlier
scheme.
The
plaintiffs
are
met
on
limine
with
the
objection
that,
admitting
that
the
statute
is
intra
vires
and
the
scheme
set
up
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
under
the
statute
is
intra
vires
and
the
orders
issued
by
the
Board
are
plain
on
their
face,
it
is
not
open
to
the
Courts
to
make
any
inquiry
as
to
the
motives
which
actuated
the
members
of
the
Board
in
passing
the
orders
which
are
now
attacked.
Speaking
for
myself
that
question
is
closed
by
my
decision
on
an
interlocutory
application
in
this
action,
reported
[1939]
3
W.W.R.
241,
and
by
the
judgment
of
Martin,
C.J.B.C.
on
the
appeal,
reported
[1940]
2
W.W.R.
193.
I
have
examined
again
the
cases
cited
in
those
judgments
and
I
can
find
no
reason
to
alter
what
is
there
said.
On
the
contrary,
with
the
greatest
deference
to
the
able
argument
presented
by
counsel
for
the
defendants
I
think
what
is
there
said
with
regard
to
an
inferior
tribunal
of
the
nature
of
the
defendant
Board
is
strengthened
by
an
examination
of
what
was
said
by
the
Judicial
Committee
in
Union
Colliery
Co.
of
B.C.
Ltd.
v.
Bryden,
[1899]
A.C.
580,
68
L.J.P.C.
118.
Being
of
that
opinion
I
did
allow
an
inquiry
at
the
trial
as
to
the
history
of
the
legislation
and
the
various
schemes
and
as
to
what
was
the
purpose
of
the
members
of
the
Board
in
passing
the
orders
in
question.
I
can
see
no
useful
purpose
in
analysing
in
detail
the
evidence
which
was
admitted.
Let
it
suffice
to
say
that
the
whole
picture
in
my
view
is
similar
to
that
described
by-Lord
Macmillan
in
another
connection
where
his
Lordship
said
they
"‘consequently
invented
the
imposing
facade
of
a
sale
which
sold
nothing.
‘
‘
The
members
of
the
Board
who
passed
these
orders
knew
that
the
agency
theretofore
existing
would
be
attacked
as
being
merely
an
agency
formed
for
the
purpose
of
equalizing
prices
and,
hence,
subject
to
being
impugned
under
the
decision
in
the
Crystal
Dairy
case,
supra.
With
a
view
of
escaping
from
that
attack
the
Board
was
instrumental
in
having
the
defendant
Milk
Clearing
House
Limited
incorporated
under
the
Companies
Act,
R.S.B.C.,
1936,
ch.
42.
It
is
pretended
that
it
was
so
incorporated
as
an
ordinary
commercial
concern
whose
object
is
to
buy
in
the
cheapest
market
and
sell
in
the
dearest
market
and
in
the
ordinary
course
of
trade
to
make
a
profit
for
its
shareholders.
I
think
the
more
one
examines
the
evidence
the
more
he
must
become
convinced
that
this
is
a
mere
sham.
I
do
not
believe
it
was
ever
intended
that
the
Clearing
House
should
make
any
profit
and
if
there
were
any
doubt
on
this
one
needs
only
to
examine
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Sherwood,
one
of
the
directors
of
the
company.
If,
as
I
think,
the
real
purpose
and
effect
of
the
impugned
arders
are,
as
alleged
in
par.
25
of
the
statement
of
claim,
"‘to
take
from
the
producer
supplying
the
fluid
market
a
portion
of
his
real
returns
and
to
contribute
the
same
to
other
producers
for
the
purpose
of
equalization
(and
that)
the
so-called
sales
and
resales
to
and
by
the
agency
so-called
are
colourable
‘
‘
then
I
am
satisfied
the
orders
cannot
stand.
Any
suggestion
of
moral
turpitude
or
mala
fides
in
any
objectionable
sense
is
expressly
renounced
by
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs.
What
is
charged
and
what
I
think
is
proven
is
that
the
chairman
of
the
Board
and
the
defendant
Barrow,
in
their
zeal
to
make
to
operate
the
machine
which
had
been
placed
in
their
charge,
over-stretched
their
hands
and
sought
to
accomplish
indirectly
what
the
law
had
disclosed
they
could
not
do
directly.
It
follows
that
the
declaration
and
injunction
will
go
as
sought
in
the
prayer
of
the
statement
of
claim.
Costs
will
follow
the
event.