CARPENTER,
Chairman
:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
Hudson’s
Bay
Company
against
the
decision
of
the
Supervisor
of
Improvement
Districts
covering,
in
the
first
place,
the
assessment
of
certain
vessels
belonging
to
the
company
and
plying
from
Waterways,
Alberta,
north
on
the
Athabasca
and
Slave
Rivers
and
on
Lake
Athabasca,
these
vessels
being
assessed
as
personal
property
within
improvement
district
No.
843,
the
revised
assessment
being
placed
at
$126,500,
and
in
the
second
place,
covering
the
assessment
of
certain
improvements,
located
on
the
railway
right-of-way
at
Waterways,
Alberta,
these
improvements
being
as
follows
:
Conveyor
and
engine,
$500;
derrick,
$300;
electric
light
plant,
$300;
gasoline
hoist,
$1,000;
conveyor
system
new
slip
way,
$8,700;
and
derrick
and
hoist,
$4,000;
a
total
of
$14,800.
Both
assessments
in
question
are
for
the
year
1938.
In
regard
to
the
improvement
assessment
of
$14,800,
it
was
contended
that
the
various
structures
and
fixtures
included
in
this
assessment
were
personal
propery
used
in
connection
with
the
company’s
warehouse
and
transportation
business,
and
were
exempt
by
reason
of
a
business
assessment
having
been
authorized
and
made
in
respect
of
the
warehouse
business
at
Waterways.
The
assessment
in
question,
however,
covers
improvements
located
on
the
railway
right-of-way
at
Waterways
and
the
Commission
is
of
the
opinion
that
the
assessment
of
these
structures
and
fixtures
under
the
classification
of-improvements
was
justified
under
the
provisions
of
The
Assessment
Act,
1938,
ch.
81,
and
that
the
assessor
was
not
obliged
to
consider
these
structures
or
fixtures
as
personal
property
used
in
connection
with
the
company’s
warehouse
business.
In
regard
to
that
part
of
the
company’s
appeal
relating
to
the
assessment
of
its
boats
and
barges,
the
Supervisor
of
Improvement
Districts
indicated
at
the
hearing
that
no
levy
would
be
made
by
the
Department
under
the
1938
assessment
and
under
these
circumstances
the
appeal
might
either
have
been
withdrawn
by
the
appellants
or,
in
view
of
the
fact
that
the
assessment
had
actually
been
made,
the
Commission
might
have
proceeded
to
allow
the
appeal.
This
would
have
left
open
only
that
part
of
the
appeal
relating
to
the
assessment
of
the
improvements
at
Waterways
to
be
dealt
with
but
it
was
suggested
by
the
Department,
at
least,
that
the
Commission
should
give
a
considered
decision
as
a
guide
in
dealing
with
future
assessments
in
regard
to
these
vessels,
and
after
some
misgivings
the
Commission
indicated
that
it
would
do
so,
although
it
must
be
realized
that
any
finding
can
only,
in
so
far
as
future
appeals
are
concerned,
be
considered
as
an
expression
of
the
Commission’s
present
views
upon
the
points
involved.
The
first
objection
raised
by
appellant
counsel
was
that,
as,
under
the
provisions
of
sec.
18
of
The
Assessment
Act,
a
business
tax
had
been
authorized
and
put
into
effect
in
improvement
district
No.
843,
and
as
under
see.
19
of
that
Act
where
the
levying
of
a
business
tax
is
authorized
no
tax
shall
be
levied
in
respect
of
the
stock
in
trade
of
such
business
or
any
personal
property
used
in
connection
therewith,
the
assessment
of
these
vessels
was
in
contravention
of
the
provisions
of
the
last-
mentioned
section.
This
objection
must
assume,
of
course,
that
the
vessels
in
question
are
personal
property
used
in
connection
with
the
company’s
warehouse
at
Waterways,
for
it
was
in
connection
with
that
warehouse
that
a
business
assessment
of
$120
was
made
for
the
year
1938.
It
may
be
said
that
the
Commission
is
not
prepared
to
assume
that
these
vessels,
valued
at
some
$126,000,
are
used
in
connection
with
the
warehouse
in
question.
It
would
seem
more
logical
for
the
Commission
to
assume
that
the
warehouse
in
question
was
used
in
connection
with
the
vessels
rather
than
that
the
vessels
were
used
in
connection
with
the
warehouse.
The
business
of
these
vessels
is
the
transportation
of
passengers
and
freight;
the
warehouse,
it
may
be
assumed,
is
used
in
connection
with
the
storage
of
merchandise.
It
remains
to
be
considered
whether,
as
was
suggested
in
the
appeal
of
Northern
Transportation
Company
Limited
[infra]
the
mere
imposition
of
a
business
tax
precludes
the
imposition
of
a
personal
property
tax
at
all.
Sec.
8(1)
of
The
Assessment
Act
provides
for
the
assessment
of
personal
property
while
sec.
18
provides
for
the
imposition
of
a
business
tax.
It
is
quite
apparent
under
these
two
provisions
that
the
same
property
might
be
liable
for
both
taxes,
were
it
not
for
the
provisions
in
sec.
19(1)
which
sets
out
that:
"‘In
the
case
of
a
municipality
where
a
by-law
has
been
passed,
or
in
the
case
of
an
improvement
district
where
the
Minister
has
issued
an
order
authorizing
the
levying
of
a
business
tax,
no
tax
shall
be
levied
in
respect
of
the
stock
in
trade
of
such
business
or
any
other
personal
property
used
in
connection
therewith.”
Apart
from
this
restriction,
the
Commission
has
not
found
any
provision
in
The
Assessment
Act
which
exempts
personal
property
from
being
taxed,
under
a
personal
property
tax
assessment,
even
though
there
is
also
imposed
in
the
same
district
a
business
tax
under
the
provisions
of
sec.
18.
The
second
objection
advanced
by
appellant
counsel
in
connection
with
the
assessment
of
these
vessels
was
that
they
were
not
subject
to
taxation
by
the
improvement
district
in
question
as
none
of
them
was
located
within
the
district,
except
temporarily
for
the
purpose
of
loading
and
unloading.
These
vessels
have
various
ports
of
registry,
some
of
them
being
registered
at
Vancouver,
some
at
Fort
William
and
some
elsewhere
but
none
of
them
at
any
place
in
this
province.
Two
cases
which
deal
with
the
question
of
the
situs
of
vessels
for
assessment
purposes
were
cited
by
appellant
counsel,
namely,
Kenny
v.
Halifax
(1879)
3
S.C.R.
497,
and
In
re
‘‘
Effie
Sweet’’
(1882)
15
N.S.R.
380.
In
Kenny
v.
Halifax,
that
city
sought
to
assess
a
vessel
owned
by
a
resident
of
the
city,
but
which
had
never
been
in
Halifax
and
whose
port
of
registry
was
in
England,
and
the
Court
held
that
the
assessment
in
Halifax
could
not
be
sustained.
In
the
second
case,
the
municipality
sought
to
assess
a
vessel
whose
owners
resided
within
but
whose
port
of
registry
was
without
the
municipality,
and
the
vessel
at
the
time
of
assessment
not
being
in
the
municipality.
In
that
case
it
was
held
that
the
vessel
was
not
assessable
at
the
place
where
the
owners
resided.
These
cases
are
not
of
much
assistance
to
the
Commission.
If
they
were
cited
in
order
to
suggest
that
the
situs
of
these
vessels
for
assessment
purposes
should
be
their
port
of
registry,
it
may
be
said
that
the
Commission
does
not
think
that
it
is
warranted
in
coming
to
such
a
conclusion.
Indeed,
the
decision
in
the
latter
case
appears
to
suggest
that
had
the
vessel
in
question
been
in
the
municipality
at
the
time
of
the
making
of
the
assessment,
the
decision
might
have
been
different.
However,
apart
from
that
it
appears
to
the
Commission
that
where
a
vessel
is
for
a
long
period
located
in
one
jurisdiction
(and
in
this
case
the
location
might
even
be
said
to
be
permanent)
the
situs
for
taxation
purposes
is
in
that
jurisdiction
no
matter
where
the
port
of
registry
may
be.
In
Cooley
on
Taxation,
3rd
ed.,
p.
652,
it
is
said
that:
il
Vessels
are
commonly
taxable
only
at
the
port
of
registry,
although
the
place
of
enrolment
or
registration
does
not
necessarily
fix
the
situs
for
taxation,
which
may
be
at
the
owner’s
domicile,
or
in
a
state
where
the
owner
does
not
reside
if
the
vessel’s
business
is
wholly
in
such
state
for
an
indefinite
period.”
The
situs
of
these
vessels
for
assessment
purposes
is,
in
the
Commission’s
opinion,
at
some
point
or
points
in
these
northern
waters
but
the
evidence
available
to
it
in
regard
to
any
definite
location,
in
this
appeal,
would
have
been
wholly
insufficient
for
it
to
establish
the
proper
place
of
assessment
of
these
vessels
as
at
Waterways
or
elsewhere
in
improvement
district
No.
843,
for
the
year
1938.
As
a
result,
the
appeal,
in
so
far
as
it
affects
these
vessels,
should
be
allowed,
but
the
appeal
against
the
assessment
of
$14,800
upon
improvements
in
Waterways
is
dismissed.
Of
course
any
question
of
the
situs
of
these
vessels
for
future
taxation
must
be
decided
by
the
evidence
available
at
such
time.
No
costs.
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