O.
Thompson,
K.C.,
and
Sandlands,
for
appellant.
Sir
Malcolm
Macnaghton,
K.C.,
and
T.
Mathew,
for
respondent.
Lor
Dunedin—The
respondent
company
were
incorporated
in
1907.
In
1910
they
purchased
certain
timber
limits
at
the
price
of
$87,500,
which
was
calculated
on
the
probable
yield
of
timber
at
$1
per
1,000
feet.
In
1917
they
sub-sold
part
of
the
timber
on
a
bargain
which
need
not
be
particularly
specified,
as
it
was
afterwards
superseded
by
another
bargain
in
1920.
The
only
relevancy
of
the
matter
is
that
a
certain
amount
of
timber
was
cut
and
payments
made
under
the
agreement
of
1917.
In
1920
the
final
bargain
was
made
by
which
the
whole
of
the
timber
limits
belonging
to
the
company
were
sold
at
the
rate
of
$4
per
1,000
feet.
A
minimum
payment
of
$180,000
was
guaranteed,
and
when
$180,000
had
been
paid
a
clear
title
to
the
whole
was
to
be
given
to
the
purchaser.
The
$180,000
was
to
be
paid
as
follows
:
$80,000
on
the
date
of
contract
;
on
January
15,
1921,
at
least
$50,000,
or
such
greater
sum
as
was
represented
by
the
$4
rate
of
timber
by
then
cut,
and
the
remaining
$50,000
not
later
than
January
15,
1922.
The
purchaser
entered
upon
the
limits
and
proceeded
to
cut.
No
dividends
were
paid
by
the
company
in
the
earlier
years
as
the
expenses
of
the
company
more
than
swallowed
up
the
comparatively
small
payments
made
under
the
earlier
agreement
of
1917.
On
December
31,
1917,
the
company
published
a
balance
sheet
and
profit
and
loss
account.
The
profit
and
loss
account
showed
a
loss
on
that
year
of
$2,317.82.
The
balance
sheet
showed
a
balance
of
$26,560.48.
In
that
year
a
small
dividend
had
been
paid.
In
1918
there
was
another
balance
sheet.
It
seems
to
have
occurred
to
the
company
that,
as
timber
was
rising
in
value,
they
were
really
in
a
good
position
and
should
show
that
in
their
balance
sheet.
Accordingly,
in
the
balance
sheet,
starting
with
the
old
balance
of
$26,560.48,
they
added
a
sum
of
$131,250
as
increase
in
value
of
timber
between
1910
and
1913.
This
was
a
purely
estimated
sum
because,
at
that
time,
the
rest
of
the
timber
had
not
been
sold
and
the
sum
realized
on
the
contracts
of
1917
had
been
only
just
enough
to
meet
the
current
expenses
and
the
dividend
paid
in
1917.
In
the
profit
and
loss
account
this
sum
of
$131,250
was
dealt
with
as
a
eross-entry.
This
method
of
calculation
disappeared
in
the
balance
sheets
and
profit
and
loss
accounts
of
the
next
years,
but
in
1921
a
change
occurred.
No
further
dividend
had
been
paid
and,
as
it
was
evident
that,
under
the
contract
of
1920,
there
was
going
to
be
a
substantial
profit,
it
was
thought
that
it
was
time
that
something
should
be
paid.
Accordingly
instructions
were
given
to
the
auditor
that
he
should
remodel
the
balance
sheet,
and,
taking
the
original
cost
price
of
$1
per
1,000
feet
and
the
sale
price
of
$4
per
1,000
feet,
should
endeavour
to
show
how
matters
really
stood.
He
accordingly
remodeled
the
accounts
and,
taking
what
had
been
paid,
he
made
out
that
two
sums
(corresponding
to
the
two
great
divisions
of
the
timber
limits)
of
$15,564.92
and
$34,484
respectively
calculated
on
the
original
cost,
still
remained
unpaid.
Assuming
this
to
be
finally
paid
off
he
calculated
profit
on
the
whole
transactions
when
finished
at
$130,001.08,
and
he
drew
up
a
document
called
‘‘undivided
profits
account’’
in
which
he
showed
that
figure.
Upon
that
a
dividend
was
declared
of
$25,000.
Now
the
company
had
to
fill
up
the
usual
form
to
declare
their
income
for
the
year
1921.
This
was
done
in
February,
1922,
in
obedience
to
an
Act
which
was
passed
in
December,
1921
[Income
and
Personal-property
Taxation
Act,
1921
(2nd
sess.)
ch.
48].
The
company
took
the
view
that
the
whole
profit
on
the
transactions
was
merely
an
enhancement
of
capital
and
not
a
profit
liable
to
income
tax
at
all,
and
consequently
that
no
return
fell
to
be
made.
The
taxine
authorities
resisted
this
view
and
contended
that
the
company
fell
to
be
taxed
on
the
sum
of
$130,001.08
above
mentioned.
The
commissioner
made
a
supplementary
assessment
to
that
effect.
This
question
was
decided
adversely
to
the
company
by
the
Revision
Judge
of
the
Vancouver
assessment
district.
His
judgment
was
affirmed
by
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
British
Columbia
(sub
nom.
In
re
Taxation
Act
and
Anderson
Logging
Co.,
34
B.C.R.
168,
[1924]
2
W.W.R.
926).
Appeal
being
taken
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
([1925]
S.C.R.
45)
that
Court
affirmed
the
main
question
in
a
long
and
careful
judgment,
but,
at
the
end
of
that
judgment,
they
added
the
following
sentence:
‘“For
these
reasons,
the
profits
now
in
question
were
assessable
in
the
years
in
which
they
were
realized;
but
the
statute
of
1921,
having
obviously
no
retrospective
operation,
gave
no
authority
to
the
assessor
to
make
any
assessment
in
respect
of
moneys
received
before
the
enactment
was
passed,
and
the
assessment
must
be
reduced
accordingly
to
$66,269.28.
As
the
appellant
company
achieves
a
substantial
success,
it
is
entitled
to
its
costs.”’
Appeal
against
that
reduction
has
now
been
taken
by
the
taxing
authority
to
the
King
in
council.
No
cross-appeal
was
taken
by
the
company.
It
may
here
be
as
well
to
say
that
their
Lordships
have
not
the
slightest
doubt
that
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
on
the
main
question
was
right,
being
indeed
entirely
in
conformity
with
the
case
of
Commr.
of
Taxes
(Victoria)
v.
Melbourne
Trust
[1914]
A.C.
1001,
84
L.J.P.C.
21,
decided
by
this
Board.
Now,
the
section
of
the
statute
on
which
the
assessment
was
made
is
sec.
656(1)
and
is
as
follows:
4
'Where,
subsequent
to
the
completion
of
any
assessment
roll,
the
Assessor
finds
that
any
personal
property
or
income
or
bank
was
liable
or
has
become
liable
to
taxation
for
the
current
year
or
any
previous
year,
but
has
not
been
assessed
on
the
roll
or
on
any
assessment
roll
for
that
previous
year,
he
shall
assess
and
tax
the
same
on
a
supplementary
assessment
roll,
or
further
supplementary
assessment
roll,
for
the
current
year,
to
be
prepared
by
him
from
time
to
time;
or
where,
subsequent
to
the
completion
of
any
assessment
roll,
the
Assessor
finds
that
any
personal
property
or
income
or
bank
has
been
assessed
and
taxed
for
less
than
the
amount
for
which
it
was
liable
to
assessment
and
taxation,
he
shall
assess
and
tax
the
same
on
a
supplementary
roll,
or
further
supplementary
roll,
for
the
balance
of
the
tax,
and
in
each
case
the
assessment
shall
be
made
at
the
rates
of
taxation
and
subject
to
the
conditions
of
assessment
governing
the
roll
on
which
the
same
should
have
been
assessed?
‘
The
figure
of
$66,269.28,
to
which
the
amount
was
reduced,
is
not
apparent
in
any
of
the
balance
sheets,
but
seems
to
have
been
matter
of
admission.
In
the
factum
for
the
present
respondents,
then
appellants,
which
was
before
the
Supreme
Court,
it
is
set
out
that
$80,000
was
paid
on
the
date
of
the
contract,
that
$40,000
was
paid
in
1921,
and
that
$26,269.28
was
paid
in
1922.
It
thus
became
apparent
that
it
was
matter
of
admission
that
these
two
sums
had
been
paid
in
the
period
embraced
in
the
assessment
laid
on
in
1922
and
it
was
admitted
by
the
respondent’s
counsel
that,
the
main
point
being
decided
against
him,
they
represented
profit,
or,
in
other
words,
that
the
expenses
of
purchase
and
other
expenses
of
working
the
company
had
been
wiped
off
before
these
sums
were
paid.
Now
on
the
figures
thus
brought
out
their
Lordships
consider
it
unnecessary
to
decide
the
question
argued
before
them
as
to
whether
the
statute
is
in
every
sense
retrospective
or
not,
because
on
the
merits
and
apart
from
any
such
question,
their
Lordships
think
that
the
decree
of
the
Supreme
Court
was
clearly
right.
The
$66,269,28
is
taxable
because
it
is
now,
the
main
question
being
decided,
admitted
to
be
profit.
The
$130,001.08
is
not
taxable
because
it
was
merely
an
estimate
conditional
on
the
eventual
payment
of
the
whole
sums
that
would
become
due
under
the
agreement
of
1920.
Their
Lordships
would
here
refer
to
what
was
said
by
this
Board
in
the
case
already
cited
:
“As
regards
the
question
of
when
a
profit
is
earned,
their
Lordships’
view
is
that
a
profit
can
be
said
to
be
earned
when
it
is
dealt
with
as
a
profit.
In
ordinary
cases
this
synchronizes
with
the
realization
of
the
sums
which
swell
the
assets
of
the
person
or
company,
and
entering
the
account
(whether
on
the
creditor
or
debtor
side
will
depend
on
the
particular
account
in
view),
go
to
bring
out
the
balance
which
is
deemed
profit.
But
for
the
reasons
already
given
their
Lordships
think
that
in
a
case
like
this
the
company
are
entitled
to
hold
at
least
a
part
of
their
realizations
in
suspense—as
indeed
they
have
done
in
their
accounts—and
that
it
is
only
when
finally
the
same
is
given
to
the
shareholders
that
the
final
impress
of
profit
is,
so
to
speak,
stamped
upon
it,
and
therefore,
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act,
that
is
the
time
at
which
it
is
earned.’’
The
emphasis
in
this
passage
is
on
the
word
"
"
realization.
‘‘
Each
case
depends
on
its
own
circumstances.
But
here
their
Lordships
consider
that
the
sum
of
$130,001.08
was
only
a
mere
estimate
necessarily
contingent
on
the
sums
due
by
the
purchaser
being
eventually
paid.
These
sums
have
not
yet
been
all
paid.
The
mere
expression
that
the
profit
will
go
to
the
shareholders
cannot
be
and
is
not
enough.
It
is
like
the
part
kept
back,
referred
to
in
the
quotation
just
made.
The
$25,000
dividend
was
a
realized
profit
and
would
have
been
taxable
as
such
were
it
not
that
the
admission
made
carries
more
than
$25,000.
It
is
further
to
be
noticed
that
the
Crown
is
not
in
any
way
really
prejudiced,
for
when
the
sums
as
yet
unpaid
come
to
be
paid,
they
will,
on
the
admission
made,
be
reckoned
as
assessable
income.
Their
Lordships
will,
therefore,
humbly
advise
His
Majesty
that
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
costs.