Beaubier
J.T.C.C.:
-
This
appeal
was
heard
at
Edmonton,
Alberta
pursuant
to
the
Informal
Procedure
on
July
10,
1996.
The
Appellant
was
the
only
witness.
In
his
evidence
the
Appellant
agreed
with
the
facts
described
in
the
Reply.
The
assumptions
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
read:
8.
In
so
reassessing
the
Appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
facts
as
admitted
above;
(b)
on
or
about
December
1,
1992,
the
Appellant
moved
from
Calgary,
Alberta
(his
“Old
Residence”)
to
Edmonton,
Alberta
(his
“New
Residence”);
(c)
the
Appellant
commenced
employment
with
MacKay
&
Partners
in
Edmonton,
Alberta
(the
“new
work
location”);
(d)
the
Appellant
moved
on
December
1,
1992
and
sold
his
Old
Residence
on
February
1,
1993;
(e)
the
Appellant
calculated
moving
expenses
of
$17,330.19
of
which
$4,583.33
was
claimed
as
moving
expenses
in
the
1992
Taxation
Year
to
the
extent
of
income
from
the
new
work
location.
The
balance
of
$12,746.86
was
carried
forward
to
be
claimed
in
the
1993
Taxation
Year;
(f)
the
Appellant
requested
that
the
claim
for
moving
expenses
he
sought
to
deduct
in
the
1993
Taxation
Year
of
$12,746.86
be
increased
by
$779.06;
(g)
the
amount
of
$3,012.53
($2,233.47
plus
$779.06)
which
represents
the
mortgage
interest,
heating
and
utility
bills
from
the
time
of
the
move
to
the
date
of
the
sale
of
the
Old
Residence
is
not
a
moving
expense.
The
Appellant
obtained
a
new
job
and
moved.
He
appears
to
be
in
this
thirties.
He
and
his
wife
have
two
children
and
they
purchased
a
house
immediately
upon
moving
to
Edmonton
so
that
their
children
would
not
be
unduly
upset
in
their
move
from
Calgary
to
Edmonton.
They
listed
their
Calgary
house
at
$164,900
on
October
27,
1992
after
he
obtained
his
new
job
on
October
13,
1992.
They
sold
the
Calgary
house
to
the
first
person
who
offered
to
buy
it
for
$153,500
on
February
1,
1993.
The
Appellant
appears
to
be
of
reasonable,
but
modest,
circumstances.
Everything
that
he
did
respecting
the
sale
of
the
Calgary
house
and
the
purchase
in
Edmonton
was
reasonable
and
sensible.
His
actions
and
circumstances
fit
the
judgment
and
description
of
Mogan,
J.T.C.C.
in
McLay
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
[1992]
2
C.T.C.
2649,
92
D.T.C.
2260
(T.C.C.)
in
the
last
paragraph
of
his
judgment
when
he
said
at
page
2657:
With
respect
to
subsection
62(3)
of
the
Act,
I
assume
that
most
“moving
expenses”
as
defined
therein
have
been
allowed
as
deductions
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
to
the
extent
that
they
were
not
paid
by
the
R.C.M.P.
The
only
specific
expense
identified
in
this
appeal
which
the
Respondent
did
not
allow
as
a
deduction
under
section
62
and
which
was
apparently
not
reimbursed
by
the
R.C.M.P.
is
the
amount
of
$1,310.89
representing
mortgage
payments
on
the
Surrey
residence
from
July
16
to
September
10,
1985.
In
my
view,
the
interest
portion
(if
any)
of
those
mortgage
payments
should
be
deducted
as
a
moving
expense
because
those
payments
cover
a
period
when
the
Appellant
was
required
to
own
two
homes;
a
person
in
the
Appellant’s
circumstances
does
not
ordinarily
own
two
homes;
and
the
need
to
retain
his
Surrey
residence
for
a
period
of
57
days
after
he
purchased
his
St.
John’s
residence
was
a
direct
consequence
of
his
move
from
Vancouver
to
St.
John’s.
I
would
allow
the
Appellant
to
deduct
only
the
interest
portion
of
those
mortgage
payments
because
he
would
have
recovered
the
principal
portion
of
those
payments
upon
the
sale
of
the
Surrey
residence.
Because
no
other
specific
expense
was
identified
as
an
alleged
moving
expense
in
this
appeal,
I
would
not
grant
to
the
Appellant
any
further
relief
under
this
third
issue.
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
without
costs
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons.
The
appeal
is
allowed.
This
matter
is
referred
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly.
The
Appellant
is
awarded
costs
of
$50.00
for
his
out
of
pocket
expenses
for
the
purposes
of
this
appeal.
Appeal
allowed.
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