Léger
J.T.C.C.:
—
All
the
parties
agreed
that
the
two
appeals
would
be
heard
at
the
same
time
and
that
the
testimony
heard
is
applicable
to
both
cases.
The
appellants
are
owners
of
a
triplex
situated
on
Notre-Dame-de-
Grâce
Street
in
Longueuil.
The
taxation
years
in
question
are
1986
and
1987.
The
appellants
were
equal
co-owners.
The
property
comprised
a
ground
floor
and
a
second
floor,
each
housing
one
5
1/2-room
apartment,
and
a
basement
occupied
in
part
by
a
bachelor
apartment.
The
bachelor
apartment
was
rented
to
a
person
dealing
with
the
appellants
at
arm’s
length.
The
appellants
occupied
one
of
the
two
5
1/2-room
apartments
in
addition
to
having
the
use
of
the
part
of
the
basement
that
was
not
occupied
by
the
bachelor
apartment
(about
50
per
cent
of
the
area
of
the
basement).
The
other
5
1/2-room
apartment
was
rented
to
a
person,
Mr.
Martel’s
sister,
who
was
not
dealing
with
the
appellants
at
arm’s
length.
The
rent
of
the
apartment
occupied
by
the
appellant’s
sister
was
$100
per
month.
The
Minister
alleged
that
the
rent
of
$100
per
month
was
an
amount
well
below
the
fair
market
value
of
rent
for
such
an
apartment.
This
apartment
was
not
rented
by
them
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
The
income
and
expenses
related
to
that
apartment
were
thus
of
a
personal
nature.
For
1986,
the
appellants
sought
to
deduct
the
amount
of
$16,215.10
in
respect
of
“maintenance
and
repair”
expenses.
The
Minister
admitted
that
$1,718
was
eligible
for
deduction
as
the
amount
attributable
to
the
“bachelor”
rental
portion
of
the
triplex,
whereas
the
remainder
claimed
was
incurred
in
respect
of
the
personal
portion
of
the
property.
For
1987,
the
appellants
sought
to
deduct
$2,257.22
in
respect
of
“maintenance
and
repair”
expenses.
The
Minister
alleged
that
the
rent
paid
by
Mr.
Martel’s
sister
was
not
a
reasonable
rent
having
regard
to
market
conditions
and
was
not
a
“transaction
at
arm’s
length”.
The
respondent
relied
inter
alia
on
paragraphs
18(l)(a),
(b)
and
(h)
and
on
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
He
contended
that
he
was
justified
in
disallowing
the
income
and
expenses
attributable
to
the
apartment
rented
to
the
appellant’s
sister
because
that
apartment
was
not
rented
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
and
therefore
did
not
constitute
rental
property.
He
contended
that
he
was
justified
in
revising
the
portion
of
the
triplex
used
personally
by
the
appellant
Daniel
Martel
to
83
1/3
per
cent
since
only
the
portion
occupied
by
the
bachelor
apartment
was
used
for
rental
purposes.
The
appellants
on
the
other
hand
said
that
the
apartment
at
842
Notre-
Dame-de-Grâce
Street
was
a
property
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
that
the
assessment
made
by
the
Minister
of
the
said
use
for
personal
purposes,
with
respect
to
the
rental
income
and
the
rental
expenses
incurred,
was
exaggerated.
Paragraphs
18(1
)(a),
(b)
and
(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
read
as
follows:
Deductions
18.
General
limitations.
(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
18(l)(a)
(a)
General
limitation.
-
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
18(l)(b)
(b)
Capital
outlay
or
loss.
—
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part;
18(l)(h)
(h)
Personal
and
living
expenses.
-
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
taxpayer,
other
than
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
while
away
from
home
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
his
business;
Subsection
248(1)
defines
what
must
be
understood
by
“personal
or
living
expenses”:
“personal
or
living
expenses”
—
“personal
or
living
expenses”
includes
(a)
the
expenses
of
properties
maintained
by
any
person
for
the
use
or
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
or
any
person
connected
with
the
taxpayer
by
blood
relationship,
marriage
or
adoption,
and
not
maintained
in
connection
with
a
business
carried
on
for
profit
or
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
The
two
parties
to
the
case
testified
to
establish
the
value
of
the
rents
of
the
property
in
issue.
The
appellants
produced
Guy
Lemonde,
a
chartered
accountant,
in
order
to
conduct
an
economic
appraisal
of
the
income
and
expenses
generated
by
the
property.
Mr.
Lemonde
was
not
a
professional
appraiser.
He
used
his
accounting
knowledge
to
give
us
his
opinion
on
the
economic
value
of
the
income
and
expenses
generated
by
the
property.
I
was
not
impressed
by
Mr.
Lemonde.
His
method
was
not
based
on
a
thorough
study
of
the
market
and
I
accept
neither
his
method
of
proceeding
nor
his
conclusions.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Minister
summoned
Roger
Lussier,
a
property
and
income
appraiser.
He
has
been
a
chartered
appraiser
since
1973,
and
he
explained
to
us
that
he
had
been
involved
in
industrial,
commercial,
agricultural
and
residential
appraisals
since
that
time.
He
is
now
employed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
as
an
appraiser.
I
was
quite
impressed
by
Mr.
Lussier’s
testimony.
He
proceeded
to
make
a
professional
appraisal
of
the
rents
of
properties
similar
to
the
property
in
issue
by
comparing
income
from
properties
similar
to
the
building
in
question
built
in
1967
and
1968,
like
the
property
on
Notre-Dame-de-Grace
Street
and
properties
located
in
locations
similar
to
that
of
the
building
in
issue,
and,
in
all
cases,
triplexes.
Using
the
comparative
method
based
on
multiple
sources
such
as
the
“M.L.S.”
book
published
by
real
estate
vendors
during
1986
and
1987,
he
gave
his
opinion,
based
on
numerous
comparisons,
that
the
average
rent
charged
by
an
experienced
owner
was
$435
a
month
for
the
second
floor
and
$255
a
month
for
a
basement
apartment.
Daniel
Martel’s
testimony
revealed
that
the
rent
obtained
for
the
basement
bachelor
apartment
was
about
$235
a
month,
which
compares
favourably
with
the
conclusion
by
the
witness
Roger
Lussier.
All
the
conclusions
arising
from
Mr.
Lussier’s
testimony
were
based
on
the
concept
of
fair
market
value
and
optimum
value.
I
unreservedly
accept
Mr.
Lussier’s
testimony
and
I
therefore
find
that
the
respondent
was
justified
in
disallowing
the
income
and
expenses
attributable
to
the
apartment
leased
to
the
appellant
Daniel
Martel’s
sister
because
that
apartment
was
not
leased
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
and
therefore
did
not
constitute
a
rental
property
as
defined
in
section
18
and
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
cited
above.
I
also
find
that
there
were
“personal
and
living
expenses”
in
the
expenses
incurred,
as
defined
in
paragraph
18(1
)(h)
and
subsection
248(1)
cited
above.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.