St-Onge
J.T.C.C.:
—
The
appeal
of
Lynn
Smith
was
heard
on
the
27th
of
September
1995
in
the
City
of
Vancouver,
B.C.,
and
the
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
can
claim
the
disability
tax
credit
for
her
son
in
her
’93
taxation
year.
In
reassessing
the
appellant
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
7.
In
so
reassessing
the
Appellant,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
Appellant’s
son,
Matthew,
was
diagnosed
with
Attention
Defecit
disorder
(“impairment”)
in
1989;
(b)
the
impairment
did
not
cause
the
Appellant’s
son,
Matthew,
to
be
makedly
restricted
in
the
basic
activities
of
daily
living;
(c)
the
impairment
did
not
last
for
a
continuous
period
of
at
least
12
months;
and
(d)
the
Appellant’s
son,
Matthew,
wqas
not
suffering
from
a
severe
and
prolonged
mental
or
physical
impairment.
At
the
hearing
the
appellant
admits
subparagraph
7(a):
(a)
the
Appellant’s
son,
Matthew,
was
diagnosed
with
Attention
Deficit
disorder
(“impairment”)
in
1989.
And
denies
the
others.
The
appellant
testified
that
her
son
had
an
attention
deficit
disorder;
that
he
does
have
problem
with
perception,
and
remembering;
that
the
main
things
is
his
thinking
at
school
continue
to
drop.
But
all
this
does
not
affect
his
basic
activity
of
daily
living.
Upon
cross-examination
she
explained
that
she
is
on
full
time,
from
9:00
to
5:00,
a
day
in
her
occupation;
that
her
son
went
to
St.
Michael,
regular
school,
in
1993
and
was
in
grade
5
at
the
age
of
10
years
old;
that
she
would
wake
up
at
7:00
and
her
son
at
8:00
to
be
back
at
9:00;
that
he
takes
the
bus
every
day
for
a
distance
that
lasts
between
10
to
15
minutes
from
her
home;
that
at
the
end
of
school
she
goes
by
bus
to
the
grandparents
to
get
him
back
every
day;
every
day
he
brings
his
lunch
for
the
noon
hour;
he
plays
hockey
with
children
of
his
age.
Dr.
Sutherland,
a
family
physician,
and
expert
witness
to
deal
with
this
type
of
case
for
Revenue
Canada,
testified
that
she
is
mandated
as
employee
of
a
group
to
look
to
the
information
received
to
know
if
a
person
is
able
to
do
the
basic
activities
of
daily
living.
She
did
study
the
file
and,
according
to
the
information
received
from
doctors,
the
appellant’s
son
had
shorter
attention
at
school;
could
perceive,
think,
and
remember;
he
could
get
the
bus
and
feed
himself
at
school;
he
had
a
very
good
IQ,
better
than
87
per
cent
of
the
children
of
his
age,
and
was
capable
of
good
learning.
She
explained
that
the
test
to
get
a
deduction
for
disability
tax
credit
is
not
about
what
people
are
doing
at
school,
but
to
know
if
people
are
well
enough
to
do
the
basic
activities
of
daily
living.
According
to
her
in
1993
the
appellant’s
son
was
able
to
think,
to
remember,
to
play
hockey
and,
above
all,
to
do
all
the
basic
activities
of
daily
living.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
the
appellant’s
son
was
not
markedly
restricted
in
his
basic
activities
of
daily
living;
that
he
was
able
to
perceive,
to
think
and
to
remember,
that
according
to
the
evidence
this
life-type
was
normal.
His
intelligence
test
was
very
good
and
his
trouble
at
school
doesn’t
mean
that
he
was
not
able
to
do
the
basic
activity
of
daily
living.
The
evidence
adduced
by
the
mother
did
not
convince
the
court
that
her
son,
Mathew,
was
markedly
restricted
in
the
basic
activities
of
daily
living.
The
court
prefer
to
rest
on
the
report
of
the
expert
witness
of
the
respondent,
Dr.
Sutherland,
the
conclusion
of
which
reads
as
follows:
Matthew
Smith
is
an
eleven
year
old
boy
who
is
diagnosed
as
having
an
attention
deficit
disorder
without
hyperactivity.
Matthew
Smith
has
an
intelligent
quotient
at
a
level
equal
to
or
better
than
approximately
87
%
of
children
at
the
same
age.
He
is
able
to
see,
hear,
and
talk.
He
can
dress
himself,
feed
himself,
walk
and
manage
his
personal
hygiene
without
supervision.
In
1991
his
psychological
test
revealed
Matthew
had
a
tendency
to
be
slightly
distractible
but
has
no
significant
evidence
of
a
serious
learning
disability.
His
mother
indicates
that
Matthew
has
trouble
controlling
his
temper
and
takes
longer
to
complete
assignments
than
most
children
in
his
class.
In
1989
he
took
ritalin
but
is
not
on
this
medication
now.
There
is
no
medical
evidence
on
file
to
indicate
that
Matthew
Smith
was
continuously
markedly
restricted
in
his
basic
activities
of
daily
living
throughout
the
tax
years
involved.
Because
of
the
evidence
adduced
and
the
report
of
the
expert
witness
the
court
is
convinced
that
Mathew
is
completely
autonomous.
Consequently,
the
appellant
is
not
entitled
to
a
disability
tax
credit
pursuant
to
section
118.4
and
paragraph
118.3(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1
(5th
Supp.)
(the
“Act”),
and
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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