Sobier,
T.C.CJ.:—The
appellant
appeals
from
the
reassessment
by
the
respondent
for
his
1986
taxation
year
whereby,
in
respect
of
the
disposition
of
certain
real
property,
the
respondent
recorded
the
amount
of
$47,826.90
as
business
income,
whereas
the
appellant
had
reported
one-half
of
that
amount
as
a
Capital
gain.
The
appellant
is
a
lawyer
practising
in
Calgary,
Alberta.
He
became
a
partner
in
his
firm
in
1984.
Having
become
a
partner,
his
taxation
year
for
his
professional
income
would
be
the
firm's
fiscal
year
which
resulted
in
a
short
taxation
year
as
an
employee
of
the
firm,
i.e.,
the
month
of
January
1984.
Accordingly,
the
appellant
would
have
little
income
for
the
1984
taxation
year
and
since
his
quarterly
instalments
for
the
1985
taxation
year
were
based
on
1984,
he
would
not
be
required
to
make
large
quarterly
instalments
for
the
1985
taxation
year
and
therefore
he
would
have
excess
cash.
It
was
the
appellant's
evidence
that
rather
than
spend
the
cash
generated
by
becoming
a
partner,
he
decided
to
invest
in
real
estate.
It
was
his
evidence
that
the
investment
would
be
for
two
purposes:first,
to
provide
a
capital
asset
which
could
be
used
in
order
to
pay
income
taxes
on
his
retirement
or
upon
leaving
the
firm
when
the
original
tax
deferral
would
catch
up
and
secondly,
to
provide
income
and
perhaps
retirement
income.
He
first
purchased
an
apartment
property
known
as
Royal
Terrace
(”
Royal”).
The
purchase
was
carried
out
under
an
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
dated
June
22,
1985
with
a
closing
on
August
29,
1985.
The
total
purchase
price
was
$237,000,
of
which
25
per
cent
was
by
way
of
cash
and
75
per
cent
by
way
of
a
mortgage
from
the
Royal
Trust
Company.
It
was
the
appellant's
evidence
that
the
cash
portion
came
from
his
own
funds.
In
addition
to
the
purchase
of
Royal,
the
appellant
and
two
others
purchased
an
apartment
property
known
as
Mission
Terrace
("Mission")
the
appellant,
owning
a
one-third
interest.
The
purchase
price
for
Mission
was
approximately
$303,000,
again
25
per
cent
was
paid
in
cash
and
75
per
cent
by
way
of
mortgage.
The
appellant
was
required
to
put
up
approximately
$25,000
cash
for
his
interest.
According
to
the
appellant,
he
borrowed
the
funds
from
his
mother.
However
since
his
mother,
for
her
own
investment
reasons,
did
not
wish
to
lend
only
$25,000,
he
borrowed
$60,000
from
her
and
gave
back
a
mortgage
on
the
Royal
property
since
this
was
the
property
in
which
he
held
a
100
per
cent
interest.
The
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
for
the
mission
property
was
dated
July
17,
1985
and
was
closed
on
September
1,
1985.
By
borrowing
$60,000
from
his
mother,
it
could
be
said
that
the
appellant
borrowed
the
cash
portions
for
both
purchases.
However,
having
paid
the
$25,000
prior
to
entering
into
the
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
for
the
Mission
property,
the
Court
finds
that
each
purchase
was
separate.
The
appellant
stated
that
these
purchases
were
to
have
been
only
the
first
of
other
investments
in
real
estate
which
he
had
planned
to
make.
He
stated
it
was
never
his
intention
to
purchase
the
properties
for
the
view
to
a
quick
sale.
Although
he
seemed
to
have
researched
the
problems
of
being
a
landlord,
he
stated
that
he
experienced
difficulty
with
the
tenants
which
he
had
not
expected.
However,
from
the
evidence
these
difficulties
did
not
appear
to
be
serious
or
recurring.
In
January
of
1986,
oil
prices
fell
dramatically
resulting
in
a
serious
drop
in
the
value
of
petroleum
and
natural
gas
investments.
According
to
the
appellant,
this
drop
in
oil
prices
affected
the
Calgary
economy
as
a
whole
and
was
not
limited
to
the
oil
and
gas
industry.
The
appellant
feared
that
the
value
of
his
real
estate
investments
would
decline
since
he
believed
the
malaise
in
the
Calgary
economy
would
likely
continue.
He
therefore
considered
liquidating
his
investment
at
an
early
date
before
the
drop
was
too
severe.
The
appellant
stated
that
it
was
also
at
the
strong
urging
of
his
wife
that
the
decision
to
sell
was
made.
According
to
his
evidence,
his
wife
was
quite
adamant
that
the
investment
be
sold.
Since
his
mother's
money
was
at
risk,
he
also
felt
that
it
would
be
wise
to
leave
the
real
estate
investment
field
before
the
losses
manifested
themselves.
In
addition,
the
appellant
had
taken
a
loss
of
some
$20,000
on
petroleum
and
gas
related
securities.
Therefore,
on
February
23,
1986,
the
Royal
property
was
listed
for
sale.
The
property
was
eventually
sold
for
$300,000
closing
on
June
3,
1986.
This
resulted
in
a
capital
gain
one-half
of
which
was
reported
in
the
appellant's
return
of
income
for
the
1986
taxation
year.
With
respect
to
the
Mission
property,
the
sale
of
the
property
was
closed
on
April
30,
1988
under
an
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
made
January
25,
1988.
There
was
also
a
gain
on
the
Mission
sale.
However,
since
the
Mission
sale
was
in
1988,
that
issue
is
not
before
the
Court.
The
appeal
is
with
respect
to
the
sale
of
the
Royal
property
in
1986.
The
issue
is
whether
the
gain
on
the
sale
of
the
Royal
property
should
be
taxed
on
income
account
or
as
a
capital
gain.
In
his
written
argument,
counsel
for
the
appellant
has
set
the
issue
out
quite
succinctly.
He
states
that"
to
be
the
former,
the
Court
must
first
conclude
that
Mr.
DeGroat
was
either
carrying
on
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
apartment
buildings,
or
that
the
purchase
and
sale
of
Royal
property
constituted
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
If
it
is
neither
of
these
then
the
Court
must
conclude
that
the
transaction
was
capital
in
nature.”
The
definition
of
"business"
contained
in
section
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
includes
an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade.
In
order
to
be
a
business,
a
taxpayer
need
not
carry
on
business.
From
the
evidence,
it
is
clear
that
the
appellant
was
not
in
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
apartment
buildings.
Therefore,
if
he
can
establish
that
the
transactions
were
not
adventures
in
the
nature
of
trade,
the
appellant
should
succeed.
If
the
appellant
is
to
be
believed,
he
was
not
entering
into
a
series
of
isolated
transactions
for
the
purpose
of
reselling
the
subject
matter
of
the
purchase
and
thereby
taking
his
gain.
On
the
analysis
of
the
case
law,
the
Court
is
left
to
determine
whether
an
asset
was
acquired
as
an
investment.
In
answering
that
question,
the
Court
must
look
at
all
of
the
facts
and
must
weigh
not
only
the
taxpayer's
viva
voce
evidence
but
also
his
conduct.
From
his
viva
voce
evidence
at
the
hearing,
and
also
from
his
actions,
the
Court
concludes
that
it
was
the
appellant's
intention
to
have
an
investment
which
would
produce
income
and
appreciate
in
value.
It
cannot
be
said
that
his
intention
to
hold
these
properties
for
possible
future
sale
transformed
the
transactions
into
ones
on
account
of
income.
Because
one
wishes
to
sell
an
investment
at
a
later
date
does
not
taint
the
investment
intended
at
the
time
it
was
made.
The
reasons
for
the
appellant's
sale
of
the
properties
in
1986
are
found
to
be
connected
with
the
state
of
the
Alberta
economy,
the
fear
for
his
mother's
investment
and
the
strong
urging
from
his
wife
to
sell
the
property.
On
the
evidence,
I
would
conclude
that
the
third
reason
was
as
strong
a
reason
as
the
others.
Having
regard
to
this,
I
find
that
there
was
no
secondary
intention
on
the
part
of
the
appellant
to
purchase
the
Royal
property
with
a
view
to
its
resale.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
with
costs
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
amount
of
$47,826.90,
one-half
of
which
was
included
into
the
appellant's
income,
was
a
taxable
capital
gain.
Appeal
allowed.