Pinard,
J.
[Translation]:—The
plaintiff
claims
the
amount
of
$16,590.76,
including
capital
and
interest,
from
the
defendant
plus
additional
interest
on
$16,590.76
to
be
calculated
at
the
rate
prescribed
from
time
to
time
under
subsections
161(1)
and
(11)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
compounded
daily,
for
the
period
from
February
11,
1989,
to
the
date
of
payment,
with
costs.
In
support
of
its
action,
the
plaintiff
invokes
the
defendant's
personal
agreement,
signed
on
June
17,
1987,
to
pay
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
in
Right
of
Canada
the
amount
of
$14,165.95
with
interest
at
the
rate
prescribed
from
time
to
time
under
subsection
161(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
amount
of
$14,165.95
represented
the
liability
of
Métal
Moderne
Chicoutimi
Ltée
(Métal),
a
company
of
which
the
defendant
was
the
principal
director,
to
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation.
That
the
liability
in
question
was
originally
incurred
by
Métal
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
with
respect
to
the
1981
and
1982
taxation
years
is
not
in
dispute.
The
defendant
disputes
the
action
and
essentially
alleges
want
of
consent
with
respect
to
his
said
agreement
with
the
plaintiff;
he
therefore
requests
that
the
said
action
be
dismissed
and
that
the
documents
attesting
to
the
agreement
be
declared
null
and
void.
The
onus
was
therefore
on
the
plaintiff
to
prove
the
personal
agreement
of
the
defendant
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
to
pay
Métal's
tax
liability.
In
this
respect,
the
plaintiff
first
produced,
as
Exhibit
P-4,
a
document
entitled
"Letter
of
Agreement"
signed
at
Chicoutimi
on
June
17,
1987,
by
the
defendant
himself
and
by
his
daughter
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
as
witness.
It
is
important
here
to
reproduce
the
full
text
of
the
document:
[Translation]
Letter
of
Agreement
Whereas
I
am
the
Director
of
Metal
Moderne
Chicoutimi
Ltee
and
am
interested
in
signing
the
present
agreement.
Whereas
Metal
Moderne
Chicoutimi
Ltee,
by
virtue
of
one
or
more
assessments
issued
under
one
or
more
taxation
statues
of
Canada
for
the
1981,
1982
and
1983
taxation
years,
owes
the
amount
of
$14,165.95
to
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
in
Right
of
Canada
with
interest
on
the
amount
of
$14,165.95
at
the
rate
prescribed
from
time
to
time
under
s.161(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
from
17/06/87
until
full
payment.
1.
I
the
undersigned,
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay,
therefore
promise
unconditionally
and
irrevocably
for
good
and
valid
consideration
received
to
pay
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
in
Right
of
Canada,
upon
the
request
of
the
latter
as
represented
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
or
a
representative
authorized
by
the
said
Department,
the
said
amount
of
$14,165.95
with
interest
on
the
amount
of
$14,165.95
at
the
rate
prescribed
from
time
to
time
under
s.161(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
from
17/06/87
until
full
payment;
2.
A
request
cannot
be
made
as
long
as
I
respect
the
agreement
I
have
entered
into
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
to
pay
the
above-mentioned
amounts
as
follows:
3.
I
recognize
that
the
request
for
payment
mentioned
in
paragraph
1
can
legitimately
be
made
for
any
lawful
reason
by
letter
mailed,
delivered
or
served
in
the
mail
box
or
under
the
door
of
the
office
located
at
222
Isabelle,
Chicoutimi-Nord,
unless
I
notify
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
by
registered
letter
of
another
address
where
the
letter
of
request
should
be
mailed,
delivered
or
served.
Signed
at
Chicoutimi
this
17th
day
of
June
1987.
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
(signature)
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
(signature)
Witness
To
complete
paragraph
2
of
the
said“
Letter
of
Agreement",
the
plaintiff
also
produced,
as
Exhibit
P-5,
a
handwritten
document
entitled
”
Notes
for
the
file”,
dated
June
17,
1987,
and
signed
by
Marie-Claude
Tremblay,
the
defendant's
daughter,
which
included
the
following
text:
[Translation]
I
hereby
acknowledge
that
Métal
Moderne
Chicoutimi
Ltée
has
tried
to
clear
up
its
liability
of
$14,165.95
(so
far)
to
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
by
selling
its
assets
to
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
by
block
sale,
and
the
same
was
true
during
the
block
sale
by
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
to
Industrie
Moc
Inc.
I
acknowledge
that
Industrie
Moc
Inc.
and
myself,
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay,
are
responsible
for
the
said
liability
and
intend
to
settle
it
as
soon
as
possible,
that
is
by
paying
a
minimum
of
50
per
cent
in
cash
on
22/06/87
and
the
balance
in
less
than
three
months.
I
am
acknowledging
my
guilt
because
I
want
to
avoid
prosecution
in
this
matter.
Signed
this
17th
day
of
June
1987
at
Chicoutimi.
Signed:
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
personally
and
as
director
of
Industries
Moc.
By
his
daughter
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
(signature)
Pierre
Girard,
a
collections
enforcement
officer
for
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
who
testified
for
the
plaintiff,
said
that
he
had
prepared
and
completed
the
two
documents
reproduced
above
before
getting
them
signed.
According
to
him,
the
"Letter
of
Agreement"(Exhibit
P-4)
originally
consisted
of
a
basic
text
printed
ahead
of
time
and
some
spaces
left
blank
to
enter
specific
and
special
information.
He
explained
that
because
of
the
limited
blank
space
provided
for
in
paragraph
2
of
the
Letter
of
Agreement",
he
had
preferred
in
this
respect
to
write
a
supplementary
document:
Exhibit
P-5.
Finally,
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
explained
that
the
defendant
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
was
in
a
hurry
and
claimed
to
have
to
leave
because
of
his
work;
he
did
so
suddenly,
but
not
without
first
having
expressly
asked
Mr.
Girard
to
complete
the
document
(Exhibit
P-5)
and
have
his
daughter
and
secretary
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
sign
it
on
his
behalf.
At
trial,
each
of
the
signatures
appearing
on
Exhibits
P-4
and
P-5
was
recognized
by
the
person
who
signed.
Nevertheless,
both
the
defendant
and
his
daughter
said
that
they
had
not
read
the
documents
before
signing,
as
they
believed
on
the
basis
of
representations
made
to
them
by
Mr.
Girard
that
it
was
merely
a
routine
matter
in
order
to
update
the
file
on
Métal,
whose
assets
had
first
been
sold
by
block
sale
to
the
defendant
himself,
who
had
then
sold
them
to
his
new
company,
Les
Industries
M.O.C.
Inc.
(M.O.C.).
The
defendant
also
testified
that
he
would
never
have
signed
either
the
Letter
of
Agreement"
(Exhibit
P-4)
or
the
general
power
of
attorney
forms
(Exhibits
P-2
and
P-3)
also
presented
to
him
by
Pierre
Girard
on
June
17,
1987,
had
he
been
aware
of
their
true
content.
In
this
context,
considering
the
conflicting
evidence
concerning
the
events
surrounding
the
signing
of
the
documents
in
question,
the
witnesses'
credibility
and
the
analysis
of
the
facts
are
of
capital
importance.
I
therefore
made
an
effort
to
observe
each
of
the
witnesses
carefully,
to
take
account
of
their
respective
interests
and
to
consider
the
plausibility
of
their
words.
Pierre
Girard
testified
without
hesitation
and
answered
unreservedly
the
questions
he
was
asked.
There
were
no
significant
contradictions
in
his
testimony,
and
his
version
of
the
facts
always
seemed
plausible
to
me.
I
would
summarize
his
testimony
as
follows:
In
performing
his
duties
as
collections
officer
for
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
went
to
the
head
office
of
the
defendant's
business
M.O.C.
at
about
9:00
a.m.
on
June
17,
1987.
He
first
encountered
the
defendant's
daughter
Marie-Claude
Tremblay,
the
business'
secretary,
and
explained
to
her
that
the
purpose
of
his
visit
was
to
verify
the
solvency
of
the
defendant
and
of
each
of
his
businesses,
Métal
and
M.O.C.
He
asked
to
see
the
defendant
but
was
told
that
he
was
busy.
He
therefore
began
by
verifying
the
solvency
of
M.O.C.
by
examining
the
balance
sheets
and
accounts
receivable
to
which
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
gave
him
access.
Unable
to
establish
the
defendant's
personal
solvency
because
the
information
provided
by
his
daughter
was
not
decisive,
Mr.
Girard
again
asked
to
see
him
at
about
10:00
a.m.
Jean-EudesTremblay
then
appeared
and
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
explained
to
him
that
he
was
carrying
out
a
verification
of
solvency
with
respect
to
the
Métal
file.
When
the
witness
expressly
referred
to
Métal's
tax
liability,
the
defendant
immediately
said
that
his
lawyer
had
already
told
him
it
had
been
settled.
After
having
said
that
this
was
not
the
case,
Mr.
Girard
offered
the
defendant
to
call
his
lawyer,
which
he
apparently
did
not
do
both
because
the
lawyer
was
out
and
because
of
previous
problems
with
him.
Furthermore,
the
defendant
acknowledged
that
he
received
a
weekly
salary
of
$300
from
M.O.C.
When
the
defendant's
attention
was
drawn
to
a
book
debt
of
$36,000
owed
by
M.O.C.
to
Métal,
he
responded
that
M.O.C.
was
to
settle
that
debt
by
paying
Métal's
former
suppliers.
The
defendant
added
that
in
the
end
only
Revenue
Canada
and
Revenue
Quebec
had
not
been
paid
by
Métal,
but
he
believed
that
those
tax
liabilities
had
nevertheless
been
settled
somehow
and
deleted.
The
defendant
then
confirmed
to
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
that
the
successive
block
sales
by
which
Métal's
assets
passed
through
him
to
M.O.C.
had
all
been
carried
so
as
to“
"win
time"
in
respect
of
the
first
company's
tax
liabilities.
Mr.
Girard
therefore
asked
the
defendant
to
settle
Métal’s
tax
liability
to
Revenue
Canada
or
risk
being
prosecuted
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
defendant
then
offered
to
pay
$7,000
in
cash
the
following
Monday
and
the
balance
of
the
liability
within
three
months.
Mr.
Girard
found
the
offer
acceptable,
said
that
he
was
authorized
to
conclude
the
agreement
and,
considering
the
maximum
time
period
of
three
months
involved,
then
turned
to
the
documents.
First
of
all,
he
had
the
power
of
attorney
forms
(Exhibits
P-2
and
P-3)
signed
(these
were
identical
forms,
but
because
Exhibit
P-3
had
been
signed
in
the
wrong
place,
Exhibit
P-2
was
signed
to
remedy
the
situation).
The
content
of
this
power
of
attorney
had
been
explained
to
the
defendant,
who
had
then
proved
reluctant
to
sign
because
he
in
fact
intended
to
pay
50
per
cent
of
the
liability
the
following
Monday
and
was
afraid
that
the
inquiry
by
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
would
harm
the
credit
of
his
business
M.O.C.
which
was
then
being
financially
reorganized.
He
agreed
to
sign
Exhibits
P-2
and
P-3
after
the
witness
had
promised
not
to
use
the
power
of
attorney
until
after
the
three
months
required
by
the
defendant
to
pay
the
tax
liability
in
question
in
full.
The
witness
then
filled
in
the
blanks
in
the
"Letter
of
Agreement"
(Exhibit
P-4)
himself
because,
inter
alia,
of
the
specific
reference
to
the
Income
Tax
Act.
He
read
the
document
out
loud
and
explained
to
the
defendant
that
its
purpose
was
to
give
concrete
form
to
their
agreement.
(It
was
at
this
point
in
his
testimony
that
the
officer
Mr.
Girard
explained
that
he
had
preferred
to
write
a
separate
document
to
fill
out
paragraph
2
of
the
Letter
of
Agreement"
because
the
blank
space
provided
for
it
was
too
small.)
The
defendant
then
showed
the
"Letter
of
Agreement"
to
his
daughter
Marie-Claude,
after
which
he
said:
"At
any
rate,
we're
stuck
with
paying".
Finally,
he
signed
the
document,
and
his
daughter
then
signed
as
a
witness.
As
for
the
supplementary
document
(Exhibit
P-5),
the
witness
Pierre
Girard
also
read
it
out
loud
to
the
defendant
even
though
the
defendant
said
he
was
in
a
hurry
to
get
back
to
work.
While
the
witness
was
reassuring
the
defendant,
who
was
worried
about
the
possibility
of
criminal
prosecution,
they
heard
a
truck's
horn
honk
and
the
defendant,
clearly
in
a
hurry,
left
the
office
saying
that
his
daughter
would
sign
the
document
on
his
behalf
and
that
he
would
pay.
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
did
sign
the
document
and
the
interview
then
came
to
an
end
sometime
between
11:45
a.m.
and
12:30
p.m.
As
for
the
defendant
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay,
he
was
examined
after
the
filing
of
his
defence,
and
the
transcript
of
notes
related
to
that
testimony
was,
by
consent,
produced
in
evidence.
The
defendant
also
testified
at
trial
and
appeared
to
me
to
be
both
reluctant
and
evasive.
For
example,
it
was
necessary
to
remind
him
of
his
answers
in
the
examination
after
his
defence
just
to
get
him
to
recognize
his
signature
on
Exhibits
P-2,
P-3
and
P-4.
He
basically
said
that
he
had
only
been
in
the
presence
of
the
officer
Pierre
Girard
for
some
five
minutes,
and
he
was
very
vague
and
imprecise
as
to
the
time
of
that
meeting
during
the
day
on
June
17,
1987.
He
said
that
he
had
not
read
the
documents
before
signing,
and
that
he
had
contented
himself
with
his
daughter's
explanation
of
them.
He
denied
that
the
meeting
of
June
17,
1987,
concerned
both
Métal’s
tax
liability
and
terms
of
payment
of
that
liability.
As
I
mentioned
above,
the
defendant
claimed
to
have
acted
on
the
faith
or
representations
by
Mr.
Girard
to
the
effect
that
this
was
only
a
routine
matter
whose
purpose
was
to
update
Métal’s
tax
file
because
there
was
no
affidavit
concerning
the
block
sale
of
its
assets.
This
is
when
he
said
that
he
had
never
intended
to
agree
to
pay
Métal’s
tax
liability.
Finally,
he
acknowledged
that
he
was
at
the
time
in
question
looking
for
additional
financing
for
his
new
business,
M.O.C.
As
for
the
witness
Marie-Claude
Tremblay,
she
acknowledged
that
she
had
signed
the
"
Letter
of
Agreement"
(Exhibit
P-4)
and
the
supplementary
document
(Exhibit
P-5),
although
she
explained
that
she
had
not
read
the
documents
before
signing.
She
said
that
Pierre
Girard
had
arrived
at
M.O.C.'s
head
office
between
9:30
and
9:45
a.m.
on
June
17,
1987,
and
that
his
visit
had
lasted
until
11:10
at
the
latest.
She
explained
that
the
defendant
had
only
attended
the
meeting
for
some
five
minutes,
probably
shortly
before
11:00,
and
mentioned
that
he
always
left
the
workplace
between
11:00
a.m.
and
12:00
noon
to
go
eat.
Like
her
father,
she
testified
that
the
topic
of
the
discussion
had
never
been
the
payment
of
Métal’s
tax
liability
but
was
instead
the
updating
of
the
file
of
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
because
of
a
missing
affidavit
from
the
block
sale
of
that
company's
assets.
She
acknowledged
that
at
Pierre
Girard's
request
she
phoned
the
accountant
of
the
new
parent
company,
M.O.C.,
at
a
point
of
the
meeting
before
the
signing
of
the
documents
was
requested.
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
explained
that
she
had
thus
considered
it
appropriate
to
call
the
accountant
to
inform
him
of
Pierre
Girard's
visit.
She
said
that
Mr.
Girard
then
spoke
to
the
accountant
to
explain
his
visit
by
speaking
of
a
routine
matter
related
to
the
question
of
the
missing
affidavit.
She
then
admitted
that
the
accountant
had
offered
to
come
to
the
office
at
any
time
if
she
asked
him
to
do
so.
At
trial,
she
insisted
more
than
once
that
this
telephone
conversation
with
the
accountant
had
not
concerned
Metal's
tax
liability
but
strictly
the
matter
of
the
missing
affidavit
from
the
block
sale
of
that
company's
assets.
Finally,
the
defendant's
daughter
did
not
consider
it
appropriate
to
call
the
accountant
back
before
signing
the
documents
in
question,
which
she
could,
she
admitted,
have
read
first
had
she
wanted
to
do
so.
It
is
important
to
mention
that
the
secretary,
Marie-Claude
Tremblay,
had
an
interesting
educational
background,
as
she
had
completed
a
general
program
at
the
level
of
Secondary
III
and
two
additional
years
of
secretarial/bookkeeping/accounting
training
at
Chicoutimi's
CEGEP.
She
seemed
to
me
to
be
intelligent
and,
although
somewhat
emotional,
she
proved
to
be
less
evasive
than
the
defendant.
In
other
respects,
her
version
of
the
facts
seemed
to
me
for
the
most
part
to
be
copied
from
her
father's
version.
As
for
the
last
witness,
the
accountant
Michel
Tremblay
(not
closely
related
to
the
defendant
and
his
daughter),
he
acknowledged
that
he
had
had
a
telephone
conversation
with
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
on
June
17,
1987,
although
he
did
not
remember
having
spoken
to
the
officer
Pierre
Girard.
He
said
that
he
had
been
informed
in
this
way
of
Mr.
Girard's
visit
to
the
place
of
business
of
his
clients,
the
defendant
and
M.O.C.,
and
that
he
had
then
warned
his
caller
not
to
sign
any
documents
without
letting
him
see
them
first:
for
that
purpose,
he
assured
her
that
he
was
fully
available.
He
explained
his
understanding
to
have
been
that
Pierre
Girard
was
making
a
simple
routine
visit,
as
he
was
unable
at
the
time
to
detect
if
it
concerned
an
audit
of
the
books
or
a
request
for
collection.
According
to
him,
the
telephone
conversation
did
not
concern
a
missing
affidavit
concerning
any
block
sale.
He
said
that
he
did
not
hear
of
the
“Letter
of
Agreement"
(Exhibit
P-4)
until
1989
when
the
plaintiff
proceeded
against
his
client,
the
defendant,
and
that
he
did
not
hear
of
the
supplementary
document
(Exhibit
P-5)
until
the
day
before
the
trial
of
the
present
case.
He
explained
that
neither
the
defendant
nor
his
daughter
had
otherwise
informed
him
that
they
had
signed
those
documents
on
June
17,
1987.
The
witness
appeared
to
me
to
be
sincere
and,
in
spite
of
some
hesitation,
anxious
to
answer
the
questions
to
the
best
of
his
recollection.
Under
the
circumstances,
I
feel
that
the
version
of
the
facts
given
by
the
officer
Pierre
Girard
was
much
more
credible
than
that
given
by
the
defendant
and
his
daughter.
I
find
it
plausible
that
the
defendant
wanted
to
sign
a
general
power
of
attorney
and
the
“Letter
of
Agreement"
and
also
to
authorize
his
daughter
to
sign
the
supplementary
document
(Exhibit
P-5)
on
his
behalf
in
order
to
avoid
the
continuation
of
an
inquiry
and
judicial
proceedings
that
would
at
the
time
in
question
immediately
have
struck
a
blow
against
the
financing
of
his
troubled
business.
After
all,
the
tax
liability
in
question
had
well
and
truly
been
incurred
by
Métal
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
in
respect
of
the
1981
and
1982
taxation
years,
as
was,
moreover,
later
confirmed
in
court
in
view
of
the
certificate
from
this
Court,
which
was
produced
in
the
present
case
as
Exhibit
P-8.
In
this
context,
threats
of
judicial
proceedings
by
a
collections
enforcement
officer
from
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
were
clearly
justifiable
and
could
certainly
not
be
invoked
to
invalidate
the
defendant's
consent
to
the
agreements
he
made.
Furthermore,
it
is
hard
to
imagine
that
both
the
defendant
and
his
daughter
signed
the
documents
without
first
having
read
them
at
least
in
part.
What
is
more,
how
could
Marie-Claude
Tremblay
have
explained
the
content
of
the
documents
submitted
to
the
defendant,
as
he
claims,
if
she
had
not
read
them
herself?
Their
explanation
of
the
reason
for
the
meeting
of
June
17,
1987,
which
they
claim
concerned
a
missing
affidavit,
was
not
only
contradicted
by
the
officer
Pierre
Girard,
but
was
in
no
way
supported
by
the
testimony
of
the
accountant
Michel
Tremblay,
although
the
defendant's
daughter
insisted
that
she
had
in
fact
brought
it
to
his
attention.
Moreover,
I
find
it
unrealistic
that
the
defendant
only
remained
five
minutes
with
a
representative
from
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
who
got
him
to
sign
documents
entailing
his
personal
liability
to
pay
so
large
an
amount.
I
find
it
much
more
plausible
that
the
defendant
agreed
to
sign
the
documents
in
question
with
full
knowledge
of
the
facts
so
as,
as
I
said
above,
not
to
jeopardize
the
financing
of
his
troubled
new
business.
Furthermore,
he
was
the
debtor
company's
director
and
as
such
had
been
made
aware
of
his
responsibility
under
section
227.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(see
Exhibit
P-9,
which
was
also
signed
by
the
defendant).
If
the
accountant's
involvement
was,
in
spite
of
his
offer
of
assistance,
unnecessary
when
Jean-Eudes
Tremblay
and
his
daughter
were
asked
to
sign
the
documents,
it
is
undoubtedly
because
the
defendant
in
fact
believed
that
he
was
going
to
settle
the
debt
in
accordance
with
the
terms
agreed
upon
with
Pierre
Girard:
$7,000
the
following
Monday
(from
funds
invested
in
a
personal
RRSP)
and
the
balance
within
three
months.
When
the
defendant
then
failed
to
obtain
the
desired
financing
for
M.O.C.,
he
decided
not
to
honour
his
per-
sonal
agreement
with
the
plaintiff
and
did
not
consider
it
appropriate
to
discuss
it
with
his
accountant
until
he
had
been
served
with
the
action
in
the
present
case.
I
must
therefore
find,
first,
that
the
plaintiff
did
by
preponderance
of
proof
establish
the
defendant's
personal
agreement
to
pay
it
the
amount
in
capital
and
interest
claimed.
Secondly,
I
am
also
of
the
opinion
that
the
defendant
failed
to
discharge
the
burden
of
proof
consequently
upon
him
to
establish
the
want
of
consent
he
alleged.
As
for
the
issue
of
this
Court's
jurisdiction,
counsel
for
the
defendant
expressly
recognized
it
at
the
beginning
of
his
oral
argument,
so
I
do
not
intend
to
expand
on
this
point.
In
view
of
the
effect
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
it
is
enough
to
refer
to
the
following
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
judgments,
which
seem
to
me
indeed
to
confirm
that
jurisdiction:
Miida
Electronics
v.
Mitsui
O.S.K.
Lines
Ltd.,
[1986]
1
S.C.R.
752;
28
D.L.R.
(4th)
641
(sub
nom.
ITO-International
Terminal
Operators
Ltd.
v.
Miida
Electronics
Ltd.);
R.
v.
Rhine,
[1980]
2
S.C.R.
442;
116
D.L.R.
(3d)
385
(sub
nom.
Rhine
v.
R.;
Prytula
v.
R.).
For
all
these
reasons,
a
judgment
is
rendered
allowing
the
plaintiff's
action
and
ordering
the
defendant
to
pay
it
an
amount
of
$16,590.76
plus
additional
interest
on
$16,590.76
to
be
calculated
at
the
rate
prescribed
from
time
to
time
under
subsections
161(1)
and
(11)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
compounded
daily,
for
the
period
from
February
11,
1989,
to
the
date
of
payment,
with
costs.
Order
granted.
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