Roland
St-Onge:—The
appeals
of
Messrs
Ernest
Hachey
and
Russell
Northrup
came
before
me
on
August
31,
1978,
at
the
City
of
Saint
John,
New
Brunswick
and
were
heard
on
common
evidence.
The
issues
are
first,
whether
the
appellants
transferred
goodwill
to
their
company
when
they
incorporated
the
latter
in
the
month
of
April
1971,
and
second,
whether
the
appellants
received
benefits
from
their
company
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
8(1)
of
the
old
Income
Tax
Act
and
subsection
15(1)
of
the
new
Income
Tax
Act
for
the
1971,
1972
and
1973
taxation
years.
The
appellants
are
professional
engineers
who
have
been
practising
since
1950.
In
August
1970
they
formed
a
partnership
and
eight
months
later,
they
incorporated
a
company
under
the
name
of
Northrup,
Hachey
&
Associates
Ltd
and
transferred
goodwill
to
said
company
for
the
sum
of
$54,000.
Heard
as
witness,
Mr
Hachey
stated
that
the
experience
he
had
and
the
contracts
that
they
were
getting
from
three
levels
of
government
for
the
building
of
bridges
and
schools
were
assets
to
the
company
and,
for
these
reasons,
the
appellant
felt
that
some
goodwill
was
transferable
to
the
company.
Upon
cross-examination,
he
also
stated
that
when
he
left
his
former
employer,
he
had
a
salary
of
$18,000
a
year,
that
the
eight-month
partnership
did
not
necessitate
the
hiring
of
any
employees
and
the
company
was
incorporated
because
they
were
negotiating
substantial
projects.
Mr
Touchie,
a
chartered
accountant,
testified
that
the
partnership
had
a
transferable
goodwill
because
of
the
substantial
project
the
applicants
were
negotiating.
To
appraise
the
goodwill,
he
used
a
net
income
of
the
partnership
being
some
$18,000
and
multiplied
it
by
three
to
arrive
at
the
figure
of
$54,000.
Upon
cross-examination,
he
also
said
that
he
generally
used
a
period
of
five
years
to
appraise
a
business,
and
although
the
partnership
was
in
existence
for
only
eight
months,
this
period
was
sufficient
to
appraise
the
goodwill
because
“it’s
all
he
had
to
use
to
appraise
the
said
goodwill”.
When
Mr
Hachey
asked
him
why
the
company
was
incorporated,
his
answer
was
“to
save
taxes”.
Mr
Moore,
an
employee
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
filed
a
written
appraisal
of
the
goodwill
as
of
April
1,
1971.
According
to
him
the
goodwill
is
personal,
not
commercial,
not
transferable
and
cannot
be
divorced
from
the
individual
who
creates
it.
Counsel
for
respondent
argued
that
the
goodwill
was
personal
and
had
no
commercial
value.
Consequently,
the
money
that
the
appellants
received
in
the
1971,
1972
and
1973
taxation
years
was
considered
as
benefits
from
their
company
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
8(1)
of
the
old
Act
and
subsection
15(1)
of
the
new
Act.
She
referred
the
Board
to
eleven
cases
which
are
listed
below:
H
W
Losey
v
MNR,
[1957]
CTC
146;
57
DTG
1098;
Nelson
T
Adair
v
MNR,
[1962]
CTC
324:
62
DTC
357:
H
E
Croteau
v
MNR,
[1964]
CTC
299;
64
DTC
643;
J
Young
v
MNR,
38
Tax
ABC
73;
65
DTC
243:
R
E
Larsen
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
267;
70
DTC
1171:
W
H
Crandall
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
2289;
74
DTC
1205;
David
S
Thomas
v
MNR,
14
Tax
ABC
97;
75
DTC
37:
W
C
McDonell
v
MNR,
9
Tax
ABC
362:
J
Lecompte
et
al
v
MNR,
[1976]
CTC
2127;
76
DTC
1104:
R
Ducharme
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2562;
78
DTC
1414;
G
H
Couture
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2687;
78
DTC
1511.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
it
is
obvious
that
the
goodwill
in
the
case
at
bar
is
purely
personal
and
has
no
commercial
value.
The
partnership
did
not
have
any
employee
and
did
not
last
long
enough
to
create
a
goodwill
which
could
be
valued.
If
the
appellants
had
disappeared
shortly
after
the
incorporation
of
the
company,
the
goodwill
would
have
disappeared
with
them.
There
is
nothing
in
the
evidence
adduced
to
show
that
the
appellants
had
something
to
transfer
to
the
company
except
their
skill,
which
is
usually
renumerated
by
a
salary.
Herein,
the
goodwill
is
so
personal
and
intangible
that
it
cannot
be
valued
and
the
Board
understands
very
well
why
Mr
Touchie
had
so
much
difficulty
in
trying
to
explain
how
he
had
arrived
at
a
figure
of
$54,000
for
goodwill.
lt
was
much
easier
for
Mr
Moore
to
fix
a
nil
value
figure
since
what
was
transferred
cannot
be
regarded
as
a
commercial
asset.
The
only
thing
that
the
appellants
had
in
1971
was
their
skill.
They
had
no
organization
and,
because
of
their
skill,
they
kept
their
clients
and
this
asset
is
not
transferable
to
a
company—it
belongs
to
the
individual.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.