Roland
St-Onge:—This
appeal
came
before
the
late
A
W
Prociuk,
Esq,
QC,
in
Vancouver,
British
Columbia,
on
April
6,
1978,
and
the
issue
was
the
assessment
of
Mrs
Dorrine
L
Payette
for
her
1973
taxation
year.
The
appellant
apparently
received
some
assets
from
her
husband
at
a
time
the
latter
owed
taxes
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
This
assessment
was
effectuated
in
accordance
with
section
160
of
the
new
Income
Tax
Act.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
agreed
on
the
following
facts:
1.
the
appellant
entered
into
a
marriage
contract
with
her
husband,
Joseph
W
L
Payette,
on
October
15,
1961,
pursuant
to
which
he
became
obligated
to
transfer
certain
assets
to
her;
2.
on
November
11,
1967,
the
appellant’s
husband
registered
the
family
residence
in
the
appellant’s
name
in
Montreal,
Quebec,
in
satisfaction
of
the
obligations
arising
from
the
marriage
contract
contained
in
paragraph
2
of
the
said
contract;
3.
that
the
transfer
of
the
husband’s
equity
in
the
family
residence
to
the
appellant
to
satisfy
the
donation
under
the
marriage
contract
is
a
transfer
of
property
within
the
meaning
of
paragraphs
160(1
)(a)
and
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
4.
the
transfer
took
place
on
November
11,
1967;
5.
the
family
residence
was
not
an
income-producing
property.
Counsel
for
appellant
made
a
motion
so
that
the
appeal
be
allowed
on
the
following
grounds,
based
on
the
decision
in
A
J
Craig
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
2119;
73
DTC
116:
1.
that
the
liability
of
a
transferee
spouse
resulting
from
the
application
of
paragraphs
160(1)(a)
and
(d)
is
limited
to
tax
on
income
from
the
transferred
property
and
since
the
property
in
question
did
not
produce
income,
Mrs
Payette
is
not
liable
for
any
portion
of
her
husband’s
tax;
2.
that
since
the
assessment
of
Mrs
Payette
pursuant
to
subsection
160(2)
was
made
more
than
four
years
after
the
date
the
property
was
transferred,
it
is
statute-barred
by
virtue
of
subsection
152(4).
I
have
read
the
transcript
and
studied
very
carefully
the
written
submissions
prepared
by
both
counsel.
The
Board
is
unable
to
decide
on
the
merits
of
this
appeal
because
there
are
still
too
many
unanswered
questions.
Furthermore,
the
Board
is
convinced
that
section
160
was
enacted
to
prevent
a
taxpayer
from
avoiding
payment
of
tax
for
which
he
may
be
liable
by
transferring
property.
Whether
the
property
in
question
is
income
producing
(apartment
building,
saving
bonds)
or
not
(a
residence,
a
car)
is
immaterial
because
the
purport
of
the
section
is
to
prevent
transfer
of
property
by
a
taxpayer
who
wants
to
avoid
payment
of
the
tax.
The
fact
that
the
Minister
“may
at
any
time
assess
a
transferee
in
respect
of
any
amount
payable
by
virtue
of
this
section’’
precludes
any
contention
by
the
appellant
that
the
Minister’s
assessment
is
statute-barred.
Since
the
appellant’s
assessment
under
review
is
the
Original
assessment,
the
four-year
limitation
period
imposed
by
subsection
152(4)
which
relates
to
the
reassessment
or
additional
assessment
has
no
application.
The
Board
agrees
with
most
of
the
submissions
presented
by
the
respondent.
Consequently
this
Motion
is
denied
and
the
question
of
quantum
raised
during
the
hearing
is
to
be
settled
by
the
parties.
If
this
is
not
done
before
December
11,
1978,
this
case
will
be
heard
during
my
December
sittings
in
Vancouver,
British
Columbia.
Appeal
dismissed.