M
J
Bonner:—The
sole
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
the
profit
realized
by
the
appellant
on
the
sale
of
two
farms
located
approximately
twenty-five
miles
south
of
the
City
of
Winnipeg
is
a
profit
on
revenue
or
on
Capital
account.
The
sole
beneficial
shareholder
and
directing
mind
and
will
of
the
appellant
company
is
Morton
Nemy,
a
Winnipeg
lawyer.
Mr
Nemy’s
practice
is
concentrated
mainly
in
the
fields
of
real
estate,
wills
and
trusts.
Before
1973
Mr
Nemy
had
acted
for
lenders
to
farmers
and
he
had
become
familiar
with
the
business
of
farming.
The
appellant
company
was
incorporated
by
Mr
Nemy
to
hold
his
personal
investment
assets,
including
mortgages
and
farmland.
In
1974,
before
the
acquisition
of
the
farms
in
question
in
this
appeal,
the
appellant
owned
two
other
farms
and
it
has
since
acquired
still
another.
farm.
The
appellant’s
farms
are
rented
out
on
a
cash-rental
basis.
Apparently
the
appellant
has
experimented
with
rentals
on
a
crop-sharing
basis
and
found
them
unsuited
to
its
needs.
In
1973
Mr
Nemy
commenced
to
act
for
a
number
of
European
investors
in
connection
with
the
purchases
by
them
of
Manitoba
farmland.
He
was
introduced
to
the
investors
by
Roland
Richter,
a
German
real
estate
agent.
Typically
the
investors
distrusted
debt
instruments
because
of
concern
with
the
incursions
which
inflation
might
be
expected
to
make
in
their
capital.
They
therefore
sought
to
buy
land.
They
were
content
to
accept
lower
rates
of
return
on
land
in
return
for
security
of
capital.
They
purchased
for
the
long-term
and
seldom
sold.
Mr
Richter
was
successful
in
finding
ever-increasing
numbers
of
such
investors
and
in
interesting
them
in
the
purchase
of
Manitoba
farmland.
Mr
Nemy’s
practice
in
connection
with
these
purchases
grew
quickly
and
substantially.
Before
long
Mr
Richter
was
permitted
to
use
space
in
Mr
Nemy’s
suite
of
offices.
The
influx
of
foreign
buyers
was
observed
with
interest
and
some
reservations
by
the
Manitoba
farming
community.
At
least
initially
farmers
were
concerned
with
the
question
of
whether
foreigners
who
had
entered
into
agreements
of
purchase
and
sale
would
fulfill
their
obligations
under
the
agreements
and
complete
the
transactions.
Over
a
period,
however,
it
became
fairly
well
known
that
a
farmer
interested
in
selling
his
land
might
well
find
a
purchaser
if
he
contacted
either
Mr
Nemy
or
Mr
Richter.
Early
in
1974
Mr
Richter
decided
to
commence
farming
on
his
own
account.
By
agreement
made
February
27,
1974,
Mr
Richter
agreed
to
purchsae
a
farm
from
George
Boaler.
The
total
price
was
$162,400.
A
deposit
of
$1,000
was
paid
upon
the
signing
of
the
agreement.
A
further
cash
payment
of
$80,200
was
due
April
20,
1974,
the
date
set
for
closing.
The
balance
of
the
purchase
price,
$81,200,
was
to
be
secured
by
mortgage
and
was
payable
in
three
annual
instalments
of
$27,066.67
each
with
interest
at
eight
%.
The
first
payment
of
principal
and
interest
was
due
on
May
1,
1975.
On
March
8,
1974,
Mr
Richter
entered
into
an
agreement
to
buy
from
Alex
Christiuk
a
farm
located
adjacent
to
the
Boaler
farm.
The
purchase
price
was
$115,000.
A
deposit
of
$2,000
was
paid
on
signing
the
agreement.
A
further
cash
payment
of
$63,000
was
due
on
closing,
May
1,
1974,
and
the
remainder,
$50,000,
was
to
be
secured
by
mortgage
back
to
the
vendor.
That
mortgage
was
repayable
in
five
equal
annual
instalments
of
$10,000
plus
interest,
such
instalments
to
commence
May
1,
1975.
Mr
Nemy
understood
that
Mr
Richter
had
arranged
lines
of
credit
with
his
bank,
not
only
for
the
money
which
he
required
to
purchase
machinery
and
seed,
but
also
to
pay
the
balances
due
on
the
closing
of
the
Christiuk
and
Boaler
purchases.
However,
shortly
before
closing
it
was
discovered
that
Mr
Richter’s
bank
manager,
who
approved
the
loans,
was
unable
to
secure
the
requisite
further
approval
from
his
superiors
for
loans
of
that
size.
Mr
Richter
was
told
that
the
funds
required
to
complete
the
land
purchases
would
be
unavailable.
Mr
Nemy
regarded
the
prospect
of
default
on
the
land
purchases
with
some
dismay.
He
felt
that
word
of
default
would
spread
within
the
farming
community
and
adversely
affect
his
growing
land-purchase
legal
practice.
Mr
Richter
had
already
bought
seed
and
machinery.
He
asked
Mr
Nemy
whether
the
latter
would
take
over
the
purchases
and
lease
the
farms
to
him.
Mr
Nemy
testified
that
he
was
persuaded
that
the
views
of
his
European
clients
as
to
the
wisdom
of
investing
in
land
were
correct
and
thus
that
the
land
would
be
a
valuable
asset.
Accordingly,
he
explored
the
possibility
of
purchasing.
Mr
Nemy
discussed
the
possibility
with
his
wife
and
his
bank
manager.
He
then
took
steps
to
take
over
the
purchases
of
the
farms.
Following
advice
from
the
bank
manager,
savings
bonds
belonging
to
Mrs
Nemy
and
some
held
in
trust
by
Mr
Nemy
for
his
children
were
cashed,
thus
raising
a
total
of
$50,000.
Mrs
Nemy’s
savings
account
was
the
source
of
the
further
$10,000.
That
$60,000
represented
all
the
liquil
resources
of
the
Nemy
family.
It
was
used
together
with
a
bank
loan
to
pay
the
balances
due
on
the
closing
of
the
two
purchases.
Mr
Nemy
stated
he
anticipated
that,
initially
at
least,
annual
payments
would
exceed
revenues
by
approximately
$23,000
per
annum,
but
he
expected
that
the
appellant
would
be
able
to
meet
the
deficiency
out
of
revenues
from
other
sources.
The
purchases
were
closed
early
in
May
of
1974.
On
May
14,
1974,
the
appellant
leased
the
farms
to
Mr
Richter
for
a
term
of
one
year
at
an
annual
rental
of
approximately
$27,000
payable
half
on
June
1,
1974,
and
half
on
December
1,
1974.
The
June
1st
instalment
of
rent
was
not
paid
on
time.
Mr
Nemy
was
not
prepared
to
evict
Mr
Richter
for
non-payment
or
to
“get
tough”
with
him
because
that
would
destroy
a
lucrative
business
relationship.
Another
German
real
estate
agent
named
Poll
was
aware
of
Mr
Richter’s
default
and
he
approached
Mr
Nemy
to
determine
whether
the
appellant
would
sell
the
two
farms
to
a
group
of
German
investors
represented
by
a
Dr
Wilhelm
Schuler.
Apparently
Mr
Nemy
knew
Dr
Schuler,
having
acted
for
him
in
the
past.
Mr
Nemy
stated
in
evidence
that
despite
a
potential
for
large
profit
he
had
never
bought
from
farmers
and
sold
to
Europeans
because
he
felt
that
a
conflict
of
interest
might
arise.
In
this
case
Mr
Nemy
wanted
to
ensure
that
Dr
Schuler,
as
a
former
client,
was
fully
informed
as
to
his
interest
in
the
appellant,
past
and
present
circumstances
(including
default
under
the
lease)
and
particulars
of
the
purchases
by
the
appellant
including,
price
paid.
Apparently
Mr
Nemy
directed
Mr
Poll
to
fully
inform
Dr
Schuler.
An
oral
agreement
to
sell
to
Dr
Schuler
was
reached
sometime
before
June
28,
1974.
On
that
day
the
appellant
executed
a
written
offer
to
sell
the
two
farms
to
Dr
Schuler
at
a
price
of
$383,157.60.
Acceptance
of
that
offer
was
dated
July
12,
1974.
On
July
19,
1974,
Mr
Richter
was
killed
in
an
accident
on
the
farm.
The
rent
was
not
paid
until
February
of
1975.
Mr
Nemy
testified
that
the
appellant
purchased
on
the
basis
of
three
factors:
annual
return,
potential
appreciation
and
avoidance
of
adverse
publicity.
The
appellant
sold,
he
said,
because
the
failure
of
Mr
Richter
to
pay
the
June
1st
rent
led
Mr
Nemy
to
conclude
that
he
had
“bitten
off
too
much”..
I
have
no
doubt
when
the
farms
were
bought
Mr
Nemy
contemplated
as
a
possibility
the
retention
of
the
farms
as
investments.
The
farms,
if
rented
to
a
tenant
capable
of
fulfilling
his
covenants
under
the
lease,
were
well
able
to
generate
a
flow
of
investment
income,
and
thus,
they
were
not
property
incapable
of
being
the
subject
of
an
investment.
The
default
in
meeting
the
June
1st
rent
payments
was
portrayed
as
an
event
which
clearly
brought
home
to
Mr
Nemy
the
fact
that
the
appellant’s
ability
to
meet
its
obligations
under
the
mortgages
and
to
keep
the
farms
was
dependent
on
an
uninterrupted
flow
of
rental
revenue.
However,
both
the
likelihood
of
such
default
and
its
consequence,
resale,
were
apparent
from
the
outset.
It
was
apparent
that
Mr
Richter
could
not
have
looked
to
the
farms
as
a
source
of
revenue
to
meet
the
first
rental
payment.
By
that
time
the
crop
had
just
been
planted.
Mr
Richter’s
financial
position
was,
from
the
time
the
appellant
first
considered
the
purchase
of
the
farms,
patently
shaky.
Mr
Nemy
was
not
prepared
to
take
any
of
the
steps
open
to
him
as
a
result
of
the
default
in
the
payment
of
rent.
The
appellant
was,
on
Mr
Nemy’s
admission,
able
to
meet
an
annual
revenue
shortfall
of
only
$23,000.
It
therefore
did
not
seem
logical
to
me
that
Mr
Richter’s
failure
to
pay
the
June
1st
rent
was
an
event
which
revealed
to
Mr
Nemy
for
the
first
time
the
fact
that
the
appellant
might
be
hard-pressed
to
keep
the
farms.
In
a
case
such
as
this
a
rapid
turnover
of
property
at
a
profit
is
a
circumstance
which,
unless
explained,
can
lead
to
an
inference
that
trading
in
the
property
was
intended
from
the
outset.
Factors
other
than
those
set
out
above
lead
me
to
doubt
the
explanation
that
the
default
in
the
payment
of
rent
led
to
the
early
sale.
Evidence
was
given
by
Michael
Cudjoe,
a
Revenue
Canada
assessor,
of
interviews
with
Mr
Nemy
which
took
place
at
a
time
before
the
making
of
the
assessment
in
issue.
Initially,
according
to
Mr
Cudjoe,
Mr
Nemy
stated
that
the
decision
to
sell
the
farms
was
made
because
the
tenant,
Mr
Richter,
had
died.
A
further
interview
took
place
following
discovery
by
Mr
Cudjoe
of
the
fact
that
the
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
between
the
appellant
and
Dr
Schuler
preceded
the
death.
In
a
subsequent
interview,
according
to
Mr
Cudjoe,
Mr
Nemy
stated
that
the
property
was
sold
because
Mr
Richter
had
difficulty
paying
the
rent
and
also
because
there
were
problems
getting
the
land
drained
properly.
Mr
Nemy
was
cross-examined
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
on
statements
made
to
Mr
Cudjoe.
His
recollection
of
statements
made
by
him
at
the
meeting
did
not
appear
to
be
particularly
clear.
He
recalled
discussing
drainage,
but
not
drainage
problems
particular
to
the
land
in
question.
When
asked
whether
he
had
indicated
to
Mr
Cudjoe
that
the
death
of
Mr
Richter
was
a
factor
leading
to
the
sale
he
responded
that
the
death
took
place
on
July
19
and
the
sale
took
place
before
then.
I
am
satisfied
that
Mr
Nemy
offered
Mr
Cudjoe,
as
reasons
for
the
sale,
explanations
which
were
not
advanced
at
the
hearing.
The
appellant,
in
its
notice
of
objection
dated
March
22,
1977,
and
signed
by
Mr
Nemy,
stated:
Capital
gain
on
disposal
of
farm
property
which
was
not
suitable
for
company
operations
was
reported
for
the
fiscal
year
ended
December
31,
1974.
When
this
statement
was
put
to
Mr
Nemy
on
cross-examination
he
simply
commented
that
the
notice
of
objection
was
prepared
by
his
accountant.
The
statement
in
the
notice
of
objection
could
conceivably
be
regarded
as
enigmatic,
but
no
attempt
was
made
by
Mr
Nemy
to
explain
it.
Having
considered,
as
carefully
as
I
can,
the
evidence
of
both
Mr
Nemy
and
Mr
Cudjoe
and
their
demeanor
when
giving
evidence
I
have
concluded
that
Mr
Nemy
was
not
entirely
forthright,
at
least
in
his
explanation
of
the
circumstances
leading
to
the
decision
to
sell.
It
appears
to
me
that
the
appellant
bought
the
farms
in
circumstances
in
which
it
is
impossible
to
find
any
clear
dedication
of
them
to
investment
account.
This
conclusion
flows
not
only
from
the
bare
fact
of
a
subsequent
sale
not
explained
by
acceptable
evidence,
but
also
from
the
fact
that
the
sale
of
the
farms
was
negotiated
without
hesitation
well
before
the
first
payments
on
the
mortgage
were
due
and
well
before
the
over-extended
Mr
Richter
could
have
been
expected
to
derive
any
revenue
from
the
operation
of
the
farms.
Mr
Nemy
disavowed
any
intention
to
speculate
by
buying
farms
and
selling
them
to
foreign
investors.
He
stated
that
although
he
might
have
made
a
fortune
doing
so
it
would
have
created
a
conflict
of
interest.
There
was
no
evidence
that
all
foreign
investors
were
clients
of
Mr
Nemy,
and
certainly
foreign
investors
did
not
form
all
of
the
potential
purchasers
of
Manitoba
farmland.
In
any
case,
Mr
Nemy
did
in
fact
sell
to
a
former
cilent
(after
quite
properly
making
full
disclosure).
Between
September
of
1973
and
May
of
1974
Mr
Nemy
closed
forty-five
“foreign
transactions”
involving
75,000
acres
of
land.
The
market
was
clearly
visible.
In
Paul
Racine,
Amédée
Demers
and
François
Nolin
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
150;
65
DTC
5098,
Noël,
J
described
the
doctrine
of
secondary
intent
at
159
[5103]
as
follows:
In
examining
this
question
whether
the
appellants
had,
at
the
time
of
the
purchase,
what
has
sometimes
been
called
a
“secondary
intention”
of
reselling
the
commercial
enterprise
if
circumstances
made
that
desirable,
it
is
important
to
consider
what
this
idea
involves.
It
is
not,
in
fact,
sufficient
to
find
merely
that
if
a
purchaser
had
stopped
to
think
at
the
moment
of
the
purchase,
he
would
be
obliged
to
admit
that
if
at
the
conclusion
of
the
purchase
an
attractive
offer
were
made
to
him
he
would
resell
it,
for
every
person
buying
a
house
for
his
family,
a
painting
for
his
house,
machinery
for
his
business
or
a
building
for
his
factory
would
be
obliged
to
admit,
f
this
person
were
honest
and
if
the
transaction
were
not
based
exclusively
on
a
sentimental
attachment,
that
if
he
were
offered
a
sufficiently
high
price
a
moment
after
the
purchase,
he
would
resell.
Thus,
it
appears
that
the
fact
alone
that
a
person
buying
a
property
with
the
aim
of
using
it
as
capital
could
be
induced
to
resell
it
if
a
sufficiently
high
price
were
offered
to
him,
is
not
sufficient
to
change
an
acquisition
of
capital
into
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
In
fact,
this
is
not
what
must
be
understood
by
a
“secondary
intention’’
if
one
wants
to
utilize
this
term.
To
give
to
a
transactions
which
involves
the
acquisition
of
capital
the
double
character
of
also
being
at
the
same
time
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
the
purchaser
must
have
in
his
mind,
at
the
moment
of
the
purchase,
the
possibility
of
reselling
as
an
operating
motivation
for
the
acquisition;
that
is
to
say
that
he
must
have
had
in
mind
that
upon
a
certain
type
of
circumstances
arising
he
had
hopes
of
being
able
to
resell
it
at
a
profit
instead
of
using
the
thing
purchased
for
purposes
of
capital.
Generally
speaking,
a
decision
that
such
a
motivation
exists
will
have
to
be
based
on
inferences
flowing
from
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction
rather
than
on
direct
evidence
of
what
the
purchaser
had
in
mind.
The
appellant
has
not
established
that
its
sole
intention
at
the
time
of
the
purchase
of
the
farms
was
to
hold
them
as
investments.
On
the
contrary
the
evidence
leads
irresistibly
to
the
conclusion
that
the
appellant,
in
buying
the
farms,
did
so
with
the
secondary
intention
of
reselling
them
at
a
profit.
The
appeal
will
therefore
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.